Politics of Ethnic Assertion in South East Asia

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There are ten countries in South East Asia, namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Some of them are very prosperous and have nearly 8 to 9 percent annual rate of growth. Singapore has NIE (Newly Industrialised Economy) status and Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia are rapidly moving in that direction. Situated between Indic and Sinic civilisations, politically none of them are fundamentalist. They have evolved their social and political institutions in such a way, which can reflect their traditional customs and moorings. Located in the middle of East Asia and South Pacific and endowed with tremendous potentials to be "Asian tigers", this area is considered very important in any strategic calculations of the Asia-Pacific. In order to examine their politics, it is imperative to understand their ethnicity as reflected through the behaviour of these states.

Ethnic identity

Ethnic groups always try to protect their identities. If they are in a dominant position in a given society, their task is not difficult. But if they are in a minority, they have to face problems in retaining their separate cultural identities. It becomes more difficult if the size of the state is small and an ethnic group adversial. Most of the states in Southeast Asia, except Indonesia, are territorially small. Therefore, the questions of ethnic and cultural identities are very intense.

Southeast Asian countries became independent after 1945, except Thailand, which was never colonised. Their existing boundaries were drawn by the colonial masters. Most of the states are multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-religious. Their sense of common nationalism developed during their fight against the western colonial masters and the Japanese invaders. After gaining independence, they tried to promote their sense of nationalism based on culture, literature and epics of the dominant ethnic groups. National symbols and anthem that they accepted mostly were related to dominant ethnic groups.

Dominant ethnic groups began to assert their perception very effectively in the initial stage of their nation building. As the government is run by the support of the dominant ethnic groups, no ruler whether charismatic or otherwise could refuse to obey assertion by the dominant groups over other ethnic groups. The minority ethnic groups, interested in preserving their distinct identity, thus suffered setbacks, and subsequently developed some grievances. During the colonial period, they had enjoyed equal privileges and they were considered important tools to neutralise the demands of the dominant ethnic groups or in the policy of "divide and rule". When the indigenous rulers took over, they gave more importance to national integration and thus evolved national guidelines to be obeyed universally. As most of the countries in Southeast Asia remained under authoritarian rule for several decades, national guidelines were pursued constantly and rigorously.

Dominant Ethnic Groups

There are four prominent ethnic groups in this region, whose identities have been well established even beyond their borders. The ethnic Malays are dominant in Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines[1] The Philippines is a Christian state, but other countries dominated by the Malays are Islamic. The ethnic Thais are spread into Thailand and also in Laos and parts of Myanmar and Vietnam. The Viets are spread into Vietnam and parts of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. The ethnic Burmans are dominant in Myanmar. Majority of the people in Thailand, Laos and Myanmar are Buddhists. Besides aforementioned four ethnic groups, there are thousands of small ethnic groups in Southeast Asian counties. Some of them have integrated with the mainstream of socio-economic life, but some are still struggling hard to preserve their separate identity, i.e., Moro, Patani, Rohingyas, Hoas, Karen, Shans and Melanesians. Politicisation of the masses in the post-independence era and modern education provokes them to be treated equally with the dominant ethnic groups. If politics is the study of who gets what, when and how, it is pertinent to know what, when and how these ethnic groups are striving to achieve their objectives under the prevailing system.

Hans J. Morgenthau, an eminent Political Scientist, suggests that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure.[2] Thus it is necessary for every party or group to take into account the laws governing the society before launching any movement. Generally, movements without the active support of the majority do not succeed.

A number of minority ethnic groups have resorted to extra-constitutional methods and adopted violent means to attain independence or autonomy. Though they had initial success in some areas, i.e., Mindanao and East Timor, they were overwhelmed by the superior forces of the state subsequently. Now as the pace of development and modernisation has gained momentum in the entire region and as the states are equipped with sophisticated weapons, the insurgents face a dilemma either to surrender or remain isolated. The imperatives of power politics suggest that they should compromise and get away with the share of spoils that the state can offer. The political masters know well that "power is the essence of politics", are unwilling to come forward to accommodate the grievances of the insurgents, because it may complicate their leadership at the helm of affairs. The adverse propaganda against insurgent ethnic groups have been conducted in such a way that the leaders espousing compromise with them would be perceived critically by the media and politicians alike. For instance, U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma (1948-62) wanted to sign an accord with the insurgent ethnic groups, but that proved the major cause of his downfall.

The dominant ethnic groups do display the sense of ethnocentricity on occasions and they have geared their powers to project that distinctive characteristic of their religion, culture and historical personalities that are regarded as the features of their nationalism. For instance, Thailand prefers its ethnic minorities to assume Thai names and observe Buddhist festival as national festivals. Similar is the case with Laos and Myanmar. On the other hand, ethnic Viets have been under the

impact of Confucianism and Buddhism and traits of Sinic culture are ingrained in their character. Their sense of nationalism emerged in course of their war against France, Japan and the United States. Their communist ideology inspired them to go for an egalitarian society and in the process, the business class of Haos suffered. On the other hand, in the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia – Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia – Islamic cultural heroes and religious symbols are considered national symbols. Though Indonesia has no state religion and it believes in secularism, the impact of Islam is omnipotent.

Problems of Minorities

The minority ethnic groups espouse and advocate the inclusion of their cultural symbols in the national category side by side the dominant ethnic groups. They thus voice their concerns and in the process express their own sense of ethnocentricity. The expressions of such ideas are disliked under the existing political system in entire Southeast Asia. Such an attitude is projected against national harmony because this provokes the organised and influential groups of minority ethnic community to oppose the system. The opposition of a section of the minority ethnic groups invites the wrath of the state, which finally leads to omission and commission. The western type parliamentary system is non-existent in Southeast Asia and therefore the channels of grievance redressal are very thin. The minority ethnic groups might like to find a forum to voice their grievances to affect changes in the system, but their options are limited.

The peaceful transformation of a society and government are preconditioned by the following factors:

i)   the ability of public opinion to express itself freely;
ii)   the ability of social and political institutions to absorb the pressure of public opinion; and
iii)   the ability of the state to protect the new status quo against violent change.[3]

There has been widespread censorship of the press irrespective of the fact that they are under communism, dictatorship or democracy. Thus the freedom of speech and expression is extremely limited in all the countries in the region. The ruling elite gives top priority to development and the media is geared to highlight the problems of development and modernisation. They, however try to avoid indulging in political polemics. They believe that if the fruits of development reach to the deprived ones, other rights would automatically follow. They are acquainted with the UN Declaration of Universal Civil and Political Rights and believe in paving the way to that goal through economic development. In the meanwhile the insurgents are increasingly getting isolated and restive. Some of them are engaged in the subversive activities or guerilla war. Therefore, the state perceives them as fifth columns and the insurgents reciprocate in the same fashion. As a result the leadership of the dominant ethnic groups are biased and turn protagonists of strong-arm methods, ushering into untold miseries to innocent people.

It is a reality that some enlightened section of the dominant ethnic groups would like to share power with the minority leaders. They do think in the long-term interests but they cannot ignore the imperatives of power for ones own existence. In the political context, G. Schwarzenberger has rightly observed power, as the capacity to impose ones will on others by reliance on effective sanctions in case of non-compliance. The demonstration of powers of the dominant ethnic groups

over the minority and certain conditions, thus provoke the reactions of the ethnic minorities. In the absence of a proper forum – fully elected legislature, free mass media, and effective political parties- are left with little options, but to indulge in acts of sabotage. In the process, they loose public sympathy and support.

There were thousands of kingdoms, sultanates and principalities before the advent of the colonial rule in Southeast Asia. Colonial masters had distinct language, dress, religion, food habits and cultural ethos. Sri Vijaya and Majapahit rulers of Indonesia were forerunners of Malay identity and culture. Their empire extended widely in Southeast Asia, extending from the tip of Thai border to the peninsular Malaya and various islands of Southeast Asia. Again the Sultanate of Sulu and Patani were great centres of Islamic culture and civilisation in the medieval period. They were prosperous and strong but internecine warfare with the neighbouring states weakened them. When the Spanish colonial rules arrived, Sulu was merged with the Philippines and Patani was divided into two parts-British Malaya and Thailand. As the people of Patani were ruled by two different countries, their movement for nationhood was also diluted. The ethnic Thais and Viets were martial races immigrating from Yunnan to Southeast Asia and they captured the territories of the Khmer kingdom to establish their own empires. They ruled with an iron hand for centuries and dominated the politics of the region. Laos was the vassal state of Thailand for centuries and Thailand and Burma fought wars for 300 years on one pretext or the other.

Thailand has evolved its own sense of nationalism and they do not permit their citizens to speak anything against nation, religion and the king. On the other hand, Indonesia is a believer and practitioner of *Pancasila* principles and nobody is allowed to be critical of those ideologies. Five principles of *Pancasila* are following:

i)   belief in God Almighty
ii)   the principle of just and civilised humanity
iii)   Indonesian unity
iv)   the principle of democracy guided by the wisdom of representatives
v)   principle of social justice[4]

Malaysia, on the other hand, has provided constitutional guarantees to protect the rights of the Bhumiputras that is ethnic Malays. Some important and sensitive posts have been reserved for the people of the dominant ethnic group and Brunei situated along Malaysian borders also upholds the principles of special privileges to the Bhumiputras. Myanmar has also provisions to protect the rights of the ethnic Burmans. In order to prove that point; they have even changed the name of the country- from Burma to Myanmar. This process of Burmanisation of the country (Myanmar) ever since 1962 has antagonised the minority ethnic groups. Likewise, the Philippines attaches great importance to the Christian population of Luzon and has proved unfriendly with the Moro Muslims. The Christians were offered advantages advertently ever since independence and the Moro Muslims were reduced to a minority status in Sulu and Mindanao areas during the regime of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A section of the Moro Muslims began to organise themselves to fight against the state, and in this endeavour they had sympathy and support of their co-religionists initially in the neighbouring countries, but only for a brief period.

In fact, Southeast Asian countries realised that if they encouraged secessionist tendencies of ethnic minority groups, it would rebound and prove counter-productive. Every country has a sizable section of the minority ethnic groups and this factor compelled them to develop common security concerns and subsequently retracted their steps and showed greater understanding of the problems of each other. Such a perception proved conducive to regional solidarity. This feeling of commonality was re-envigorated by the signing of the Treaty of Amity, Cooperation and Friendship in 1976, under the aegis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This agreement paved the way for creation of friendly environment in this region. This also contained effectively any transnational support to terrorist/subversive activities. Later on, the ASEAN countries forged very friendly relations with China in the wake of China's four modernisation drives. Trade and commercial relations with these countries developed so rapidly, that China had to close the chapter on proletarian revolution or communist fraternity. China had the potentials to destabilise or sabotage the political system in the region. However, better trade relations demanded stability and prosperity in Southeast Asia. The Chinese almost forgot their earlier ideological commitment in favour of the realistic benefits. They made considerable investments in the economy of Southeast Asia and it was suitably reciprocated. Now the entire region is booming based on the principles of market economy and free trade.

Thus, the sources of external threats were contained, but they have yet to cope with the internal challenges of nation building and modernisation. The challenges do emanate from the imbalanced relationship in power politics and that is two-edged weapon. The parties or groups in pursuit of power, try to use ethnicity or religion to advance their positions against their adversaries. This has more often been the root cause of the rise of fundamentalist ideas. Though this is a sensitive issue because none of the states in question would admit standing on the fundamentalist course, yet this is an emerging problem of the growing politicisation.

Constitutional Provisions

Here it would be pertinent to analyse the constitutional provisions affecting different sections of population in these countries. Brunei Darrussalam, where 66 per cent of the population are Muslims, 12 percent Buddhists and 9 per cent Christians, has declared Islam as the official religion. Its legislature –33 member Legislative Council- was dissolved in February 1984 and since then Brunei has no legislature. The supreme political powers are vested in the Sultan. Though this country has 25 percent Chinese population; they are classified as non-citizens and are excluded from state benefits. There is ban on alcohol import and Christmas cannot be celebrated publicly. There is a ban on Muslims too-eating in restaurants, because they think that the cooks are non-Muslim invariably. Malay Islam monarchy is a compulsory subject to be taught in the secondary schools.[5] However, all citizens enjoy free medical care and education, government housing loans and full employment. The ethnic Malays have reason to be happy with the system and therefore Brunei National Democratic Party (PKDB) has been unable to find an independent base.

The Indonesian political system is based on *Pancasila*, in which deliberation lead to a consensus. They have a legislature – House of People's Representatives- with elected and nominated members. Though there are 87 percent Muslims and 9 percent Christians, they have offered religious liberty to all. It is an archipelagic country with more than 13,000 islands and has striven

for "unity in diversity". Indonesia, ever since its independence in 1945, has witnessed only two presidents, namely Sukarno and Suharto. It is very difficult to contain the influence of Suharto, who is firmly entrenched in power. Therefore, some religion- based parties are trying to exploit the religious sentiments. An Islamic organisation, Nahdatul Ulama, under the leadership of Abdurrahaman Wahid has become popular in recent years. It advocates constructive role of religion in politics and has been highly critical of the professional politicians.[6] They also express their concern privately that the country's four million ethnic Chinese are getting richer and the indigenous people poorer. The government is seized of the matter. Thus Muhammidiyah Muslim Movement under the leadership of Samsyuddin is getting a tacit support. It advocates bigger share for Indonesia's 164 million Muslims in decision making within Golkar and its influence is growing.

Malaysia, on the other hand, has declared Islam as the official religion as more than half of its population are Muslims. It has a bi-cameral legislature-Senate and House of Representatives and a democratic polity. It has also allowed the emergence of a multi-party system and has charismatic leadership of Mahathir Mohamed, who has a strong mass support. Therefore, it is difficult to oust him from power. Some Islamic organisations, such as Pertai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) is trying to challenge his authority by preaching the role of Islamic religion in the politics of the nation. The political masters are aware of their demands and trying to offer as much advantages to the ethnic Malays as possible. The government is trying to project that the ethnic Malays can fulfil their aspirations under the rule of UMNO led by Mahathir only. Malaysia under Mahathir embarked on 20-year new economic policy during 1970-90 and offered substantial reservations for the Bhumiputras.[7] Though the government tried to improve the economic conditions of the Malays vis-à-vis the Chinese constituting about 37 per cent of the population. However, it could not fulfil the desired objectives. The Chinese population remains affluent and dominant in business and trade.

Singapore, situated in the middle of the Malay world offers an excellent example of inter-ethnic harmony. It has uni-cameral legislative assembly called Parliament. It has 81 members elected by secret ballot with the customary exception of those serving criminal sentences; all citizens over 21 years are eligible to vote. Voting in an election is compulsory. There is a common roll without communal electorates and they have tried to make sure that representatives from all the communities are elected to the parliament. They have also established Presidential Council for minority rights, which is authorised to consider and report on matters affecting persons of any racial or religious community as referred to it by parliament or the government. The Council is authorised to draw attention to any bill or subsidiary legislation, which in its opinion is a differentiating measure. Though overwhelming number of the population are ethnic Chinese, Singapore has four official languages, i.e., Malay, Chinese (Mandarin), Tamil and English. They consider Malay as the national language and English as the language of administration. The system of grievance redressal is effective and the people are generally happy.

Thailand is in the process of democratic experiments. It adopted a new constitution in 1991, which provided for a bi-cameral legislature – 270 member Senate and 360 member House of Representatives – multi-party system and greater avenues for popular participation in decision making. Thailand with more than 47,049,223 Buddhists and 1,869,427 Muslims has declared Bhasa Thai as the official language. It has been a great campaigner of the policy of ethnic

assimilation and it has admirably resolved its disputes with the ethnic Chinese. The latter has been allowed to play their traditional role in business and trade and in the meanwhile the integration through intermarriage and other measures have yielded satisfying results. However, there are some other ethnic groups, which have shown defiance, such as ethnic Malays in the South and ethnic Viets in the Northeast. In fact Thai government insists on adherence to the basic tenets of Thai nationalism- nation, religion and the king. Minority ethnic groups have options either to integrate or remain isolated perpetually.

The Philippines has been witnessing momentous changes ever since the Marcos regime was overthrown Corazon Aquino took over on 25 February 1986. Filipinos adopted a new constitution in 1987 through which a bi-cameral legislature was established – 24-member Senate and 200 member House of Representatives. It has a population of more than 31,169,488 Roman Catholics, 14,33,688 Anglipayans, 15,84,963 Muslims, 33,639 Buddhists, 11,22,999 Protestants, 4,75,407 Iglesia in Cristo and they are scattered in several islands. The government of the Philippines has been facing the problems of national integration and it was therefore that Marcos had proclaimed martial law in 1972.[8] English is the official language. Majority of the population are Christians and are determined to pursue secular polity. However, the system offered more benefits to the Christians compared to the Muslims in the past few decades.

Myanmar has been under authoritarian rule for several decades. In last few years it is facing the threat of insurgency. The problems of national integration are intricate. This country with 68 percent Buddhists tried to promote integration by force, which ultimately proved counter-productive. It has a sizable number of minority ethnic groups, i.e., Shans, Karens and Rohingyas who are organised to offer opposition. Under the leadership of General Ne Win (1962-88) the regime pursued a policy of Burmanisation. The government adopted dictatorial means to subdue the dissenting ethnic leaders and as a result the minorities were persecuted, executed and isolated. The Rohingya Muslims were treated very harshly and their nightmarish trauma compelled them to flee to Bangladesh.

Besides Rohingyas, Karens (Christians) and Shans (Buddhists) also suffered immensely. In fact, they demonstrated that the country belonged to ethnic Burmans only and other ethnic groups in Myanmar could survive only at their mercy. The military usurped the power in the name of Burmans. As a result, there were great upheavals and the resentment grew. When General Saw Maung came to power on 18 September 1988 and State's Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was created to administer the country; Burmese became the official language and remained medium of instruction in all the schools. Though religious freedom and use of English were permitted, no substantial concession was given to attract the support of the minority ethnic groups.[9]

Likewise, Indochinese countries – Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia- have also to grapple with their ethnic problems. The *raison d'etre* of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia is based against ethnic Vietnamese, who migrated to that area in the historical past or in the post-1978 period. In 1975, when Khmer Rouge had come into power, it had pursued anti-Vietnamese policies and had driven out 50,000 ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia. At present when it is out of power and increasingly isolated, its legitimacy is based on rights of Khmers against the Vietnamese. It is willing to drive out Vietnamese population and influence on Cambodia. The ruling coalition of Cambodian

People's Party and Funcinpec, led by Norodom Ranaridh and Hun Sen, however, is trying to offer equal rights to all the ethnic groups.

Vietnam is also a multi-ethnic society comprised of ethnic Viets, Chams, Khmer, Thais, Hoas and tribal people. It has adopted a uni-cameral legislature called National Assembly and has introduced "multi-candidate election system" to encourage popular leaders to participate in the decision making. The Communist Party of Vietnam no longer decides the panel of candidates but it depends on personality and social base of the candidate.

In fact, the Vietnamese abolished private trade in South Vietnam in 1978 and closed 30,000 private shops, which had been allowed to function in the post-unification era. As most of these businesses were run by the ethnic Chinese (Hoas), it affected them exclusively.[10] This development was given an anti-Chinese colour at the cost of Hoas. The Chinese government expressed solidarity with the Hoas and hostility broke out against Vietnam. It repeatedly talked of war and naturally Sino-Vietnam relations soured. Faced with difficulties in leading a normal life, Hoas started deserting their homes in boats and rafts and thereby known as 'boat people". Their number increased in thousands during 1978-81 and their plight shook the conscience of the civilised world. As a result, the international community criticised Vietnam and it had a desirable impact. Vietnam retraced its steps and helped the rehabilitation of the Hoas subsequently, but this event inflicted great harms to the cause of inter-ethnic solidarity, which had developed in course of their wars against the external invaders.

Besides Hoas, Moro Muslims have also suffered due to their assertive attitude in the Philippines. Moros demanded independence or autonomy for themselves based on distinct history, cultural identity, religion and geography.[11] They fought fierce wars to attain their objectives and finally the Aquino government agreed to grant limited autonomy through the formation of Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in July 1988. Four provinces out of 13 in Mindanao – Lanao del Sur, Magindanao, Sulu and Tawi – approved the proposal and thereafter the elections to appoint the Governor and other office bearers of ARMM was also held. The democratic leaders in the Philippines are trying to forget the legacies of the Marcos era and Moros are being encouraged to participate in decision making. Thus the resolution of the Moro problem is an exemplary model, which may be applied for conflict resolution of ethnic problems in other parts of Southeast Asia.

The most difficult and complicated example of ethnic assertion and dispute in entire Southeast Asia can be traced in East Timor, formerly a Portuguese colony and now the 27th province of Indonesia. This problem is more or less like Kashmir, and equally internationalised. The indigenous population are Christians of Melanesian descent. They are also known as Topasses in Indonesia. They seek autonomy on the ground that they are different from the Malay Muslims and also because they were subjected to a different colonial master than other parts of Indonesian archipelago.[12] They do enjoy the traditional support, of Portugal in particular, and has posed problems to the Indonesian government to integrate. The UN is seized of the matter and it has not legitimated integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Insurgency activities in East Timor are accelerated by an organisation called Fretilin, and innocent people are the victims of internecine warfare.

Indonesia claims East Timor because it was a part of Indonesia before the advent of the European colonial rulers. When it got independence from the Dutch rule, East Timor like Goa (India) remained the only area outside its control. It was clearly in possession of Western half of Timor and the surrounding areas of East Timor. It was expected of Portugal to concede the claims of Indonesia as France did in case of Pondicherry and Mahe vis-à-vis India. The Portuguese proved different. India too had to fight to integrate Goa, Daman and Diu. Similarly, Indonesia was compelled to fight and integrate East Timor. But the Portuguese succeeded in internationalising the issue and effectively created international opinion against Indonesia's integration of East Timor. However, the situation is transforming now and efforts are made to resolve the dispute amicably.

Conclusions

To conclude, it can be stated that the minority ethnic groups are concerned about preserving their distinct identity and cultural symbols side by side the majority community. Some ethnic groups, such as Moro, Patani and Rohingyas emphasise the importance of their religion (Islam) above all other things, but Timorese attach prime importance to ethnicity to prove their distinctiveness. It is necessary for the dominant community to be considerate and sympathetic to understand the sentiments of the minority to have a fruitful dialogue. The minority ethnic groups would prefer significant changes in the academic curriculum to accommodate knowledge about their religion and cultural identity at part with that of the dominant groups. They would like shares in the civil service and overall decision making. Above all confidence building measures are sufficiently required to inspire them to participate in nation building and modernisation.

Problem of ethnic assertion (group solidarity in conflict or cooperation) is as old as human civilisation. Ethnicity was one of the potent instruments to strengthen the position of political masters in their societies. Rulers used to evolve policies to boost the morale of their followers through ethnic appeals and the chiefs were regarded as the custodian of ethnic rights. Gradually ethnicity did not remain the reserved prerogative of the rulers, but it was sought to be used politically by the people. This was also used against the rulers and such a trend was disliked. This gave birth to power struggle. Under the circumstances if ethnic assertion took place through the political rulers astutely, it was welcomed by the majority. If it was attempted by the minority against the state, it was condemned as sabotage and invited ruthless use of force. Hence thesis and anti-thesis between dominant and dominated ethnic groups originated. Thus the competition for assertion and counter-assertion continued.

The important point is that if the feeling of nationalism is high, the capacity of understanding and resilience can develop under than parameter. On the other hand, if the activities of any ethnic group is directed against the existence of the state without caring for the opinion of the majority, it would be checkmated by the superior force of the state.

There is an increasing urge for democratic government and polity in the entire Southeast Asian region. The various regimes are trying to fulfil the aspiration of all section of the people and have been evolving innovative methods of development. The cooperation with the system at this stage in the long run would definitely help the divergent ethnic groups to retain their cultural identity and

due assertion in future. The politics of ethnic assertion is an eternal phenomenon and should be viewed not in a negative but in a positive and constructive way.

Endnotes

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8. For further details, see, J. Bresnan, ed., *Crisis in the Philippines: the Marcos Era and Beyond,* Princeton University Press, 1986.

9. For Burmese Politics, See, B. Lintner, *Outrage: Burma's struggle for Democracy*, London 1990 and J. Silverstein, *Burmese Politics: the Dilemma of National Unity*, Rutgers University Press, 1980.

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12. For a comprehensive analysis of this aspect, see, Jill Jollife, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism,* St. Lucia, 1978