Concept of Security: A Theoretical Analysis

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The evolution of the concept of 'nation-state' in Europe in the 17th Century led to the development of concept of security. However, the genealogy of the concept of security can be traced back to the ideas of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, who advocated the "Social Contract Theory" in order to root out the perceived insecurities prevailing in the 'State of Nature'. In contemporary times, the concept of national security has become relevant.

However, the concerns with the security of the estates and states and relations among them led to the Treaty of Augsburg (September 25, 1555) and Treaty of Westphalia (October 24, 1648A.D.). As the state system evolved in Europe and rest of the world, the concept of state or national security assumed greater significance. Right since its inception, the idea of national security was essentially understood in terms of military security. However, the concept of security has faced real challenges from the changing political and security scenarios in the world today. In the post-Cold War period, for example, the integration of states in the West (like European Union-EU), as well as the disintegration and fragmentation of states (like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia), have led to a 'security dilemma' among the states. The security scenario in the contemporary world is further complicated by several hypotheses emanating from the West, like *End of Ideology* (Daniel Bell)*, End of History* (Francis Fukuyama) and *Clash of Civilizations* (Samuel P. Huntington).[1]

In fact, in the face of challenges, the concept of security has undergone a sea-change over the last few decades. The field of security studies has assumed primacy within the broader arena of International Relations.

What, then, are the nature of changes in the concept of security? In classical terms, security primarily means to defend and safeguard the territorial integrity and autonomy of the nation, the domestic political order encompassing both the polity and the economy, essentially from other states. In other words, security envisages protection and welfare of the state from other neighbouring states. But the process of globalisation has made the whole world a 'global village'. States and communities have come together to promote their shared interests either forgetting or ignoring their differences. Thus in such an interdependent world, the unidimensional conception of security (as understood in military terms), has given way to a multidimensional concept of security, including within its fold social, economic, political and cultural security (advocated by Mc Namara, Buzan, et al.). The scope of the studies on security

has therefore expanded with the emergence of diverse concepts, like, cooperative security and comprehensive security.

The first section of the paper deals with the meaning of security. The second section, analyses the concept of security from the two dominant schools of thought in IR theory— realism/neo-realism, liberalism and neo-liberalism. The third section, discusses the various newly emerging dimensions of security, like common security, comprehensive security, cooperat-ive security, human security, societal security and globalist views of international security. And lastly, the fourth section explores the possibility of bringing different approaches together and developing an unified approach to understand the security problem.

[I]

Concept of Security: An Overview

A state's security is essentially threatened by two kinds of threats— internal and external. While internal threats vary from country to country, external threats are countered through strengthening of defence preparedness. Strategic analysts generally hold the view that a nation's primary objective is to maintain its territorial and political integrity. Conceptualising states as entities formed to provide protection against external assault, they see defence and security as the most basic goals that governments provide.[2] The conventional studies on security emphasised on the defence capabilities of a country to defend itself from territorial aggression such as extra-regional threats, global wars and violence. Conventionally, the concept of national security is defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats. Walter Lippmann, the noted American columnist has defined security in the following terms : "A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war".[3]

Arnold Wolfers put the argument in a little different way. He said, "Security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked".[4] Thus, national security is the permanent and continuing guarantee provided by the state to ensure the safety of its subjects and their properties against an attack, danger or harm from any quarter, whether it is internal or external. According to Frank Traeger and Frank N. Simonie, national security "is that part of government policy", which has "as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries"[5]. John Hertz has emphasised that the achievement and maintenance of national security is traditionally the chief external function of the state.[6]

However, total security has rarely been possible even for the only superpower in a uni-polar world (primarily from a political perspective). Security, therefore, is not a uni-dimensional concept, nor is the security phenomenon a uni-linear phenomenon. Security has many dimensions and any serious effort aimed at conceptualising security has to take into account its multi-dimensional nature.

In fact, when we talk about ensuring the security of a state we take into account the political, economic, commercial, cultural, technological and defence dimensions and aim at a state of socio-economic and political stability at the international level which will contribute to the security of all states. Security therefore, implies a state tranquility in matters relating to inter-state affairs. Such a view holds that national security is not an objective fact, but a subjective feeling which gives confidence that disaster of war and vagaries of international political life can be avoided or absorbed so that nation and its institution can exist in a fundamentally unimpaired fashion.

Whatever may be the precise meaning of the term security, howsoever ideal may be the conditions within which the states operates, no nation feels confident about its security. In today's complex and interdependent world, threats to national security could stem from a variety of factors which include external support to secessionist and insurgent movements, intervention in the internal affairs of a nation and the manipulation of economic policies, transgressions in territorial waters and the extended economic zone, the denial and withholding of resources, and the manipulation of neighbouring countries against the interests of a particular nation. There is also the possibility of partial occupation of territory combined with some, or all of the above kinds of security challenges.[7]

There are other challenges to the very idea of an universal concept of security. Is security for a developed country like US quite the same as security for an underdeveloped country, like India or Rwanda? Since each nation's security is determined by its national interest, and national interest is determined in consonance with the state of socio-economic and political development of a country, therefore, it is obvious that the idea of security for a developed country is not the same   as   that   for an underdeveloped one. The demonstration of the will of the US to launch pre-emptive attacks (in the case of the continuing war on terror) redefines, in a way, the concept of security for less powerful states, who are forced to keep the interests of the powerful always in mind while shaping their security policies. At another level, after the attack on the twin towers on September 11, 2001, one has to underline the sense of insecurity of the most powerful state in the world today, which in spite of its superior military might is getting increasingly aware of the dangerous potential of the non-state or trans-state actors in the world today.

[II]

Theoretical Perspectives

While the conventional/classical notions of security as advocated by the realists and neo-realists primarily emphasise on a state-centered concept of security, the focus of liberalism/neo-liberalism is on the security of the individual. The proponents of Realist theory have high regard for the values of national security and state survival. The realists assume that sovereign states work within an atmosphere of anarchy at the international level. Realism presents the picture of a conflictual international relations guided by power politics. Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the prominent advocates of realist theory, defines national interest in terms of power. As *Morgenthau* aptly observed, "Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate

aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action".[8]

The realists identify different elements of power, like economic power, resources, technology, etc. However, the most important power of the state is military power. This approach is based on the premise that states are engaged with each other in a struggle for power in order to protect their security. And, in order to protect their security, they employ various means, like balance of power, deterrence, etc.

The realist/neo-realist school of thought, essentially looked at security as the negation of war, i.e., '*negative peace*'. The realists, including the structural realists (like Morgenthau and Rousseau), historical or practical realists (like Machiavelli and Carr) and the liberal realists (like Thomas Hobbes and Hedley Bull) all believed that in international relations struggle for power was going on between the states and hence there was little chance of a permanent peace. The state was considered as the principal actor in international relations. The realist approach primarily focused on three S's– *Statism, Survival and Self-help*.

The historical realists believed that for political survival, any type of action could be taken. However, the structural realists looked at "Realism" as a permanent condition of conflict or the preparation for future conflict.[9] There are two types of structural realism— those "who emphasize human nature is the structure (structural realism-I) and those who believe that anarchy is the structure which shapes and shoves the behaviour of states (structural realism-II)".[10] On the other hand, Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt argued that liberal realism rejects the pessimistic picture of historical and structural realists, believing that the state of war can be mitigated by the management of power by the leading states in the system and the development of practices such as diplomacy and customary international law.[11]

Samuel P. Huntington, a realist scholar in his classical thesis '*Clash of Civilizations*' has essentially argued that in the future, the world will witness not economic or ideological conflicts, but cultural conflicts. The thesis of Huntington, considered the emergence of positive peace— based on legitimacy and authority rather than force— improbable because notions of what is legitimate vary from one civilization to another and a cross-cultural consensus on the question is impossible. This thesis fears the likelihood of a destabilised world in upheaval and disorder, for the West no longer possesses material and civilizational supremacy to hold it together.[12]

The neo-realists, on the other hand, believe that international institutions do not have any important role to play in the prevention of war. The neo-realists are primarily concerned with issues of power and survival. In Neo-Realism, the central analytical focus is the structure of the system, especially the relative distribution of power. Since the structures are more or less determined actions, structures compel the actors to act in certain ways.[13] Some of the contemporary neo-realists are Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer.

Kenneth Waltz in his pioneering work, *Theory of International Politics*, has argued that International politics was not unique because of the prevalence of war and conflict, since this was also there in domestic politics. The key difference between domestic and international orders lies in their structure. In the domestic polity, citizens do not have to defend themselves. In the

international system, there is no higher authority to prevent and counter the use of force. Security can therefore only be realised through self-help. In an anarchic structure, 'self help is necessarily the principle of action.' But in the course of providing for one's own security, the state in question automatically fuels the insecurity of other states.[14]

Another well known neo-realist scholar, John Mearsheimer building upon the basic realist premises, argued that after the Second World War, the bipolar system during the cold war have led to a 'long peace' and that the disintegration of the Soviet Union have undermined this peace. Moreover, the disintegration of Soviet Union would result in resurgence of ethnic conflicts in that region.[15]

Liberal and Neo-Liberal Perspectives

From the sixteenth century onwards, liberal scholars have made various plans for peace. However, liberals differ on some questions like, whether peace is the ultimate goal of world politics and whether collective security or world government can ensure peace at the international level. As described earlier, we need to distinguish between three different strands of liberalism – liberal internationalists, idealists, and liberal institutionalists.

The liberal internationalists, like Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham emphasised on individual liberty, free trade, prosperity and interdependence as the major determinants of peace and security.[16] On the other hand, the second strand of liberalism, i.e., idealism, dominated the period from the 1900s through to the late 1930s. The idealists believed that disputes between states should not be settled by war. They underlined the need for the construction of a new peaceful international order, to be managed by an international organisation. Moreover, states were bounded by the rules and norms of international organisation. These policies of the liberal idealists led to the formation of League of Nations in the 1920s and the United Nations in 1945. The idealists like Woodrow Wilson essentially believed in national self-determination, and collective security and emphasised the need to take public opinion into account. They essentially laid down the normative basis of international relations, i.e., the world as it ought to be and not just what it is.[17]

The period of liberal idealists gradually came to an end with the collapse of the League of Nations. Liberal idealism gave way to the third strand of liberalism, i.e., liberal institutionalism in the 1940s. The liberal institutionalists emphasised the growing importance of the international institutions which the state could not perform. The liberal institutionalists pointed out the state's inability to cope with modernisation. This led to the evolution of *integration theory* in Europe, advocated by David Mitrany, and *pluralism* in the United States advocated by Keohane and Nye.

As opposed to the liberal perspective of security, a neo-liberal oriented foreign policy professed for the promotion of free trade, open markets, and Western democratic values and institutions. The neo-liberal internationalists also essentially advanced the 'democratic peace' thesis in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The central argument was based on Kant's philosophical sketch of '*Perpetual Peace*'(1795) emphasising that liberal states do not go to war with other liberal states. In other words, democratic states would not fight one another. It essentially meant that democracy would ensure peace.[18]

Among others Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett were the chief advocates of the '*Democratic peace*' theory. Doyle pointed out, democratic representation, an ideological commitment to human rights, and transnational inter-dependence provides an explanation for the 'peace prone' tendencies of democratic states. Equally, the absence of these attributes, he argues, provides a reason why non-democratic states tend to be 'war-prone'. Without these democratic values and restraints, the logic of power replaces the liberal logic of accomodation.[19]

Tim Dunne argued, that the supporters "of democratic peace ideas do not reject the insights of realism; rather, they reject the preoccupation of what they call 'vulgar realism', with the idea of war of all against all. They argue that internal norms and institutions matter."[20] The argument put forward by Michael Doyle that liberal democratic states have been peaceful has been further substantiated by another hypothesis put forward by Francis Fukuyama in 1989.

In an article entitled '*The End of History*' (1989) and later in the book *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992),[21] Fukuyama contended that liberalism has become the dominant ideology, especially with the collapse of the socialist block. Moreover, in international relations, liberal states are more stable internally and more peaceful. Since most of the erstwhile Eastern European countries have opted for liberal democracy and market economy, it meant that the forces of individualism and liberal capitalism have emerged victorious. It was in this context, that he called it as "the 'end' of one phase in 'history' and the beginning of another where liberal economic values would prevail globally."[22] Fukuyama's theory was essentially based on three concrete arguments: "one about the pacific character of democracies; another about the integrative role played by multilateral institutions, and a third about the benign security consequences of global capitalism."[23] Fukuyama's liberal optimism essentially underlined the superiority of American values, and the export and the subsequent global prevalence of liberalism.

[III]

Emerging Concepts of Security

Within the fold of the realist theory, lot of churning has taken place in the meanwhile. The concept of security has thus undergone some reformulation in recent years to include concepts like 'common security', 'cooperative security' and 'comprehensive security'. One can call such endeavours as a jump at the conceptual level from the 'vulgar' to a more moderate and 'sober' realism.

Common Security

The concept of Common Security has broadened the definition of security to include not only military means of security, but it has also recognised "the security inter-dependence of all states within the international system".[24] In 1982, the *Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues* headed by Olof Palme, the Prime Minister of Sweden articulated the concept of 'Common Security' in his Common Security report. This theory is based on the premise that the two superpowers, US and former USSR have reached a level of strategic interdependence,

because of the advent of nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons by either country would ultimately result in their mutual destruction.[25]

In a nuclear world, states have increasingly become economically, politically, culturally, and militarily interdependent, and there is also a gradual realisation of the futility of nuclear weapons. Moreover, unilateral security has essentially led to common security between states, in which each state recognises the other's legitimate security concerns and together they believe in joint survival. In other words, collective security is based on the principle of non-provocative defence.[26]

As Craig A. Snyder succinctly elaborates the concept of *non-provocative defence*: Non-provocative defence refers to the development of purely military forces rather than offensive forces. The most common proposal for such a military force for states is not only to maintain a professional military but to equip it with purely defensive weapons, i.e., weapons that are efficient in terms of defence but have no long-range offensive capabilities. A state pursuing non-provocative defence should offer no military threat to those outside its borders but maintain a strong capability to repel any attack from its rivals. This could entail conventional defence at the border, with static defence structures such as mines, tank traps and fixed fortifications defended by professional soldiers and civilian militias, followed by civilian resistance to any occupation of the state by an adversary should the conventional defences fail.[27]

Snyder further argues that non-provocative defence and common security in general provides a situation whereby states can break free from the security dilemma often problematised by the realists, i.e., the actions that a state takes to increase its own security (military preparedness) do not affect the degree of insecurity felt by others in the system.[28]

Comprehensive Security

During the Cold War period, the concept of '*Comprehensive Security*' gradually developed. Comprehensive Security includes within its fold not only military issues, but also non-military issues.

Comprehensive security changes the very nature of threat perception and focusses on threats not only from states, but also from non-state actors and even natural catastrophes. Thus it identifies environmental, economic, political and cultural threats and seeks to counter them in the most effective manner. It assumes that security should be addressed at the domestic, bilateral, regional and global levels. It has been adopted by states like Japan as well as regional organisations like ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations).[29]

Cooperative Security

Cooperative Security, also like common security and comprehensive security includes within its fold social, economic, and environmental security. In cooperative security, the paradigm of relations move from conflictual relations to cooperative relations. It is assumed that regional states will gradually develop confidence and security building measures through discussion, negotiation, cooperation and compromise.[30] As Craig Snyder aptly observes: "Cooperative

Security is primarily focused on preventing interstate conflict and as such tends to work to preserve the status-quo between and within states".

However, cooperative Security can also be used to maintain the security of individuals or groups within states. Not only non-governmental organisations be involved in the management of international crises, but also non-state actors should gain a voice on security issues, be they internal or external in many international fora. This is not to suggest that coop-erative security is designed to allow external interference in the domestic affairs of states, or even to assist on democratic forms of governance, but merely that non-state voices should be heard.[31]

Cooperative Security in the post-Soviet world has given way to regional peace and cooperation and the initiation of the much talked about 'Track-II diplomacy' or what may be referred to as 'unofficial security dialogues'. Some examples of Track-II institutions are the *Neemrana talks* between India and Pakistan, the Indonesian and Canadian co-chaired *Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts* in the South-China Sea, the annual *UN-Regional Meetings on Confidence and Security Building Measures for the Asia-Pacific*, held in Kathmandu etc.[32]

Thus, cooperative security not only gives the non-state actors enough scope to play a vital role in the international arena, but it also provides the states with the most effective regional security structure, as it allows the establishment of multinational institutions and provides the mechanism by which the sub-state groups can peacefully gain independence.

Human Security

However, all these concepts of security are more or less state One can call it a jump at the conceptual level from 'vulgar' to a more moderate and sober realism.-centric and do not take into account the central issue of protection and welfare of the individual.

The growing dissatisfaction with the concepts of development and security, as it was prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s gradually led to the development of the concept of 'human security', where the prime focus is on the individual human being. In the late 1960s (from 1968 onwards), a transnational research enterprise called *World Order Models Project* (WOMP)[33] comprising of scholars from all over the world tried to construct a more just and 'Preferred World Order' based on the four world order values (i.e., peace, economic well-being, social and political justice, and ecological balance).

In this effort, their prime focus was on the individual well-being and safety. Then came *The Limits to Growth* thesis by the Club of Rome and two Independent Commissions on International Development Issues (one chaired by Willy Brandt in 1980 and the other chaired by Olof Palme in 1982). All these theses sought to accord centrality to the 'individual' within the studies and researches on 'security'. Further, the *Stockholm Initiative* on Global Security and Governance in 1991 gave a call for "Common Responsibility in the 1990s", which talked about the other challenges posed to security other than political rivalry and armaments and articulated a "wider concept of security, which deals also with threats that stem from failures in development, environmental degra-dation, excessive population growth and movement and lack of progress towards democracy"[34] In 1995, the famous report *Our Global*

Neighbourhood, by the Commission on Global governance put this argument more explicitly. It pointed out that the "concept of global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on security of states to include the security of the people and the security of the planet"[35]

The Human Development Report (HDR) prepared by the UNDP in 1994, lent further credibility and sanctity to the concept of human security. It was Mahbub-ul-Haq, a well-known development economist from Pakistan, who formulated the concept of human security in the HDR prepared by the UN. There are two main aspects of human security, i.e., (1) Safety from chronic threats like hunger, disease and repression and (2) Protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life— whether in homes, jobs or in communities. Such threats exist at all levels of national income and development".[36]

According to *Kanti Bajpai,* 'Human security' relates to the protection of the individual's personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence. The promotion of human development and good governance, and, when necessary, the collective use of sanctions and force are central to managing human security. States, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and other groups in civil society in combination are vital to the prospects of human security.[37]

Securitization Theory and Societal Security

One of the many important theories in the area of security studies which has developed in recent years is the theory of "securitization", developed by the *Copenhagen School* consisting of scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and their associates. In securitization theory, "security" is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process, the social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured and from what) is analyzed by examining the "securitizing speech-acts" through which threats become recognised and represented. Issues become "securitized", treated as security issues, through these speech acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such.[38]

Security therefore, according to the Copenhagen school, comprises of five sectors, where each sector has their own referent object as well as threat agenda. In the "military" sector, for example, the referent object is the territorial integrity of the state, and the threats are overwhelmingly defined in external, military terms. In the "political" sector, by contrast, what is at stake is the legitimacy of a governmental authority, and the relevant threats can be ideological and sub-state, leading to security situations in which state authorities are threatened by elements of their own societies, and where states can become the primary threat to their own societies. Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of "societal" security, in which the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements.[39]

Security for the *Copenhagen school* is a specific kind of act : what makes a particular speech-act a specifically 'security' act— the process of 'securitization'— is the casting of the issue as an 'existential threat', which calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics".[40] That is, 'by labelling something as a security issue, and having it

recognised as such, it becomes a security issue. A security issue is different from a political one because it threatens the very existence of the unit concerned. The threat therefore cannot be dealt with through normal political means'. As Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and J. De Wilde explain: "The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure...... That quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by labeling it as security an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means".[41] According to the Copenhagen School, 'securitization', "has three components (or steps) namely existential threats, emergency   action, and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules".[42]

It is the Copenhagen School which has articulated the concept of societal security. In societal security, the threat emanates neither from "military" security(territorial inviolability), nor "political" security (governmental legitimacy and autonomy). Here, "identity" plays an important role in security relations. What is threatened is essentially the identity of a society, its sense of "we-ness", that can develop into a major conflict, especially in ethnic conflicts, like for example the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Thus in societal security, the central focus shifts from state to society. As Waever points out: "State security has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and societal security has identity. Both usages imply survival. A state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live as itself.[43]

Globalist Views of International Security

The process of globalisation at the beginning of the twenty-first century led to the emergence of a 'global society' school. This school assumes that the world is gradually becoming a global village, because of the emergence of a global economic system, global communi-cations, and the emergence of elements of a global culture. In a globalised, post-Soviet world, there have been not only the emergence of a number of social movements (like women's, human rights, etc.); but also the fragmentation and disintegration of nation-states, as reflected in the disintegration of Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.

The disintegration and fragmen-tation of nation-states has resulted in new forms of insecurity arising out of nationalistic, ethnic, and religious rivalries— both inter-state and intra-state as well as across boundaries of states. Some examples of such brutal civil wars can be seen in Bosnia, Russia, Somalia, Rwanda, Yemen and Kosovo during the decade of 1990s. The global society theorists argue that these conflicts present a dilemma, that whether the international community should respect the domestic affairs of sovereign states or should intervene in order to safeguard and protect human rights and minority rights. Therefore, there is a need for a paradigmatic shift from state security to individual and group security within the emergent global society.[44]

According to John Baylis, what is needed, according to this school of thought, is a new politics of global responsibility, designed to address issues of global inequality, poverty and environmental stress, as well as of human rights, minority rights, democracy, and individual and group security, which cut across dominant interests on a world scale as well as within every state. Such thinking along globalist, rather than national or international lines will lead to more

effective action (including intervention where necessary) to deal with the risks to security which exist in the world community at present, the advocates of the globalist school would argue.[45]

[IV]

Conclusion

After discussing all the different dimensions and approaches to security, it becomes pertinent to evaluate which theory is the most suitable in order to understand the complexities of the security problem. Let us first take the realist/ neo-realist approach to security. It is quite clear that if the militarist conception of security is given primacy in international relations then there will be more instability in the international arena among the various contending states vying for global power. The US military action in Iraq and Afghanistan shows the dominance of realist thinking in US foreign policy. US involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan are guided by considerations of power politics and in fulfilment of its national interest. The US policy towards Pakistan vis-a-vis India, and its policy towards Israel vis-a-vis Palestine clearly shows the dominance of realpolitik in US policy.

The assumption of the neo-realists that the bipolar system during the Cold War was a period of long peace, shows their interest to perpetuate the dominant role of US as the only superpower.

Among the various new dimensions of security, common security as well as comprehensive security adopt the realist approach to security because of their emphasis on a state-centric discourse. Since the basis of common security is non-provocative defence, or in other words, the development of defensive military forces instead of offensive military forces, this approach has great significance in a nuclearised world.

However, all these theories fail to explain the resurgence of conflicts on ethnic, nationalistic, religious lines, as reflected in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Yemen, Kosovo, etc. The resolution of these kinds of conflicts can be explained with the help of societal security, where the focus is primarily placed on the identity of a community. The globalist approach to international security addresses issues of global inequality, poverty, human rights, minority rights, democracy, individual and group security, and thus provides a much more broader perspective on security. The central focus in human security is on the individual, which suggests the lasting relevance of the liberal thinking. The liberalist concern with safety and well-being of individual freedom has thus led to the formulation of new concepts like human security, and 'humane governance'.

Since no theory alone can explain all the complexities of the present-day international politics, what is needed is a unified or integrated theory of international politics. In doing so, we need to think about three basic aspects of security "security as a goal; the means of pursuing security; and the relation between security and domestic affairs".[46]

With regard to the first question "security as a goal", one of the fundamental question is security at what cost? For example, in underdeveloped countries, where people do not have access to basic facilities, like food, housing, shelter and the basic issues are poverty, illiteracy, disease and unemployment, security cannot be defined in terms of military or defence capability alone.

Therefore, the states at the global level need to strike a balance between security and other basic national interests. It is worthwhile to quote Craig Snyder here:

"Security is important, but how much security is needed and are there other national interests that are equally important at the very basic level? What good is security if there is no food, arable land or drinkable water in a country? In the post-cold war era, many in the West in particular are questioning the marginal costs of security. Most would accept that the Western states have an overabundance of security and therefore the return on a dollar spent on security is less than the return that dollar would provide if spent on less abundant goods. In other words, if the military budget allows more security than is now considered necessary it would be more cost-effective to reduce the military budget and spend that money on projects such as cleaning up the environment or feeding the people".[47]

With regard to the means of security, during the cold-war period, the military force was the prime means. However, in the post-cold war period, security threats have become multi-dimensional. Threats to security can emanate from various sources, like human rights, environmental rights, displaced persons, marginal farmers, under-privileged sections of the society Therefore, security has assumed much wider connotation and warrants more prudent state action at the non-military level.

Moreover, the focus of security has shifted from state to individual and groups in the post-Cold War era. In other words, the central concern should be what is the role of the individuals in state security, or can the state, while ensuring security of the individuals, contribute to national security in a much more wholistic manner.[48]

Endnotes

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