The comment critically examines Israel’s military assault on Iran in June 2025, arguing that strategic, political, and personal motives—rather than Iran's nuclear threat—drove the decision. The authors question official narratives, highlight geopolitical dynamics, and suggest that multiple intersecting factors shaped Israel’s timing and objectives.
Highlights
- Israel cited Iran’s nuclear programme as justification for the attack, but US intelligence and historical patterns suggest Iran has not pursued nuclear weapons since 2003. Israel offered no solid evidence to contradict this.
- Netanyahu opposed ongoing US-Iran negotiations, fearing they would strengthen Iran economically and diplomatically, and used military action to derail talks.
- Israel believed the Iranian regime was vulnerable and hoped military pressure might incite internal collapse. Netanyahu portrayed the government as “very weak” and unpopular among Iranians.
- Facing legal troubles, international criticism, and internal political pressure, Netanyahu used the assault as a distraction and a rallying point to consolidate his coalition and sustain leadership.
- Israel lacked capacity to destroy deeply buried nuclear infrastructure independently, requiring US intervention for meaningful strikes—highlighting tactical dependence.
- The attack was also about messaging power and deterrence, despite limited operational success, since Iran retains the capability to rebuild its nuclear programme.
Israel’s 12-day conflict with Iran ended abruptly on 23 June 2025, following a ceasefire announced by U.S. President Donald Trump. The declaration came one day after Trump claimed that American forces had “obliterated” three major Iranian nuclear facilities—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. While both nations assert victory, the ceasefire remains tenuous. Its sustainability depends on multiple variables, including U.S. leverage over Israel, mutual assessments of military capacity, and shifting domestic political landscapes.
The hostilities began on 13 June amidst US-Iran nuclear negotiations, after Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear sites at Natanz, assassinated top Revolutionary Guard generals and nuclear scientists, and targeted Iranian ballistic missile storage facilities. However, the question that continues to dominate discussions, despite the exchange of deadly missiles and drones, is what propelled Israel to attack Iran at this particular moment.
The primary reason cited by Israel for the attack is Iran advancing its nuclear weapons programme, but the facts on the ground contradict this claim. US intelligence agencies have maintained that Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 and has not restarted it since then. The Trump administration restated this as recently as March 2025, when his Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, claimed that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon, something the US President conveniently dismissed, thereby forcing her to amend the statement as well.
Moreover, the Israeli government’s justification for targeting Iran is questionable, given that it has hardly provided any concrete evidence to the international community about Tehran’s active nuclear file. It is telling that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been repeatedly claiming since 1992 that Iran was months, if not days, away from developing a nuclear weapon, without any evidence. This has been his consistent rhetoric over the decades. Interestingly, Netanyahu even appeared before a US Congressional Committee in 2002, claiming both Iran and Iraq were building nuclear bombs and chemical weapons, which was followed by a US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, even though no weapons of mass destruction were ever found there.
Despite relying on questionable intelligence regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, Israel has long acknowledged its inability to dismantle deeply embedded Iranian nuclear facilities—like Fordow near Qom—through independent military action. Limited to striking surface-level targets, Israel’s efforts fell short until the US joined the conflict on 22 June, deploying bunker-buster munitions to attack hardened sites. However, even if the infrastructure was significantly damaged, Iran retains the technical expertise and resilience to rebuild. This enduring capability means that, if the regime chooses, a nuclear weapon remains within reach.
So, what actually drove Israel to strike Iran on 13 June? At this point, there seem to be four major reasons why it chose this course of action. Firstly, the Israeli establishment firmly believes that the Iranian regime is antithetical to Israel and would never allow for normal relations between the two countries. Hence, as long as this regime remains in power, it would continue to pose a threat. This was evidenced by Netanyahu’s recurrent statements that the military strikes “could certainly” result in regime change, as the government in Iran was “very weak.” He claimed that “80% of the people would throw these theological thugs out.” Netanyahu may have planned, with the Trump-led Republican establishment arguably being the most pro-Israel government in US history, that the right time had come to kill the snake at its head. But eliminating the regime is easier said than done. More discomforting for Netanyahu is that the assaults on Iranian cities have united the Iranian people against Israel to defend their homeland.
Additionally, even if the people were to rise against the regime, there is no proper opposition, no democratic movement, or any viable alternative to replace the current Iranian government. This raises the likelihood of Iran descending into chaos, much like Syria and Libya, as Iranian society is ethnically diverse. Moreover, such chaos could give the military an upper hand to establish de facto domination and take more aggressive action towards building a nuclear bomb.
Secondly, Israel aimed to end the US-Iranian nuclear talks. Netanyahu has reportedly been upset with the US’s decision to proceed with these talks, ignoring Israel’s objections. The stalemate over uranium enrichment, coupled with the expiration of Trump’s 60-day deadline to Iran, presented Netanyahu with the perfect moment to strike. Iran, with economic sanctions lifted and better relations with the US, could, in Netanyahu’s understanding, pose a greater threat to Israel. With Trump still giving all kinds of signals, the jury is still out on the extent to which Netanyahu has been able to fulfil this objective.
Another driving force behind Israel’s offensive was Prime Minister Netanyahu’s determination to retain power amid mounting domestic and international pressure. Western nations—including the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway—had imposed sanctions on far-right ministers in his cabinet, while the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him. Compounding this was growing Israeli public support for a ceasefire with Hamas in exchange for 50 remaining hostages—27 of whom were believed dead. The imminent conclusion of the Hamas conflict threatened to expose Netanyahu to a barrage of inquiries, including the 7 October attacks, the Gaza war’s fallout, the Qatar-gate scandal, and long-standing corruption charges. By redirecting attention through an assault on Iran, Netanyahu not only galvanized his right-wing coalition but also delivered a high-stakes military manoeuvre to appease domestic hawks who have long advocated for action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
The fourth reason is the considerable weakening of the Iranian regime. Over the last year, Iran has been severely weakened. Its first line of defence, Hezbollah and Hamas, has mostly been destroyed. Eighty per cent of Hezbollah’s missiles were destroyed, and its chief, Hassan Nasrallah, was assassinated last year by Israel. The Israeli assault on Lebanon was so severe that the Lebanese public is highly averse to any idea of attacking Israel, making it unlikely that Hezbollah will initiate an attack at this time. Moreover, Hamas is now just a shadow of its past, most of its leaders have been killed, and 70 per cent of Gaza is under Israeli control. Another major asset of Iran, the Assad regime in Syria, is also gone.
On top of that, Israel destroyed Iran’s air defence systems along with its ballistic missiles in its attacks last year. All these developments convinced Israel that this was the best time to attack Iran and establish its preeminent hegemony in the region. But then the question arises: why at this particular time? The situation had been favourable since the breaking of the ceasefire deal in March. One explanation could be that Israel needed some time to prepare for this much bigger operation in Iran; thus, it waited for three months.
While pinpointing a single reason remains a challenging task at this stage, it seems that a combination of all these factors might have pushed Netanyahu to strike Iran at this time. As the dust settles, deeper layers behind Israel’s decision are likely to emerge, giving a clearer picture of the motivation behind the attack.
Syed Kamran Ali and Md Asad Uzzaman are doctoral candidates at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.
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