Pakistan’s Ideological Lens: Why Anti-India Narratives Persist

Pakistan’s persistent criticism of internal developments in India is rooted not in concern for minorities but in an ideological framework that requires India to remain a civilizational adversary. Anchored in the Two‑Nation Theory and reinforced by the military–clergy nexus, this narrative sustains radicalisation, legitimises proxy warfare, and preserves elite power. While projecting itself as Islam’s guardian, Pakistan simultaneously suppresses dissent, persecutes minorities, and erases non‑Islamic heritage at home. Its anti‑India rhetoric thus functions as a political tool, not a moral stance. Lasting regional stability demands confronting and dismantling these entrenched ideological structures that perpetuate hostility.

****

Pakistan recently criticised India on its internal issues, this time regarding the hoisting of a saffron religious flag (Dharma Dhwaj) atop the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya—a move that followed a familiar script. In its official reaction, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the Ayodhya site as the ‘Ram Temple’ constructed on the site of the historic Babri Mosque and urged the international community to take notice of what it called “growing Islamophobia, hate speech and hate-motivated attacks in India.” New Delhi responded sharply, with MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stating that India rejects Pakistan’s remarks “with the contempt they deserve,” adding that Pakistan — “with its deeply stained record of bigotry and systemic mistreatment of minorities” — has “no moral standing to lecture others.” These exchanges fit into a long and predictable pattern: for decades, Pakistan has reacted to almost every domestic development in India by invoking Babri Masjid, RSS ideology, Hindutva, or minority rights. These reactions are not spontaneous expressions of concern but products of a deeper ideological construction that Pakistan relies upon to sustain a narrative of permanent hostility toward India. Understanding this framing is essential to grasp why Pakistan consistently comments on India’s internal issues.

From Jinnah to Munir

Pakistan imagines itself as the world’s only nation created explicitly in the name of religion—a state supposedly ordained by God to protect Muslims, a self-proclaimed defender of Islam. This idea began with early Muslim thinkers such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and was later sharpened by Allama Iqbal, but it was Muhammad Ali Jinnah who ultimately articulated and championed the Two-Nation Theory in its political form. He argued that Hindus and Muslims were distinct nations with incompatible social, cultural, and religious practices, and that Muslims required a separate homeland to preserve their identity. This ideological foundation has been continually reinforced by Pakistan’s ruling elites, especially the military establishment, which often invokes the Two-Nation Theory to define the state’s purpose and identity. As Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir recently reiterated: Our forefathers believed that we were different from Hindus in every possible aspect of life. Our religion is different. Our customs are different. Our traditions are different. Our thoughts are different. Our ambitions are different… That was the foundation of the Two-Nation Theory. We are two nations, not one nation.” Such statements are not made casually; they reflect a long-standing ideological position, rooted in Jinnah’s vision, that continues to shape how Pakistan defines itself and frames its relationship with India.

This framing allows Pakistan to portray India as an eternal “other,” transforming the differences between the two countries into a civilizational struggle rather than a mere geopolitical dispute. In this process, radicalization becomes easier when the conflict is portrayed in religious terms. By presenting hostility toward India as part of a divine or civilizational mission, Pakistan’s deep state is able to recruit, indoctrinate, and mobilize individuals for its proxy warfare against India. Terrorism then becomes framed as a sacred duty rather than an act of violence.

Importantly, this ideological mobilization is sustained through a close nexus between the military establishment and sections of the religious clergy. Pakistan’s armed forces have historically patronized select religious scholars, mosque networks, and madrasa leaders by offering institutional protection, financial assistance, political space, and social privileges. In return, these clerics function as ideological multipliers, selectively interpreting religious texts to sanctify hostility towards India and legitimize violence against its people as jihad. Religious teachings are manipulated to blur the distinction between faith and state policy, transforming political objectives into theological imperatives. In a largely feudal, hierarchical, and economically stratified society—where questioning authority, whether tribal, religious, or military, is quite rare—such narratives achieve deep social penetration. Clerics wield disproportionate influence over public consciousness, particularly in rural and marginalized regions, making indoctrination easier, more durable, and resistant to counter-narratives.

The practical consequences of this ideological ecosystem are visible in the rhetoric of Pakistan’s political leadership, particularly in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Recent statements from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir leadership reinforce this mindset. Chaudhry Anwarul Haq, the former Prime Minister of PoJK who was recently removed through a no-confidence motion, openly boasted that Pakistan-linked groups had struck India “from the Red Fort to the forests of Kashmir,” claiming that “by the grace of Allah, we have done it.” These remarks, which resurfaced after the Delhi attack, have been widely reported as an admission of cross-border terrorism. Similarly, Pakistani leaders have frequently made rhetorical statements about unfurling the Islamic flag at India’s Red Fort—an expression that reflects this civilizational and ideological thinking. They do not speak of unfurling a flag at any random Indian location; it is always the Red Fort. This is because the Red Fort is not merely a historical site—it is the central symbol of Indian sovereignty, nationhood, and political continuity. Every Independence Day, the Prime Minister of India addresses the nation from its ramparts, making it the most visible emblem of the nation.

For Pakistan’s deep state, referencing the Red Fort serves a deliberate symbolic purpose: it seeks to project the idea that striking or conquering this site would amount to symbolically subjugating India itself. The recent terror attack in Delhi, carried out in the vicinity of the Red Fort, further underscores this fixation, echoing the same ideological script. Such rhetoric captures the deeper working of Pakistan’s ideological machinery, where the Red Fort is invoked as a civilizational target rather than a mere physical location—intended to suggest that Pakistan’s struggle against India is moral, eternal, and divinely sanctioned.

However, when it comes to its own society, Pakistan’s ruling structure reflects very little of Islamic moral or ethical philosophy. The military—Pakistan’s most powerful institution—has hijacked the state. For decades, Pakistan’s military rulers have relied on foreign support, maintained authoritarian control, suppressed dissent, and imprisoned popular political leaders. Pakistani society itself shows little adherence to any coherent Islamic system of values. Religion functions primarily as a political tool, invoked when convenient and ignored when inconvenient.

Yet, hypocritically, the same state attempts to present itself as the guardian of Islam for Muslims in the region—despite refusing to implement Islamic principles within its own society. Pakistan’s elites understand that genuine Islamic jurisprudence would hold them accountable for corruption, theft, oppression, and abuse of power; many of its leaders would face the very punishments they loudly cite when commenting on India. Precisely because they fear the consequences of true Islamic governance at home—knowing they themselves are complicit in corruption and malpractice—they weaponize Islam strategically as a political tool abroad, using it against others rather than as a moral system to be followed.

Persecution and Cultural Erasure at Home

Furthermore, the gap between Pakistan’s self-proclaimed religious identity and the reality within its borders is vast. While it accuses India of discriminating against minorities, its own record shows relentless persecution. The Centre for Social Justice documented 344 blasphemy cases in 2024, and between 2021–2024, at least 421 minority women and girls—mostly Hindus and Christians, 71% of them minors—were victims of forced conversion. In 2023, civil-society groups recorded 193 attacks on minority homes, businesses, churches, temples, and Ahmadi mosques, while the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (2023/24) reported mob assaults, desecrated Ahmadi graves, arbitrary detentions, and growing insecurity across minority communities.

The destruction of Hindu heritage further exposes this hypocrisy. In July 2023, two Sindh temples were desecrated within 24 hours; the 150-year old Mari Mata Temple in Karachi was demolished and another small temple used by the Bagri community in Kashmore was even attacked with rocket launchers. In 2021, a century-old temple in Teri, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was burned down by a mob. A Supreme Court commission in 2021 confirmed widespread neglect and encroachment of historic Hindu sites like Katas Raj Mandir and Prahlad Mandir. Of the 428 Hindu temples existing in 1947, fewer than two dozen remain functional today. Pakistan’s claims appear hollow when set against the violence, fear, and systematic cultural erasure suffered by its own minorities.

Deconstructing Pakistan’s Anti-India agenda

In the end, it is important for India to recognize that Pakistan’s commentary on Indian domestic issues, particularly those involving Muslims, is not driven by genuine concern. It is part of a calculated ideological narrative that sustains anti-India sentiment and rationalizes Pakistan’s internal structures of power. By selectively focusing on these issues, Pakistan also seeks to damage India’s international reputation, drawing attention from Western media outlets that sometimes amplify these narratives. Without the framing of an existential religious conflict, Pakistan’s deep state would struggle to justify radicalization, maintain political control, or mobilize public opinion. This is why the two-nation theory continues to dominate Pakistan’s political and intellectual landscape. It is not just a historical idea; it is the narrative that keeps Pakistan’s hostility toward India alive.

This also means that even if territorial issues were absent, this enmity would persist. The conflict is ideological rather than territorial or geographical. Pakistan’s identity—in its current form—requires India to remain the civilizational adversary. As long as Pakistan defines itself through this religious and ideological lens, the cycle of radicalization and hostility will persist. Therefore, any long-term effort to reduce tensions must involve confronting and deconstructing the ideological foundations of the Pakistani state.

At the same time, deconstructing Pakistan’s ideological foundations requires acknowledging the nature of Pakistani society itself—a largely feudal and hierarchical system in which the military and religious clergy sustain one another. The army provides power and patronage, while the clergy offers ideological legitimacy and social control. Any meaningful deconstruction must therefore recognize these societal structures and tailor responses accordingly.

The persecution of minorities, the persistent portrayal of Hindus as the “other,” the superficial use of Islam for political legitimacy, and the exploitation of anti-India sentiment for power all expose the deep contradictions within Pakistan’s self-image. For the region to achieve lasting stability, these entrenched ideological narratives must be confronted and dismantled. Until they are challenged, peace and stability will remain elusive in the region.

*Dr Imran Khurshid is Associate Research Fellow at ICPS. The views are his own.