Date
09-06-2025
Highlights
- Born from the Students Against Discrimination (SAD) movement, JNP was officially launched on 28 February 2025 as a student-led political party.
- JNP Seeks to end bipolar dominance of Awami League & BNP while advocating for a new constitutional framework.
- Calls for establishing a Second Republic and complete overhaul of Bangladesh’s 1972 Constitution, aiming to decentralize political power and institutionalize inclusive governance.
- Faces resistance from established parties like BNP, internal factionalism, funding difficulties, and the struggle to maintain ideological cohesion.
- Advocates a non-aligned stance but faces scrutiny over apparent strategic biases in regional affairs.
- With elections expected by June 2026, JNP stands at a crossroads—either catalysing a democratic renewal or becoming a transient force.
Abstract
The rise of the Jatiya Nagorik Party (JNP) marks a transformative shift in Bangladesh’s political landscape, breaking the long-standing dominance of the Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Emerging from the July 2024 uprising, the Students Against Discrimination (SAD) movement swiftly transitioned into a formal political entity, advocating for a Second Republic through constitutional reforms and a pluralistic, centrist platform. The JNP’s ability to reshape the country’s political trajectory hinges on building consensus, navigating entrenched power structures, and avoiding coercive governance tactics. While its leadership seeks an inclusive, Bangladesh-centric identity, internal ideological divergence and opposition from legacy parties pose significant challenges to its long-term viability.
Introduction
Bangladesh’s political landscape is undergoing an emergent yet potentially transformative reconfiguration, catalysed by the rise of the Jatiya Nagorik Party (JNP)—a newly constituted political entity that explicitly seeks to end the long-standing dominance of Bangladesh politics by the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia. It is also known as National Citizen Party (NCP). It was founded on 28 February 2025, as a student-led political party in Bangladesh, emerging from the “Jatiya Nagorik Committee” and the “Students Against Discrimination” movement. The party aims to establish a "second republic" and promote a centrist and pluralist political approach.
The JNP’s entry into the formal political arena has caused visible consternation among the established political actors, particularly the BNP. Khaleda Zia’s party had been anticipating a political resurgence after a large-scale student-led mass uprising dislodged Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024, with the hope of ending its prolonged political marginalisation of over fifteen years as the development appeared to widen the scope for opposition resurgence by reshaping the national political calculus. This article critically examines the implications of the JNP’s emergence for Bangladesh’s evolving political trajectory, with specific focus on its ideological underpinnings and the structural and institutional constraints it is likely to confront in the evolving competitive landscape.
The 2024 Uprising: A Catalyst for the Genesis of JNP
The 2024 mass uprising known also as the July Revolution is arguably the most momentous event in Bangladesh since its formation in 1971, representing a significant break with what many viewed as a growing authoritarian consolidation of power by Sheikh Hasina during the last few years of her over a decade-and-a-half-long rule. The immediate catalyst for this mass mobilisation became the 5 June 2024 Bangladesh High Court order reinstating the contentious government job quota system, which allocated 30% of civil service positions to the descendants of liberation war veterans.[1] The long-running reservation policy had been withdrawn by the government earlier as it had become contentious due to the aggravating unemployment scenario in the country. This judicial reinstatement and the government’s delay in challenging the order ignited widespread discontent, particularly among university students, who perceived the measure as structurally discriminatory and antithetical to meritocratic principles.
The initial mobilisation was spearheaded by university students in Dhaka to start with, who coalesced under the banner of Students Against Discrimination (SAD), which swiftly consolidated its position as the principal organisational channel for articulating and coordinating resistance to the reinstated quota system. The protest movement rapidly gained traction across the nation’s higher education institutions, evolving from an issue-specific agitation into a broader platform for voicing dissent against systemic authoritarianism.
By July 2024, the government’s reliance on coercive tactics—including the deployment of state security forces and the use of lethal violence, including by its supporters, most prominently its students wing, Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), resulting in dozens of student fatalities—catalysed the student protest movement into a full-fledged mass uprising. According to a report by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), state actions in July 2024 resulted in the deaths of over 600 individuals.[2] Resultantly, as student protests intensified, it prompted several opposition political groups, such as BNP, and various Islamist factions led by Jamaat-e-Islami, to also join the anti-government movement. This confluence transformed the movement’s focus from a singular demand for redressal of the job quota issue into a mass uprising by foregrounding popular grievances over chronic systemic corruption, state-led political persecution, and qualitative erosion of civil liberties and human rights in the country.
The mass character of the movement, coupled with the Bangladesh Army’s refusal to intervene against civilian demonstrators, triggered an unprecedented political rupture, and consequently, on 5 August 2024, PM Sheikh Hasina was forced to resign before subsequently departing the country for India, where she remains in political exile.[3] It is in this context that the country saw students emerge as a prominent political bloc seeking a broader systemic reform.
Emergence of the Jatiya Nagorik Party (JNP)
The Students Against Discrimination (SAD) movement swiftly translated its grassroots momentum into tangible political influence following the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2024. Demonstrating its dominance, SAD played a critical role in ensuring the appointment of Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus as Chief Advisor of the Interim Government, which formally assumed office on 8 August. The movement’s political prospects increased further with its foray into the government machinery through the induction of three of its prominent leaders—Nahid Islam, Asif Mahmud, and Mahfuj Alam—into advisory roles within the Yunus administration. This preserved a crucial role for the movement to articulate and advance its wide-ranging reformist agenda from within the system.
The political vacuum created by the forced exit of Hasina and the ensuing campaign against her Awami League, with thousands of its leaders and supporters either fleeing the country or going into hiding, reconfigured the nation’s political landscape. Not only did the new political reality create space for long-marginalised actors such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, but it was also for emergent forces like SAD. While BNP managed to reclaim its space despite its prolonged political marginalisation, it was the sudden dispossession of the Awami League that SAD’s leadership viewed as a historic opening to consolidate their revolutionary project.
Seizing this moment of flux, SAD established a pan-national political platform—the Jatiya Nagorik Committee (JNC), or National Citizens Committee—on 8 September 2024.[4] It was formed under the leadership of Akhter Hossain of Gonotantrik Chhatra Shakti (Democratic Student Force)— formed in October 2023 and dissolved in September 2024— and Nasiruddin Patwari of Amar Bangladesh Party (My Bangladesh Party)— founded on 2 May 2020, by a reformist faction that split from Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. JNC was described as the ideological vanguard of the July 2024 uprising, committed to dismantling what it termed as Bangladesh’s “established fascist political system” and build national consensus for establishing a new inclusive democratic republic with a new constitutional contract.
Within weeks of its formation, JNC’s leadership began articulating an ambition to institutionalise its movement through a formal political party. In November 2024, Sarjis Alam, the Committee’s chief organiser, publicly argued for the creation of new political parties as a necessary corrective to Bangladesh’s ossified political landscape and to end the dominance of one or two parties.[5] This vision swiftly translated into grassroots mobilisation, with JNC launching a nationwide campaign in December 2024 to establish thana (police station)-level committees across all 64 districts. The campaign culminated in the announcement that a political party would be formally launched by February 2025.
Accordingly, on 28 February 2025, the SAD movement transformed the JNC into a full-fledged political party called the Jatiya Nagorik Party (JNP), or National Citizens Party (NCP). In preparation for this transition, Nahid Islam, a prominent SAD leader and serving Advisor in the Yunus administration, resigned from the government on 25 February to assume the role of Convenor of the new party. Projecting itself as the architect of a “New Bangladesh,” the JNP unveiled a 153-member executive committee, prominently featuring ten influential figures from the historic anti-quota protests.[6]
Among the party’s key leadership figures are: Samanta Sharmin, former JNC spokesperson, and Ariful Islam Adib, ex-General Secretary of the Chhatra Odhikar Parishad (Students' Rights Council), as joint convenors; Akhtar Hossain, JNC as Member Secretary; Abdul Hannan Masud as Joint Coordinator; and regional Chief Organisers Hasnat Abdullah (Southern Region) and Sarjis Alam (Northern Region).[7] The other prominent JNC leaders on the committee include Tasnim Jara and Nahida Sarwar Niva, which further underscores the seamless continuity between the SAD movement, the JNC platform, and the newly launched JNP.
Ideological Orientation
Ideologically, the party is projecting a moderate, centrist and pluralist image based on values such as equality, justice, good governance, rights, and civil dignity. The JNP manifesto holds that its guiding principle will be the “strong protection of all democratic and fundamental rights,” with the objective of building a pluralistic and prosperous polity that preserves “the ethnic, social, gender, religious and cultural values and diversity” inherent within Bangladesh’s social socio-political setup.[8] The Manifesto holds:
“We strive to cultivate a political culture where unity prevails over division, justice replaces vengeance, and merit and competence triumph over dynastic politics at all levels of society and the state. There will be no place for corruption and nepotism in our politics.”[9]
The JNP is positioning itself as ideologically agnostic, avoiding the essentialist frameworks that often underpin dominant political narratives by espousing a centrist platform beyond conventional left-right ideological taxonomies. Such a characterisation is reflective of its origins in collective civic mobilisation rather than doctrinaire partisanship. The party’s leadership asserts that it consciously refrains from privileging any singular ideological framework—be it nationalism, secularism, or religion. As articulated by its member secretary Akhtar Hossain, the JNP aspires to a centrist political orientation that transcends conventional ideological binaries: “The party will emerge from a moderate political practice in Bangladesh. We will not tolerate the long-standing Islamophobia in Bangladesh. Similarly, we will not tolerate Hindu extremism or Muslim extremism.”[10]
Similarly, Samantha Sharmin, one of the party’s Senior Joint Convenors, emphasises that the JNP seeks to foreground a politics of rights, responsibility, and compassion—deliberately decentring any singular ideology or religion.[11] The party, she contends, has vowed to prioritise the interests of Bangladesh and the rights of its citizens, thereby ensuring that individuals of all faiths and ideological persuasions can freely practice their beliefs within an inclusive civic framework.
Likewise, JNP chief organiser Nasir Patwardan contends that the JNP repudiates the Manichean binaries that are characteristic of ideologically rigid parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami.[12] Instead, the party envisions a departure from such polarising political discourses that, in its view, fracture the sociopolitical fabric of Bangladesh. Instead, the party is advancing a narrative of positioning itself as a convergence point for all people across the ideological spectrum, provided they place the national interest of Bangladesh as their principal concern. Some observers have informally characterised this inclusive orientation as Bangladeshponthi—a term literally meaning “Bangladesh-centric" or "Pro-Bangladesh”, denoting a commitment to placing Bangladesh’s priorities above all else.
In terms of its broader worldview, particularly its vision for Bangladesh’s regional engagement, the party advocates a recalibration of Dhaka’s foreign policy posture grounded in an explicitly non-aligned, nationalistic ethos. Nahid Islam, the party convenor, maintains that JNP’s centrist orientation necessitates avoiding preferential alignments by adopting an equidistant and principled stance vis-à-vis regional powers such as India and Pakistan. Nahid asserts that the new party wants “to talk about the future. We want to move beyond the past and discuss the possibilities of Bangladesh.”[13]
However, despite such rhetorical assertions, it remains premature to assess the extent to which these ideological positions will translate into praxis—particularly given emerging indications to the contrary. This assumes importance as the Interim Government, where the student movement exercises significant influence, has demonstrated a discernible tilt toward Islamabad and Beijing, implicitly side-lining New Delhi, thereby casting doubt on the party’s professed non-alignment and centrist credentials.
For instance, in the wake of the India-Pakistan standoff following the 22 April Pahalgam terrorist attack—claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which resulted in the death of 26 individuals—Major General (Retd.) ALM Fazlur Rahman, a close associate of Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, provocatively suggested that should India initiate military action against Pakistan-based militant groups, “Bangladesh should occupy the seven states of Northeastern India.”[14] He further advocated for Dhaka to commence “discussions with China on a joint military arrangement in this regard.”
While the interim government has officially distanced itself from these remarks, the fact that such statements stem from within the broader political milieu of the Students Against Discrimination (SAD) and the Jatiya Nagrik Party (JNP) raises important concerns about the coherence and strategic maturity of the political ecosystem from which these entities emerge. As such, this emergent strategic partiality not only undermines the party’s avowed non-aligned posture but also calls into question the authenticity of its proclaimed centrist and moderation-based political ethos.
Core Objectives: A New Constitutional Contract for a New Republic
A number of core demands articulated by the SAD have effectively become de facto objectives of the JNP political agenda as the party transitions from a student-led movement into a broader, pan-Bangladesh political formation. At the heart of JNP’s professed political agenda lies its articulated vision of establishing what it terms a “Second Republic”—a transformative political project anchored in a new constitutional charter aimed at institutionalising an inclusive democratic order.[15] This envisioned framework aspires to dismantle entrenched authoritarian legacies and facilitate the decentralisation of political power.
This necessitates, as the JNP leadership demands, an outright abrogation of the current constitutional arrangement, in place since 1972, that they derisively label as the “Mujib-Badi Constitution.”[16] It is deemed fundamentally flawed for not only failing to embody the democratic aspirations that underpinned the country’s liberation struggle but also structurally enabling authoritarian drift by lacking strong checks and balances to prevent ruling parties from establishing their dominance through the systematic erosion of institutional autonomy. Accordingly, the party advocates the drafting of a new constitutional framework, a prerequisite for establishing its envisioned Second Republic, that genuinely embodies the spirit of the liberation movement—one that promotes democratic decentralisation, enhances political pluralism, and provides safeguards against authoritarian consolidation. As the party manifesto provides, “The July 2024 Mass uprising has marked the beginning of our struggle to establish a second republic. To achieve this, we must eliminate all possibilities of restoring constitutional autocracy through the adoption of a new democratic constitution.”[17]
Yet, a critical question persists: can the JNP, alongside the broader Students Against Discrimination (SAD) movement, generate the requisite political consensus to actualise this vision? The challenge is compounded by the presence of entrenched political actors—such as the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the currently marginalised but socially embedded Awami League—each of which continues to command significant constituencies and propagate competing normative and strategic visions for the state. This is particularly instructive in light of SAD’s failure to forge consensus with other factions involved in the July 2024 uprising on officially recognising it as a “Revolution,” as, despite not categorically opposing such a designation, these groups remain divided over the terminology and narrative framing advanced by the student leadership.[18]
Moreover, against the JNP’s calls for wholesale abrogation of the Constitution of 1972, a major political force like the BNP has called for its selective constitutional amendments, which adds to the new party’s bucket of political challenges. Therefore, any attempt to implement its vision of establishing a “Second Republic” that fails to account for these competing imperatives risks undermining the legitimacy of the JNP-led movement. Besides, this may further render it indistinguishable from the hegemonic formations it ostensibly seeks to displace, particularly if its agenda is advanced through exclusionary or coercive means. How a newly-born party like the JNP navigates and advances such a contentious agenda in the face of intra-opposition divergence will determine its future political trajectory.
Nevertheless, among its other key objectives, the JNP advocates comprehensive systemic reforms across state institutions, including the police, the Election Commission, and the judiciary.[19] These reforms are aimed at establishing strong mechanisms accountability mechanisms to counter systemic holes that render it susceptible to corruption —a persistent challenge in Bangladesh’s governance landscape of the last seven decades. Additionally, the party calls for equitable access to employment opportunities for all citizens—irrespective of identity-based differentiations—with merit serving as the sole criterion for selection.
JNP’s Impact on Bangladesh’s Political Landscape
The formalisation of a student’s movement as a political actor adds a new milestone in Bangladesh’s democratic development, which signals a generational shift toward issue-based, youth-led political participation. It remains to be see how much of the grassroots support it can garner to be electorally significant. This will serve as a crucial indicator of its capacity to alter the country’s political equilibrium.
JNP is positioning itself as a political melting pot open to individuals of all ideological persuasions—provided they prioritise Bangladesh above partisan interests— aspiring to fill the political vacuum left by the Awami League, which it seeks to exclude from national politics until its leadership is held accountable for alleged abuses committed during its decade-and-a-half in power. This assertive positioning has generated unease among established parties such as the BNP, which had anticipated a relatively unchallenged path back to power.
Nevertheless, with national elections expected within the next six to eight months—even as Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus has repeatedly extended the deadline ahead, currently as June 2026—the JNP’s electoral performance will assume significance. It will determine whether the party can transform its reformist rhetoric into a viable electoral instrument by embedding its vision within the national consciousness to win the election or whether it will remain confined to the role of a symbolic force of dissent within a structurally entrenched and institutionally circumscribed political order.
Challenges Ahead
Notwithstanding its organisational momentum, the JNP confronts several formidable challenges. Principal among these is navigating the largely bipolar political landscape of over four decades that defined Bangladesh’s body politic. How the party navigates this schism and creates a space of its own will decide its political and electoral fortunes. The party currently seems to have establishment’s patronage even as its Convenor Nahid Islam, resigned from the government, and other prominent figures continue to be part of the administration.
The second challenge for the party is the funding aspect of running an organisation at the national level. While it currently relies on the crowdfunding model, whether it can sustain such an arrangement in the long run or will succumb to some kind of clientelist system that has sustained other parties, such as AL, BNP and Jamaat, is to be seen.
Third is its ability to build consensus over political reform wherein it has faced opposition from legacy parties such as the BNP, which dismisses the JNP’s call for constitutional abrogation, for instance, as politically reckless and juridically untenable. The BNP instead proposes a gradual and sequential approach to institutional reform through targeted amendments, insisting that only an elected government with a clear popular mandate should undertake such foundational restructuring of the state institutions. In this context, the BNP has consistently called on the interim administration to focus solely on holding fair elections, arguing that restoring democratic legitimacy requires following proper procedures, not redefining the political system.
At the organisational level, the JNP’s ideological heterogeneity may also become a liability. Divergent views within the leadership on the desired pace and depth of reform—ranging from radical constitutional ranging from radical constitutional reform to gradual, pragmatic changes— could fuel factionalism, especially when other political parties seem to be reluctant to allow such a wholesale dismantling of the system. While the party's unity has so far been anchored in shared opposition to the Awami League, the lack of a cohesive ideological foundation may undermine its stability as it evolves from a protest movement into a governing force. If these internal divisions become public, they could weaken the party’s credibility, hinder its operational effectiveness, and ultimately compromise its ability to govern.
Signs of internal discord were apparent even before the formal launch of the JNP, particularly when former leaders of Chhatra Shibir—the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami—such as Ali Ahsan Zonaed and Rafe Salman Rifat, who had been active within the National Citizen’s Committee (NCC), were excluded from leadership roles in the emerging party.[20] Their public decision to abstain from joining the JNP highlights the challenges of uniting a politically heterogeneous coalition, bound primarily by the shared objective of removing Sheikh Hasina from power.
Beyond ideological differences, this also reveals the complex interplay of personal ambition and political strategy within the broader movement—individuals who once stood together in opposition to Sheikh Hasina’s government now maneuver to secure influence and carve out political space for themselves.
As such, the major challenge for the JNP lies in maintaining ideological cohesion while broadening its support base. Furthermore, it would need to institutionalise its organisational structure and articulate an achievable governance agenda that resonates beyond its initial youth constituency to the broader society, where it will have to compete with the political messaging of an established party like BNP. How the party navigates such challenges will determine its political future.
Conclusion
The rise of the JNP marks a potential turning point in Bangladesh’s political evolution, breaking away from the entrenched bipolar dominance of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League and Khaleda Zia’s BNP. Emerging from the July 2024 uprising, the rapid institutionalization of the Students Against Discrimination (SAD) movement into the Jatiya Nagorik Party (JNP) reflects both generational renewal and the urgent demand for systemic reform.
Positioned on a centrist, ideologically pluralistic platform, the JNP aspires to establish a “Second Republic” through a new constitutional charter, seeking to fundamentally reshape Bangladesh’s political landscape. However, its ability to redefine the country’s trajectory depends on building consensus among fragmented opposition forces, navigating entrenched power structures, and steering clear of the coercive tactics it seeks to dismantle.
The party’s credibility as a centrist and non-aligned force will be tested by the coherence of its foreign policy and its internal ideological discipline. As Bangladesh approaches its next electoral moment, the JNP stands at a crossroads—either emerging as the catalyst for inclusive democratic renewal or fading into a transient force, overwhelmed by the same political inertia it seeks to overcome.
Mohmad Waseem Malla is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi, where he also serves as the Assistant Editor of its quarterly peer-reviewed Journal of Peace Studies (JPS).
Faiza Rizwan is a Research Intern at the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi, working under the supervision of Mohmad Waseem Malla. She is pursuing an M.A. in Peace and Conflict Studies at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia.
Endnotes
[1] “Universities outside Dhaka also heat up with quota movement”, The Sun,15 July 2024, Available at: https://www.daily-sun.com/post/757945 (Accessed: 2 May 2025).
[2] United Nations OHCHR (2024), “Preliminary analysis of recent protests and unrest in Bangladesh”, Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/preliminary-analysis-recent-protests-and-unrest-bangladesh (Accessed: 2 May 2025).
[3] Mujib Mashal et al. (2024), “Bangladesh: Hasina’s Final Hours”, The New York Times, 6 August 2024, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/06/world/asia/bangladesh-hasina-final-hours.html (Accessed: 2 May 2025).
[4] “Jatiya Nagorik Committee announced: Nasiruddin convener, Akhter member secretary”, Prothom Alo, 08 September 2024, Available at: https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/s57dvhxfkl (Accessed: 2 May 2025).
[5] “New political parties to emerge in the next 2 months: Sarjis”, Bangladesh Pratidin, 27 December 2024, Available at: https://en.bd-pratidin.com/national/2024/12/27/26419 (Accessed: 2 May 2025).
[6] Mahathir Mohammed (2025), “Who are the top 10 leaders of the Jatiya Nagorik?”, Dhaka Tribune, 28 February 2025, Available at: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/politics/375026/who-are-the-top-10-leaders-of-the-jatiya-nagorik (Accessed: 11 April 2025).
[7] “The Super 10: The National Citizen Party”, The Daily Star, 28 February 2025 Available at: https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/the-super-10-the-national-citizen-party-3836156 (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[8] “বাংলাদেশের নতুন রাজনৈতিক দল?” (The New Political Paty of Bangladesh), BBC News Bengali, 2 March 2025, Available at: https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/cj4n2dnzdk5o (Accessed: 2 May 2025).
[9] P. K. Balachandran (2025), “Bangladesh Students Party to be neither pro-India nor pro-Pakistan, says leader Nahid Islam”, Eurasia Review, 2 March 2025, Available at: https://www.eurasiareview.com/02032025-bangladesh-students-party-to-be-neither-pro-india-nor-pro-pakistan-says-leader-nahid-islam-analysis/ (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[10] Liakat Ali Badal (2025), “Akhtar: The Jatiya Nagorik Committee and the new politics”, Dhaka Tribune, 23 January 2025, Available at: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/politics/371662/akhtar-the-jatiya-nagorik-committee-and-the (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[11] “বাংলাদেশের নতুন রাজনৈতিক পরিবেশ”, BBC News Bengali, 15 February 2025, Available at: https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/c8xqz4l08vlo (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[12] “ছাত্রদের দলের মূল ফোকাস: বহুত্ববাদ”, Protidiner Bangladesh, 26 February 2025, Available at: https://protidinerbangladesh.com/politics/130863/ (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[13] Op. Cit. 9.
[14] “If India attacks Pakistan, Bangladesh should occupy northeastern states: Muhammad Yunus aide”, The Hindu, 3 May 2025, Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/if-india-attacks-pakistan-bangladesh-should-occupy-northeastern-states-muhammad-yunus-aide/article69533502.ece (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[15] Op. Cit. 9.
[16] “Scrap ‘72 Constitution Ban: Chhatra League”, The Daily Star, 23 October 2024 Available at: https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/scrap-72-constitution-ban-chhatra-league-3734051 (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[17] Ibid.
[18] “July Uprising Proclamation: Take Some More Time”, The Daily Star, 17 January 2025, Available at: https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/july-uprising-proclamation-take-some-more-time-3801106 (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[19] “Citizens’ Committee Seeks New Constitution, Provides 69 Proposals”, The Business Standard, 02 December 2024, Available at: https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/citizens-committee-seeks-new-constitution-provides-69-proposals-1008406 (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
[20] Ashik Abdullah Apu (2025), “New Political Party: Ex-Shibir Leaders, Nagorik Committee Stay Away”, The Daily Star, 27 February 2025, Available at: https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/new-political-party-ex-shibir-leaders-nagorik-committee-stay-away-3834826 (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
