The comment argues that Pakistan’s rhetoric of “self‑determination” for Kashmir contradicts the political, economic, and cultural realities in the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit‑Baltistan. It highlights the absence of genuine self‑rule, demographic manipulation, cultural erosion, economic neglect, and marginal benefits from CPEC. Comparing these regions with Jammu and Kashmir in Inda, it notes stark disparities in development and governance. Public frustration, migration trends, and unfulfilled protest demands underscore the deep disconnect between Pakistan’s claims and lived experience.
Pakistan’s recent celebration of “Self-Determination Day” on 5th January in the name of the people of Jammu and Kashmir exposes a fundamental contradiction between its rhetoric and its actual practices in the territories under its occupy. While Islamabad projects itself internationally as a defender of Kashmiri rights and invokes United Nations resolutions to criticise India, the lived reality in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir—that consists of both the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan— reflects a persistent denial of political representation, economic opportunity, cultural freedom, and basic human dignity. The gap between Pakistan’s claims and lived experience on the ground makes its self-determination narrative deeply unconvincing.
The Myth of “Azad” Kashmir
Pakistan strategically refers to the territory under its control as “Azad Jammu and Kashmir,” yet this so-called freedom exists largely as a political slogan. In practice, the region is administered from Islamabad and Rawalpindi, with real authority residing in Pakistan’s federal and military establishments rather than in locally representative institutions. Although elections are held in AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan, genuinely independent local leadership is systematically weakened through co-optation, legal constraints, and centralised control exercised from Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Neither AJK nor Gilgit-Baltistan sends representatives to Pakistan’s National Assembly or Senate, and with key powers over finance, security, and constitutional authority retained by the federal establishment, elections create only an appearance of participation while real decision-making remains external, severely limiting representative self-governance.
Furthermore, in AJK, 12 assembly seats are reserved for refugees from Indian Jammu & Kashmir, who live outside the territory, a provision that has become a focal point of controversy. These seats, while intended to represent displaced populations, are often used to control the region, manipulate legislative outcomes and undermine accountability to residents actually living in the region, reinforcing the gap between formal representation and meaningful self-governance.
The absence of genuine self-rule has resulted in mounting public frustration, which recently manifested in protests across AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan. In late September and early October 2025, thousands of residents in AJK, mobilised by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC), staged shutter‑down strikes and demonstrations demanding economic relief, structural reforms, and lower tariffs; clashes with security forces led to injuries and deaths, and only partial agreements were reached. In Gilgit-Baltistan, mid‑2025 protests saw hundreds of residents block the Karakoram Highway and the Sost dry port, demanding relief from federal taxes, better economic rights, and local decision-making. These protests were driven not by ideological agendas but by everyday hardships, including soaring prices of wheat and essential commodities, unemployment, lack of subsidies, and chronic neglect of basic infrastructure—Even these modest and legitimate demands have largely been ignored by the Pakistani state.
Beyond Political Slogans
The principle of self-determination, often traced to Woodrow Wilson’s articulation in international discourse, has frequently been reduced to a narrowly political and territorial interpretation. In reality, self-determination is fundamentally an individual and societal condition rooted in the availability of basic rights, representative governance, cultural autonomy, and a dignified quality of life. By this substantive understanding, Pakistan’s performance in both AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan falls far short of its proclaimed commitments.
Cultural erosion in these regions has been systematic and deliberate. Kashmiri identity in AJK is steadily disappearing, with the Kashmiri language rarely spoken today as Punjabi linguistic and cultural dominance has taken hold. A 2024 sociolinguistic study by Dr. Shamaila Amir reports that in AJK, Kashmiri is now spoken by only about 2 percent of the population. This process of cultural assimilation intensified under General Zia-ul-Haq, whose policies promoted a homogenised national identity at the expense of local traditions and pluralism. In Gilgit-Baltistan, the situation is even more severe, particularly for the Shia population, which has historically formed the demographic core of the region. Over time, Shias have faced marginalisation, demographic dilution, and increasing vulnerability, while control over land and resources has shifted toward non-local actors, especially from Punjab. This has been corroborated by a report from the Centre for Policy Analysis, which states: “Besides numerous violent attempts of ethnic cleansing in these regions, Pakistan government and military, under the leadership of Zia-ul-Haq, made several continuous attempts to alter the ethnic demography of the region. Post-1980s, Sunni Muslims from hegemonic Pakistani provinces like Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa started to make an influx through business routes and gradually settle in the region.”
Pakistan frequently highlights the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as evidence of development and progress in Gilgit-Baltistan. However, the lived reality suggests that CPEC has brought little tangible benefit to local communities. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) are resentful because they feel CPEC projects were designed and implemented without their input and will be of little benefit to them. The report further noted that these projects "could also affect G-B's delicate Sunni-Shia demographic balance." The ICG concluded that "the State's response to local dissent and alienation has been an overbearing security presence, marked by Army checkpoints, intimidation and harassment of local residents and crackdowns on anti-CPEC protests." Chinese projects rely overwhelmingly on Chinese labour, Chinese security personnel, and Chinese operational control, leaving local populations excluded from employment and decision-making. These projects serve China’s strategic interests, particularly its access to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar, while creating debt dependency rather than sustainable local development. Analysts have described this approach as a “development without development,” highlighting that infrastructure and investment often bypass local empowerment, skill-building, or meaningful economic participation.
Furthermore, the growing presence of Mandarin in educational institutions, as noted in the study “Cultural Diffusion from China to Pakistan via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Study of Mandarin Learning in Gilgit Baltistan of Pakistan” (Pakistan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences), is accelerating cultural marginalisation. The study finds that while Mandarin learning is largely voluntary and driven by economic opportunities linked to CPEC, it is beginning to influence local linguistic practices and cultural dynamics, pushing indigenous languages and identities closer to extinction if efforts to preserve them are not strengthened.
Economic deprivation remains widespread. Agriculture is increasingly unviable due to the absence of state support and subsidies, while feudal social structures continue to dominate AJK. Unlike Indian Jammu and Kashmir, where land reforms were implemented in the early years after independence, Pakistan failed to dismantle feudal ownership patterns, resulting in greater landlessness and inequality. Healthcare facilities are scarce and concentrated in urban centres such as Mirpur, leaving rural populations without access to essential services. Educational institutions are limited in number and poor in quality, with inadequate infrastructure, insufficient teacher training, and weak institutional support. Roads and connectivity remain poor, further isolating communities from economic opportunities and public services.
Comparative perspective
A comparative perspective highlights the weakness of Pakistan’s claims. Despite decades of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and instability since the 1980s, Indian Jammu and Kashmir continues to perform better on a wide range of social and economic indicators. Educational infrastructure, healthcare services, road connectivity, and public investment are significantly stronger, a reality reflected in Jammu and Kashmir’s performance on measures such as the NITI Aayog’s Multidimensional Poverty Index and other human development indicators. This contrast is reinforced by budgetary priorities: in the Union Budget for 2025–26, India allocated around ₹41,000 crore (US$ 4.94 billion) as central assistance for Jammu and Kashmir to support development, infrastructure, and fiscal stability. In comparison, the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)’s Annual Development Programme amounts to only PKR 49 billion (approximately ₹1,568 crore or US$ 175 million), even though its total budget exceeds PKR 310 billion, the bulk of which is consumed by non-development expenditure. Gilgit-Baltistan’s total budget stands at around PKR 148.6 billion (approximately ₹14,863 crore or US$ 1.78 billion), with an even smaller proportion devoted to development spending. India’s allocation is thus nearly eight times larger than AJK’s development outlay and close to three times the entire budget of Gilgit-Baltistan. More importantly, development in Indian Kashmir is not confined to symbolic infrastructure but is reflected in institutional capacity, service delivery, and measurable quality outcomes across key sectors.
Pakistan’s self-determination narrative also rests on the misleading assumption that Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a single, unified entity. In reality, the region is marked by profound diversity and multiple internal fault lines, encompassing Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, the Chenab Valley, Pir Panjal, Gujjar–Bakarwal communities, and a range of religious and sectarian minorities, including Shias and Ahmadis. If political self-determination were to be extended on ethnic, linguistic, or regional lines, it would inevitably activate these fault lines, generating competing claims and counter-claims and creating a domino effect that could lead to fragmentation, internal conflict, and even civil war. This risk is further compounded by the presence of radical and extremist forces that are currently kept in check by state institutions; granting unfettered political autonomy in such a volatile environment would likely embolden these groups, with minorities such as Shias and Ahmadis becoming primary targets, replicating the patterns of sectarian violence, shrine destruction, and persecution witnessed in Pakistan. Given Jammu & Kashmir’s geostrategic location, such instability would also invite intervention and manipulation by external powers, including China, United States, and other global actors, turning the region into a theatre of intense geopolitical rivalry.
Lost Hopes and Limited Rights
The most telling indictment of governance in the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir which constitutes both AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan is reflected in the mindset of the people living there. Public expectations are no longer anchored in local development or political reform but in migration. For many, the primary aspiration is to leave Pakistan altogether, particularly for the United Kingdom, Gulf countries, or elsewhere. As reported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), “over 40 % of Pakistanis want to leave the country because of unemployment, lack of social security, weak education, and economic decline, and this sentiment is particularly strong in regions such as AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan.” Historical migration patterns further confirm this trend, with large numbers from districts like Mirpur moving to the UK, forming established diaspora communities. The passport has thus replaced political participation as the symbol of hope, reflecting a deep loss of faith in the region’s economic prospects and state capacity. The failure to address even recent popular demands raised by local action committees reinforces this sense of abandonment.
Even recent demands raised by local action committees have largely gone unaddressed. While the federal and regional governments claim to have accepted most protest demands and reiterated their commitment to implementing all agreed points, however the core demands like the abolition of elite privileges enjoyed by ministers and officials and the removal of 12 reserved assembly seats in the AJK assembly for migrants/refugees—remain unfulfilled. These were central to the protests and highlight the continuing gap between official assurances and the reality on the ground.
Self-determination cannot be reduced to a political slogan or a tool of strategic pressure against another state. It is measured by how people live, how they are governed, and whether they have free and fair participation in the political process, are able to preserve their culture, exercise their rights, and pursue meaningful opportunities. On these parameters, Pakistan has failed the people of AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan while continuing to pointlessly and wrongly accuse India of failing the people of J&K. True self-determination lies not in territorial acquisition but in representative governance, socio-economic empowerment, and human dignity—and it is precisely these foundations that remain absent under Pakistan’s control.
Idress Aftab is a freelance researcher who focuses on foreign policy and security issues in the South Asian region.
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