Ambiguity and Unrest: AJK and GB in a Perpetual Constitutional Limbo

While 2025 saw widespread protests against governance and economic hardship in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK)— including both ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’(AJK), and Gilgit Baltistan (GB)— followed by a violent state response leaving at least 10 people dead, the political situation continues to remain tense in the beginning of the year 2026. The issues that brought the people of PoK to the streets remain unresolved.

While the government in Islamabad along with the local governments, which act largely at its behest, has tried to arrive at some understanding with both Awami Action Committees (AAC) of ‘AJK’ and GB separately and agreed in principle (even has signed an agreement with AJK-AAC) to attend to their demands, the underlying issues of political disenfranchisement and economic marginalisation persist, keeping the political temperature high in these twin regions of PoK. Both the regions are confronted with persistent constitutional ambiguity and frequent administrative changes.

Notably, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) has seen its fourth change in leadership within a single year, a symptom of chronic political instability. Such political turbulence stems from local concerns about steady loss of autonomy (in ‘AJK’) and a state of de-facto statelessness that undermines the representative governance at the local level (in GB). The composition of governments in these regions remains heavily dependent on approval from Islamabad, forcing local leadership to operate within strictly confined parameters.

In especially GB, the constitutional limbo has resulted in recurring electoral delays and questions about democratic legitimacy. The Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly completed its five-year constitutional term on 24 November 2025, triggering sixty days’ constitutional window for fresh elections. However, the Election Commission of GB postponed the scheduled 24 January 2026 elections, citing harsh winter conditions that would impede voter access and logistical arrangements. This decision has sparked criticism from political observers who noted that the delay violated constitutional provisions mandating elections within 60 days of assembly dissolution, further deepening public mistrust in the democratic processes in these terrains.

The recent rise of civil society mobilisation in both these territories as potent a political force represents a significant evolution in the region’s political landscape. The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC), an umbrella organisation representing traders, lawyers, students, and transport workers, emerged as a powerful extra-parliamentary force challenging both local and federal authorities. Their 38-point charter of demands, presented in September 2025, fundamentally challenged existing governance structures by calling for the abolition of 12 legislative seats reserved for Kashmiri migrants from Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir. This demand directly challenges the foundational political arrangement that has governed ‘AJK’ since its establishment, revealing deep fissures between native Kashmiris and refugee communities, whose political representation has been constitutionally guaranteed. Similarly, the Awami Action Committee (AAC) for GB has been at the forefront of the popular struggle demanding justice against the taxation and subsidy cuts under the rallying cry "No taxation without representation". Formed in 2014, the AAC has over time grown into a broad coalition uniting political activists, lawyers, and community leaders. It rose to popularity during the 2015 wheat subsidy protests and has since emerged as a key voice against federal policies, using public demonstrations and social media to raise awareness of resource exploitation and political marginalisation in the region.

Economic Marginalisation and Fiscal Dependency

The economic relationship between these territories and the Pakistani federation is a skewed one centering on resource extraction without proportional returns. ‘AJK’ possesses significant hydropower potential, with projects like the Mangla Hydropower Project and the Neelum Jhelum Hydropower Project generating electricity primarily for Pakistan’s national grid. Under the December 2025 agreement, ‘AJK’ secured a royalty of just 1.10 per unit of electricity produced from Neelum Jhelum— a rate, which activists argue fails to compensate for the environmental and social costs borne by local communities. Similarly, in Gilgit-Baltistan, despite hosting strategic infrastructures— like the Diamer-Basha Dam and the CPEC touted as a “guarantor of national prosperity”— local communities continue to suffer from acute energy shortage, with power outages lasting up to 22 hours daily in some areas. The development paradigm in both regions prioritises federally-directed mega-projects over local needs. In GB, military-affiliated corporations like the Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Frontier Works Organization (FWO), Special Communications Organization (SCO), and National Logistics Cell (NLC) dominate infrastructure contracts, often without competitive bidding or transparency. Projects like the Naltar Valley hydroelectric plant, initiated in 2005 with an initial budget of 4 billion rupees, remain incomplete with costs ballooning to 16 billion PKR. This pattern of contractual opacity and delayed execution has led to widespread public disillusionment, with residents questioning whether development serves national strategic interests or local welfare.

Integrated Fiscal Policies and Local Economies

A significant development in federal-territorial fiscal relations emerged in January 2026, when the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) amended income tax rules to integrate taxpayers from ‘AJK’ and GB into Pakistan’s Active Taxpayer List (ATL). This technical adjustment, framed by the GB Council link as “a significant achievement and relief for residents,” allows individuals registered with local tax authorities to access benefits available to Pakistani filers. However, this integration has raised concerns about fiscal assimilation without corresponding political representation.

The economic consequences of repeated political unrest have been severe for local economies. The September-October 2025 protests in ‘AJK’ resulted in a complete shutdown of commercial activities for nearly a week, crippling small businesses and daily wage earners. Similarly, in GB, protests blocking the Karakoram Highway— the vital trade artery connecting Pakistan to China via the Khunjerab Pass— disrupted cross-border commerce and stranded cargo trucks for weeks, undermining the region’s economic lifeline. These disruptions highlight the economic vulnerability of these regions dependent on non-remunerative and vulnerable transportation corridors and seasonal tourism.

Emerging Political Configurations and Social Movements

The JAACs in ‘AJK’ and GB represent a novel form of political organisation/moblisation that transcends party structures. Unlike conventional political parties organised around different ideological platforms or patronage networks, the JAAC emerged from specific material grievances— initially, electricity prices and wheat subsidies— before expanding into a comprehensive critique of governance structures. Their leadership, including figures like Shaukat Nawaz Mir, comes from professional backgrounds rather than political dynasties, lending the movement credibility among disillusioned citizens.

These movements have been characterised by broad-based civil society movements with comprehensive agendas addressing both economic and constitutional issues. As a result, the federal government has been forced to strike negotiated settlements with attendant economic concessions in ‘AJK’, while maintaining the same old political structures. Crucially, while the JAAC has recently emerged as an important player in the political landscape of ‘AJK’, at the same time, the Muslim Conference is staging a come-back in renewed form, whose possible role in neutralising the JAAC in future cannot be underestimated.

In GB, political mobilisation has taken different forms, reflecting the region’s unique ethno-sectarian landscape. The Gilgit-Baltistan Youth Movement (GBYM) has emerged as a vocal critic of established political processes, protesting the composition of the caretaker cabinet and demanding greater youth inclusion in governance. Simultaneously, localized protests in Hunza, Nagar, and Diamer districts focus on immediate service delivery failures— particularly electricity and water shortages— while implicitly challenging the authority of both local and federal administrations. The federal government’s response has focused on administrative adjustments and electoral management without substantive constitutional engagement. These movements operate within a delicate sectarian balance between Shia-majority populations and Sunni communities, with incidents like the October 2025 assassination attempt on Sunni cleric Maulana Qazi Nisar Ahmed highlighting the persistent potential for sectarian tensions. The region remains economically marginal despite the stated strategic importance of the CPEC projects, with local communities benefitting minimally from major infrastructure developments in these regions.

Federal Intervention and its Consequences

The federal government’s response to unrest in both territories has followed a consistent pattern of initial heavy-handedness followed by negotiated settlements. During the September 2025 protests in ‘AJK’, authorities imposed a complete communications blackout, suspending mobile and internet services across the territory. This strategy of information control aimed to disrupt protest coordination but also paralyzed normal economic activities and healthcare services, creating widespread resentment beyond activist circles. The deployment of paramilitary forces from “mainland Pakistan”— a move criticized by protests leaders as unnecessary given the fact that it could have been dealt with by the existing local police— further reinforced perceptions of the territories as occupied rather than autonomous regions.

The negotiation outcomes reveal the limits of federal flexibility on structural issues. While the October agreement between the JKJAAC and the ‘AJK’ government addressed many economic demands, it deferred the most politically sensitive issue— the abolition of legislative seats reserved for the refugees to a committee for further study. This pattern of strategic deferral on constitutional matters while conceding economic demands suggests Islamabad’s preference for maintaining existing political structures while using fiscal concessions to manage discontent.

Reservation of seats for Kashmiri refugees is increasingly resisted in ‘AJK’ because locals feel it dilutes their political voice and allows non‑resident voters—living in Punjab, Sindh, or KP—to determine the character of the ‘AJK’ government. These refugee constituencies often swing elections, creating a perception that Islamabad can influence and engineer ‘AJK’ politics through voters who do not share local governance concerns such as roads, land, services, or budgets. Many residents argue the system is outdated: it was designed in the 1950s when refugees were expected to return, but most are now long‑settled outside ‘AJK’. As a result, legislators elected from Pakistan’s provinces help shape ‘AJK’s development priorities without living under its administration. This fuels concerns about fairness of representation, resource allocation, and the erosion of local identity and self‑governance.

In GB, the appointment of retired Justice Yar Muhammad as caretaker chief minister represents a similar approach selecting a politically neutral technocrat to oversee elections while avoiding substantive engagement with demands for constitutional clarity. There are also concerns about local autonomy and resistance against absolute control exerted by Islamabad without giving the people right of representation in the federal system. The movement in GB with calls for ‘no-taxation without representation’ captures the local mood in favour of ending their isolation and initiating self-rule through legitimate representative governance.

Federal-Provincial Relations and Local autonomy/Constitutional Ambiguity

The governance architecture of both territories reflects their unique constitutional status. ‘AJK’ operates under the so called Interim Constitutional Act of 1974, which grants nominal autonomy while crucial powers including defence, foreign policy, and currency rest with the Government of Pakistan. The region’s prime minister and cabinet require approval from Islamabad, creating a system of dual oversight that often leaves local authorities caught between popular demands and federal directives. This structural duality was evident during the 2025 protests, where ‘AJK’ Prime Minister Chaudhary Anwarul Haq appealed for calm while simultaneously implementing communication shutdowns and paramilitary deployments dictated by Islamabad.

In sum, the 1974 Interim Constitution gives ‘AJK’ the appearance of a parliamentary system, but real authority flows upward to Islamabad through the ‘AJK’ Council, chaired by Pakistan’s Prime Minister and dominated by federally appointed members. The Council controls key legislative subjects—natural resources, hydropower, taxation, civil service rules—leaving the ‘AJK’ Assembly with residual less significant municipal powers that stunts the autonomy of the local government. Islamabad also influences appointments, bureaucracy, budgets, and major development projects, while the Kashmir Affairs Ministry in Islamabad acts as the central coordinating authority. As a result, ‘AJK’s executive and legislature operate within a framework where strategic decisions, fiscal flows, and administrative structures remain tied to federal preferences. The system preserves symbolic autonomy but embeds structural subordination.

GB’s constitutional status remains even more ambiguous, governed by the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009-an executive order rather than constitutional provision. This arrangement leaves the region in constitutional limbo, neither a full province nor a federally administered territory. Thus, GB is administered through executive orders rather than a constitution, most recently the GB Order 2018, which grants limited self‑rule but retains decisive powers for Islamabad. Key subjects—minerals, hydropower, security, and major taxation—remain federal. The GB Assembly legislates on local matters, but the federally appointed Governor and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs shape core policy, budgets, and administration, producing a hybrid system with constrained autonomy.

The recent calls by GB’s governor for separate provincial status reflect growing frustration with this ambiguous arrangement, particularly as other Pakistani regions advocate for new provinces based on administrative efficiency rather than constitutional disputes. This constitutional exceptionalism has practical consequences; for instance, the development projects require multiple layers of approval from both local and federal bodies, creating bureaucratic delays and accountability gaps leading to failure of projects in many cases.

Moreover, the composition of governance institutions in both territories remains a point of contention between local populations and federal authorities. In ‘AJK’, the twelve legislative seats reserved for refugees from Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir have become symbolic of broader grievances about representation and resource allocation. As stated earlier, these seats, representing approximately 20% of the strength of ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly create a powerful political bloc that has also been accused of monopolising development funds. The JAAC’s demand for abolishing these seats challenges a decades-old political arrangement, revealing how demographic changes and intergenerational grievances have reshaped political expectations.

In GB, institutional reforms have focused on technical adjustments rather than ensuring constitutional clarity of the region. The January 2026 expansion of the caretaker cabinet to include twelve ministers and two advisors was criticized for alleged partisan appointments aimed at influencing electoral outcomes. More fundamentally, the region lacks the parliamentary representation at the federal level that Pakistani provinces enjoy, denying it a voice in national finance distribution through the National Finance Commission (NFC) awards. This exclusion from fiscal federalism mechanisms means GB remains dependent on federal grants rather than constitutionally guaranteed shares of national resources, despite its strategically significant location and critical resources.

Another important demand raised by the nationalists in both these regions is their total independence or autonomy which is completely disregarded by Islamabad. While Pakistan considers these territories as disputed and therefore maintains constitutional distance as regards their status— projecting it to the world that ‘AJK’ is ‘Azad’ or independent, and GB cannot be absorbed into the federation as another province— the people of the region are treated as ‘subjects’ rather than ‘citizens’ bereft of their rights. 

Conclusion

The political landscape in both territories reflects a continuing crisis of legitimacy. In ‘AJK’, traditional political structures are increasingly unable to respond to public grievances, deepening the sense of a legitimacy deficit. GB, meanwhile, remains constrained by constitutional ambiguity that limits democratic consolidation and leaves key questions of authority unresolved. Islamabad’s strategy—offering short‑term economic relief while preserving long‑standing political arrangements favouring tight federal control— has become progressively less viable as civil society movements push for meaningful, structural reforms rather than symbolic gestures. In the months ahead, ‘AJK’ is likely to experience further tension as the JAAC monitors implementation of the October 2025 agreement, especially the review of reserved seats. In GB, the postponed elections mark a pivotal moment: they could either open space for democratic renewal or accelerate the erosion of institutional credibility. Both regions must navigate these internal pressures while managing their ties to a Pakistani state increasingly driven by strategic imperatives amid regional uncertainty.

Dr. Mohd Usman Bhatti and Dr. Muneeb Yousuf are Researchers with the South Asia Centre at MP-IDSA, New Delhi. The views expressed here are their own.