The Depth of Distrust: Airstrikes in Afghanistan will not make Pakistan Secure

Tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalated into "open war" following Pakistani airstrikes on 21–22 February 2026, which targeted suspected militant hideouts but reportedly killed dozens of civilians. Pakistan justifies these operations as counterterrorism against the TTP, yet critics argue they serve as political signalling to discourage growing diplomatic ties between Kabul and New Delhi. This "dominating attitude" and use of dehumanising propaganda have fuelled deep resentment. Ultimately, the conflict reflects Pakistan’s strategic anxiety over losing influence, ignoring that the TTP is primarily a domestic failure rooted within its own borders.

Recent Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan on 21–22 February 2026, and the subsequent escalation into open hostilities between the two countries, once again highlighted the deep tensions shaping Islamabad’s approach toward Kabul. The crisis soon evolved into a full-fledged confrontation when Pakistan formally declared what its leadership described as “open war” against Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif issued one of the strongest statements during the escalation, declaring: “Now it is open war between us.” Following this declaration, Pakistan carried out further strikes inside Afghanistan, reportedly killing many people and targeting several locations, including areas around Bagram Airbase, a facility that has frequently been referenced in strategic discussions by U.S. President Donald Trump.

These strikes were followed by retaliation from Afghanistan, with Taliban forces claiming that they killed several Pakistani soldiers and captured multiple Pakistani border posts. Afghanistan’s Taliban-led Ministry of Defence also stated that its forces conducted drone and aerial strikes against several Pakistani military installations, including the strategically important Nur Khan Airbase and other military facilities. The ministry described the attacks as “precise aerial operations” targeting Pakistan’s strategic military infrastructure.

Propaganda, Airstrikes, and New Delhi’s response

The crisis also saw another dimension of information and propaganda warfare, which they have always used to dehumanize Afghans, often calling them namak harams. During the conflict, a Pakistan government-linked video produced by individuals connected to the country’s information ministry was circulated widely online. The clip featured actors delivering scripted lines mocking Afghanistan. In one segment, a line ridiculed Afghans by saying, “تم افغانی ہو اور پاکستان پر حملہ کرو گے؟” (“Tum Afghani ho, aur Pakistan par hamla karoge?” which menas “You’re Afghani, and you’re going to attack Pakistan?”). Another line stated, “تنور چلانے کے علاوہ تم جنگ بھی لڑتے ہو؟” (Tandoor chalan eke alawa tum jang bhi ladhte ho” which means “Apart from running tandoors, do you also fight wars?”). The content dehumanized the Afghans and portrayed them in racially inferior manner. The fact that such content emerged from Pakistan’s information ministry raised concerns about the mindset reflected in these narratives. When insulting and dehumanising language toward Afghans comes from government-linked sources, it not only reinforces perceptions of hostility but also reflects an authoritarian mentality in which Afghans are viewed as inferior and subject to control.

The strikes that initially triggered the escalation took place in Nangarhar, Paktika and Khost provinces. Pakistan claimed they targeted Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP) hideouts, describing the operation as intelligence-based retaliation for recent terror attacks inside Pakistan, including a sectarian bombing at a Shia mosque. However, Afghan authorities and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported civilian casualties, with at least 13–18 killed—including women and children—and several others injured when residential areas and a madrassa were hit. Homes and religious structures were also damaged. Pakistan, by contrast, claimed over 70 militants were eliminated and denied civilian casualties. This sharp divergence highlights the ongoing dispute over facts and responsibility.

Subsequently, as the crisis escalated into open hostilities between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the human toll increased significantly. According to UNAMA, between 26 February and 5 March 2026 at least 185 civilian casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, including 56 civilians killed and 129 injured, with more than half of the victims reported to be women and children.

These recent airstrikes were not isolated ones. Pakistan has a long history of such operations. In April 2022, pre-dawn strikes in Khost and Kunar reportedly killed at least 47 civilians and injured over 20, mostly women and children, though Islamabad claimed militant hideouts were targeted. Similar incidents occurred in later years: in March 2024, strikes in Khost and Paktika reportedly killed eight civilians; on 24 December 2024, clustered strikes in Paktika killed at least 15 people; and in November 2025, another operation in eastern Afghanistan reportedly killed 10 civilians, including nine children and one woman.

United Nations reporting documented that from October to December 2025, intensified cross-border clashes—including airstrikes and artillery exchanges—caused at least 70 civilian deaths and hundreds of injuries across multiple provinces. Over the past four years, repeated airspace violations, drone strikes, and artillery fire in eastern Afghanistan have cumulatively resulted in over 100 civilian deaths, according to Afghan and UN-linked sources. Pakistan has consistently justified these operations as counterterrorism measures targeting terror networks.

In response to these attacks on Afghanistan, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated, “India strongly condemns Pakistan’s airstrikes on Afghan territory that have resulted in civilian casualties, including women and children, during the holy month of Ramadan. It is another attempt by Pakistan to externalise its internal failures.” New Delhi reiterated its support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and maintained that such actions reflect an attempt to deflect from domestic security challenges rather than address them.

Even within Pakistan, criticism of border management has surfaced. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-F, said, “Not even a single pomegranate can be imported from Afghanistan, yet Pakistan’s government alleges that terrorists are coming from Afghanistan.” His statement underscored contradictions in Islamabad’s narrative — that while trade and ordinary movement are tightly restricted, armed actors are still able to operate across the frontier.

Pakistan’s Dominating Attitude and Strategic Anxiety

At a deeper strategic level, Pakistan appears to seek dominance over Afghanistan’s external orientation and security choices. Islamabad has long viewed close ties between Kabul and New Delhi as a serious security concern. Afghanistan maintaining independent and constructive engagement with India is perceived within Pakistan’s strategic establishment as a direct national security threat. Pakistan has historically viewed Afghanistan as part of its concept of “strategic depth” and finds it difficult to accept that the Taliban are maintaining good relations with New Delhi.

This perception became particularly evident in October 2025, when Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited India — the first such high-level visit since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. During the same period, Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Afghan territory. In geopolitics, timing matters greatly. If the strikes were purely tactical counterterrorism measures, they could have been conducted at a different moment. The decision to carry them out while Afghanistan’s top diplomat was engaging with New Delhi inevitably created the impression of political signalling. It reinforced the belief that Islamabad is deeply uncomfortable with visible Afghanistan–India diplomatic proximity.

Pakistan has consistently portrayed Afghanistan–India relations as a threat, framing them as a potential encirclement strategy or an existential security concern. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif has repeatedly amplified this narrative, stating that Pakistan faces a “two‑front threat” and alleging that India and Afghanistan are acting together against Pakistan’s interests. He went so far as to call Afghanistan a “colony of India.” Several other Pakistani officials have echoed similar claims. Even Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari weighed in, stating that “Afghanistan is acting as a proxy for India.”

This perceived security threat is driving Pakistan’s increasingly aggressive policies toward the Taliban, including repeated military actions against a sovereign country and frequent violations of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also reflects Pakistan’s continued attempt to maintain a dominant influence over Afghanistan’s political and strategic direction.

Yet this perception does not automatically constitute evidence of coordinated anti-Pakistan groupings. Instead, it reflects a broader strategic anxiety within Pakistan about losing influence in Kabul. Since returning to power, the Taliban leadership has attempted to pursue an independent foreign policy rather than operating under the direction of external actors. That independent posture has not aligned with Pakistan’s expectations.

When the Taliban took control of Kabul in 2021, sections of Pakistan’s leadership publicly celebrated the development. Many in Islamabad and Rawalpindi seemed to assume that the new authorities in Kabul would closely follow Pakistan’s directives and strategic preferences. However, that expectation has not materialized.

Internal Failures and the Fallout of Pakistan’s Aggression

At the same time, the terror networks that attack Pakistan are largely rooted within Pakistan itself. The TTP is a Pakistani-origin organisation with recruitment, ideological foundations, and an operational history embedded within Pakistan’s own territory. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan predates the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 and was, at times, even more severe in earlier periods. To attribute the entirety of Pakistan’s security crisis to Afghan sanctuaries overlooks this internal dimension.

Moreover, the Pakistan–Afghanistan border has long been porous, with cross-border tribal, familial, and commercial movement predating modern political disputes. For decades, communities have moved across this frontier for trade, refuge, and kinship ties. Using the cross-border movement of people as a justification for airstrikes inside Afghanistan — as was done in the recent incident, when a Pakistani who carried out an attack on innocent Shia civilians in Pakistan had reportedly travelled to Afghanistan a year earlier — remains a highly contested rationale.

Pakistani leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman has also highlighted Pakistan’s broader strategic failures, noting that, “In 78 years, Pakistan has not been able to make Afghanistan its friend. You only know war. You cannot solve this problem.” He further remarked that Pakistan now struggles to maintain good relations with many of its neighbours, underscoring what critics describe as Islamabad’s long-standing diplomatic difficulties in the region.

Reflecting Afghanistan’s perspective, Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi stated: “We don’t want conflict with anyone. Pakistan is not our only neighbour — we have five other neighbours, and all of them are happy with us except Pakistan.”

The repeated use of air power and the killing of innocent civilians risk fuelling deep-seated resentment that could have long-term consequences for Pakistan itself, including further destabilisation.

Dialogue, Sovereignty, and the Need for Constructive Engagement

It is time for both countries to engage in dialogue rather than Pakistan repeatedly claiming that Afghanistan is a proxy of India and pointing fingers at New Delhi. A stable and constructive relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is in the interest of Pakistan itself as well as the wider region. Instead of pursuing a dominating approach, Islamabad should prioritise diplomacy and peaceful engagement with the Taliban leadership.

Repeated violations of Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, along with hostile media narratives, psychological warfare, and attempts to portray Afghans as inferior, only deepen mistrust. Constant accusations that Afghanistan is acting on behalf of India do little to address the real issues between the two countries.

Pakistan must move away from its dominating posture and recognise that Afghanistan is an independent and sovereign country with its own political agency and the right to pursue its own foreign policy. A relationship based on mutual respect and constructive engagement offers the only realistic path toward reducing tensions and achieving long-term stability in the region.

Dr Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.