Bidya Devi Bhandari’s May 2025 visit to China marks her symbolic re-entry into Nepali politics and reveals Beijing’s renewed interest in consolidating leftist forces in South Asia. This comment unpacks the ideological, intra-party, and geopolitical ramifications of her outreach. With tensions simmering in the CPN-UML and Prime Minister Oli seeking balance between China and India, Bhandari’s rising profile could reshape Nepal's strategic orientation and destabilize internal party dynamics. India’s quiet support for Oli may be a strategic counterweight, while the UML convention looms as a potential proxy battleground for external influences.
Highlights
Bhandari’s Political Re-Emergence
- Former Nepal president Bidya Devi Bhandari from CPN-UML reactivates her political persona post-2023, through grassroots outreach and symbolic diplomacy. Her ideological positioning evokes “original UML values,” contrasting Oli’s populist pragmatism.
- Chinese Communist Party’s warm reception and calls for unity signal Beijing’s interest in leftist alignment and intra-party engineering. Echoes of past efforts like the failed 2018 UML-Maoist unification show historical precedent for Chinese involvement.
- Bhandari vs Oli rivalry intensifies. Oli’s purges and institutional redesigns may not withstand Bhandari’s Beijing-backed ascendancy.
- China’s symbolic backing of Bhandari is perhaps prompting India to recalibrate by quietly courting Oli. Nepal’s strategic space shrinks as internal power plays intersect with regional rivalry.
- India prefers influence through development aid, diplomacy, and engagement with rational actors. Oli’s repositioning may appeal to New Delhi not because of personal reasons, but as a counter to growing Chinese influence. But it may not be a wise move.
- The upcoming UML convention may be a test of strength between factions and external alignments. Nepal risks political destabilization if regional powers are seen as backing internal players.
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When Bidya Devi Bhandari, the former president of Nepal and a staunch advocate of communist consolidation, touched down in China this May, the optics were unmistakably political. Red carpets, high-level CPC meetings, and a call for “unity among like-minded forces” revealed far more than diplomatic niceties. What makes the episode remarkable is not merely her visit, but its timing, amid rising factional tensions within Nepal’s ruling CPN-UML and a simmering rivalry between Bhandari and Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli. In the power play unfolding within the Himalayan republic, Bhandari’s Chinese outreach is both a personal assertion and a return of ideology in intra-UML politics. It signals not only her re-entry into active politics but also Beijing’s renewed appetite for alignment with left forces in South Asia. The unspoken question: Will this push Oli closer to New Delhi?
China’s messaging was subtle, but its symbolism was not lost on observers. Meeting Vice President Han Zheng and high-level CPC officials, Bhandari was urged to “deepen cooperation” and “maintain stability.” Beneath the formalities, there was an unmissable undertone. Beijing still believes in the project of communist unity in Nepal, and Bhandari could be its new face. This is not unprecedented. Earlier in 2018, the unification of the CPN-UML and Maoist Centre into the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) bore China’s fingerprints. That experiment crumbled under the weight of ego and ideological dissonance between Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Today, with Dahal leaning opportunistically toward India and Oli facing dissent within the UML, Bhandari’s rise may appear to Beijing as a reset button. The irony, however, is stark: Beijing’s re-entry strategy, meant to foster unity, may instead deepen the cleavages within the UML.
Since stepping down from the presidency in 2023, Bhandari has gradually reactivated her political persona. Visits to grassroots networks in Koshi Province, increasing visibility at party events, and now her China trip, all hint at a calculated return. The Madan Bhandari loyalists give her an ideological purity that Oli, increasingly seen as power-centric, cannot claim. Yet, Oli is not new to power games. He has purged dissenters like Bhim Rawal and redrawn the UML’s rulebook to solidify his grip. His leadership, however, now faces dual challenges: external pressure from China’s subtle backing of Bhandari and internal murmurings about ideological deviation. If Bhandari’s return is framed as a call for “original UML values,” Oli’s utilitarian populism may come under ideological fire. And herein lies the danger for him: an intra-party contest not just of charisma, but of authenticity.
The 2015 blockade, followed by Oli’s pivot to China, ushered in a new era of Nepalese assertiveness. India’s strategic patience has been about maintaining quiet channels, especially through developmental aid, security cooperation, and religious diplomacy. But the Bhandari moment presents a potential reconfiguration. If Beijing is seen as overtly championing her cause, India may offer quiet encouragement to Oli. To understand this, one must separate political posturing from geopolitical interests. For India, it is not about who leads UML; it is about engaging with political actors who may not be seen as overtly close to China. A weakened Oli, threatened by Bhandari's Chinese-backed re-emergence, may become more receptive to India’s terms, be it on hydropower, trade, or trilateral connectivity.
For Nepal, the China-India axis is a double-edged sword. Beijing offers the dream of infrastructure-led prosperity through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); India offers cultural proximity, open borders, and a critical trade corridor. Neither actor can be ignored. But when internal political actors begin using one external patron to outmanoeuvre domestic rivals, things become a bit complex. This is precisely where Bhandari’s China visit is being read with concern. While she remains a private citizen, her stature and symbolism make any such trip more than ceremonial. That the Chinese urged her to “lead” the process of left unity is being read in Kathmandu and in New Delhi as a soft endorsement of the policy of regime engineering. The long-term consequences of such policy could be destabilising: Oli might harden his faction, Bhandari, raise her profile, and the UML convention might become a proxy battlefield for competing regional influences.
While Oli has never been India’s favourite, he has proven to be a rational actor under certain conditions. His previous anti-India posture was as much about consolidating nationalism as it was about deflecting internal challenges. Today, as Bhandari’s challenge grows with a geopolitical shadow, Oli may find in New Delhi a necessary counterweight. Signs of this shift are emerging. Oli’s outreach to Indian diplomatic channels, his muted response to recent border tensions, and his government’s toning down of anti-India rhetoric, all signal an attempt to recalibrate. Unlike Bhandari, who now risks being viewed as Beijing’s emissary, Oli can reposition himself as a balancer, playing one power against the other. For India, such a move is welcome, not because of who benefits in Kathmandu, but because it restores equilibrium in a region increasingly penetrated by China’s party-to-party diplomacy.
For India, its indelible historical ties and recurrent investments in Nepal’s development create tension between strategic restraint and opportunism in Nepal. Open border arrangement, - deep cultural affinities, and extensive people-to-people links create cross-border social and economic interdependence. While these legacies account for mutual familiarity and influence, they also generate resentment in certain Nepali circles that view India’s proximity as hegemonic, big-brotherly, or intrusive. In situations like this, policy of either ‘strategic restraint’ or ‘opportunism’ comes to mind. While restraint would mean maintaining distance and decorum, and faith in long-term ties and institutional linkages, avoiding destabilizing tactics, respecting sovereignty, and sustaining influence through consensus, opportunism would entail selective backing of actors (e.g. Oli, in this case) drifting away from Beijing, driven by geopolitical necessity rather than genuine endorsement of them.
The next few months will be critical. The UML’s planned policy convention may transform into a leadership contest. Bhandari, armed with symbolic capital and Beijing’s silent nod, may pose a serious challenge to Oli’s hegemony. But unless she rallies a sizeable faction, her influence may remain atmospheric. Meanwhile, Oli’s survival instinct may push him to rebuild bridges with India. There are other questions to be answered too: will this convention cement ideological realignment or fragment the party further?
Bidya Devi Bhandari’s visit to China has lit a fuse. Whether it sparks a new era of left unity or merely fans the flames of intra-party rivalry depends on how Oli and the UML establishment respond. But what is clear is that Beijing has once again chosen to act through symbolism and subtext, nudging political realignment in Kathmandu. In the process, it may have pushed Oli to reconsider his strategic gameplan. India cannot afford to ignore Bhandari's China visit and her political resurgence. It may not be a right move for India to support Oli solely because of the China factor.
*Harsh Pandey is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. He is also a Life Member of the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.
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