The 2026 legislative elections in the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) unfolded as a violent confrontation over constitutional identity and federal control rather than a routine democratic exercise. The crisis emerged from decades of an "interim" constitutional framework established in 1974, which created a subordinate political system where real power rests with Islamabad through the Kashmir Council. The mobilisation of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) demanding economic justice and constitutional reforms, particularly regarding abolition of 12 refugee seats, precipitated widespread boycotts and deadly clashes during elections. This analysis examines how controlled autonomy, resource exploitation, and political alignment with Islamabad have produced a constitutional void, where elections reflect federal preferences rather than authentic popular will, culminating in the 2026 electoral crisis.
The 2026 legislative election in the so-called ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK), part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), unfolded not as a routine democratic exercise but as a violent confrontation over the territory’s constitutional identity and the limits of federal control. While the formal electoral machinery processed votes over three phases, widespread boycotts, allegations of manipulation, and deadly clashes between protestors and security forces resulting in dozens of deaths, exposed the deep fissures within an “interim” constitutional framework that has now endured for over five decades. The crisis, ensuing the proscription of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) and a violent crackdown, represents the most significant challenge to the controlled political order established under the 1974 Interim Constitution. As the state proceeded with elections while ignoring the JAAC’s calls for the fulfillment of its demands, including the abolition of 12 refugees seats and broader constitutional reforms, the resultant violent clashes and deaths prompted the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and Amnesty International to give calls for a transparent enquiry into the killings of protestors, while a 50-day internet blackout severely impeded independent verification of the events on the ground.
Historical Trajectories: From Controlled Experiment to Managed Democracy
The electoral process in PoK originated not from a popular movement for self-determination but as an administrative mechanism to manage the territory’s ambiguous status. According to UNCIP resolutions, the administration of this area was entrusted to Pakistan until the region could exercise its right to self-determination, a provision that has remained in constitutional limbo for over seven decades, primarily because of Pakistani vacillation and fear that any such exercise in the 1940s and 1950s would. Have gone against it. Prior to 1970, governance rested on indirect electoral colleges under the Basic Democracy framework, with the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference dominating political life in AJK. The landmark ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ Government Act of 1970 introduced adult franchise for the first time, establishing a presidential system that, while appear progressive, still operated within the constraints of Pakistan’s overall control. A decisive shift occurred in 1974 when the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto replaced the presidential system with a parliamentary framework and, critically, instituted the ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ Council. Chaired by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, this Council retained significant legislative and executive authority over the territory, controlling 52 subjects including electricity generation, tourism, banking, telecommunications, and economic planning.
The AJK interim Constitutional Act 1974, as critics note, enshrined a structure where the federal government, through the Council, exercises “supra power” over the local legislature, with the Prime Minister of Pakistan holding virtual veto rights on everything. The very designation of the constitution as “interim” was presented as a provisional measure pending the resolution of Kashmir’s final status, yet this provisionality has become permanent, creating a prolonged “constitutional void.” While amendments over the years, including the Thirteenth Amendment of 2018, suggested a path toward empowerment through the transfer of certain financial and administrative powers to the elected government, core limitations have persisted. The amendment transferred 21 of 52 subjects from the Council to the ‘AJK’ government, with the Council retaining control over the remaining subjects. The Council continues to exercise authority and control over key appointments, resource allocation, and strategic matters, leaving the territory as an extension of the federal government.
Constitutional Void and Political Alignment
The constitutional framework is explicitly interim, pending the resolution of the state’s final status. This provisional nature produces what local observers call a “constitutional void”. Under this provisional setup state institutions appears to function, but their authority is circumscribed by the larger unresolved dispute and by residual federal prerogatives. The Government of Pakistan retains exclusive authority over defence, foreign affairs, currency, and the implementation of UNCIP resolutions, while the Kashmir council holds legislative and executive authority over subjects that, under Pakistan’s constitution, belong to the federation.
The ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly, in contrast, is “only responsible for dealing with day-to-day affairs in a given legal setup”. This structural arrangement places the elected assembly in a subordinate position, with the federal government exercising indirect but effective control. The most glaring manifestation of this controlled autonomy is the pattern of political alignment. Since the mid-1970s, the party or coalition in power in Islamabad has consistently secured corresponding majorities in Muzaffarabad. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won when it held power federally; the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) rose when it controlled Islamabad; and in 2021, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) won a majority while leading the federal government.
This phenomenon has progressively marginalised ‘indigenous’ political formations, as the organisational structures of mainland Pakistani partiers have been extended into the territory, crowding out local parties. The structural dominance of the federal government, through its influence over finances, development budgets, senior administrative and judicial appointments, and informal political alliances, ensures that local elections often reflect the political will of Islamabad rather than the authentic preferences of the local population. This reflects the “structural dominance of the federal government,” as one analyst notes, “that has influence over finances, development budget, senior administrative and judicial appointments, and informal political alliances”. The ‘AJK’ government remains accountable to the Kashmir Council and, by extension, to Islamabad, rather than to the people who elect it.
Resource Grievances and Economic Discontent
Economic grievances, particularly around resource distribution, form a critical backdrop to the current crisis. ‘AJK’ contributes far more electricity than it consumes, largely through hydropower projects, yet faces severe constraints on fiscal autonomy. The Mangla Dam issue epitomises this friction for years, as the territory received only nominal water-use charges, and although subsequent agreements have sought to bring payments closer to provincial levels, implementation has remained contested.
The project, executed between June 2004 and September 2007, inundated 15,780 acres in Mirpur district, displacing residents of 118 villages. While a compensation package worth PKR 26 billion was agreed upon, a substantial portion remains pending, with only 46 out of 449 affected individuals receiving partial compensation and PKR 4.4 billion still held by the Ministry of Finance. The territory’s heavy reliance on federal grants for development budgets with the 2025-26 and 2026-27 budgets dependent on federal allocations of PKR 104.90 billion under federal variable grants and PKR1 billion as water use charges, perpetuates a relationship of dependency that undermines local autonomy.
The government’s decision to waive electricity arrears for 2,376 affected consumers, amounting to PKR 139.170 million, was perceived to be too little too late represented a belated effort to address longstanding grievances. However, critics argue that ‘AJK’ receives far less than its fair share of revenue generated from its natural resources, especially hydropower: data presented in the National Assembly revealed that over the past decade, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa received PKR 216 billion in net hydel profit, Punjab PKR 73.45 billion, while ‘AJK’ received only PKR 6.4 billion.
Moreover, the Kashmir Council’s control over subjects like electricity and hydro-power generation means that the ‘AJK’ government lacks meaningful authority over the very resources that could provide fiscal autonomy. A recurring demand from the successive local governments and particularly civil society has been for ‘AJK’ to receive a fair share if revenue generated from its natural resources, a demand that has remained largely unfulfilled. As recently as May 2026, the Ministry of Defence warned the Prime Minister’s office and Finance Ministry that continued delays in compensation payments for victims if the Mangla Dam Raising Project could trigger public protests and affect internal security. This warning proved prophetic, as the cumulative weight of resource exploitation and fiscal dependency has fueled successive protest cycles, including the JAAC mobilisation that precipitated the 2026 electoral crisis.
The rise of JAAC and the demand for fundamental reform
The current crisis has its immediate origins in the mobilisation of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a coalition of civil society actors, students, lawyers, and traders that emerged in September 2023 with a 10-point charter of demands centered on subsidised flour and recalibration of electricity tariffs based on production costs from the Mangla Hydropower Project. The movement intensified over the following months, and by September 2025, JAAC had expanded its demands to a 38-point charter that encompassed not only economic grievances but also constitutional reforms, including the abolition of 12 refugee seats and elite privileges. Talks between JAAC, the ‘AJK’ government, and federal ministers convened in late September 2025 but collapsed when a deadlock emerged over this constitutional demand, triggering a shutter-down strike and protests that descended into violence, leaving at least nine people dead.
To end the unrest, the government claimed that it addressed some of these major demands by fixing electricity tariffs, subsidising wheat, and announcing a relief package for the region. According to the advisor to the prime Minister Rana Sanaullah, the government accepted 37 of the 38 demands put forward by JAAC, including fixing electricity tariffs at Rs4 per unit, providing subsidised wheat, and announcing a Rs 23 billion relief package for the region.
The Case of 12 “Refugee Seats”
However, one of the primary demands by JAAC regarding the refugee seats remained unfulfilled. These 12 “refugee seats”, six linked to the Kashmir valley and six to Jammu, elected by refugees settled across Pakistan have however, long been a source of contention. Critics argue that these seats distort representation, dilute local political will, and allow, mainland parties to unduly influence government formation. The arrangement is notably lopsided, with six seats representing approximately 434, 000 refugees from the Jammu division and six representing only 30, 000 from the Kashmir valley.
JAAC’ argument was straightforward: those who do not live in Kashmir should not have the right to govern its people. The government, however, has defended the seats as a historical and constitutional necessity, arguing they preserve representation for Kashmiris displaced from areas administered by India. Advisor to the Prime Minister Rana Snaullah told the Senate that the seats could not be abolished through executive orders, as all political parties in ‘AJK’ its parliament, and other constitutional forums supported retaining refugee representation. The ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly passed a resolution retaining the seats, and the region’s Supreme Court ruled in June 2026 that they are constitutionally protected under Article 22 and cannot be altered, reduced, or abolished without a constitutional amendment enacted strictly in accordance with Article 33 of the ‘AJK’ Constitution.
State Response: Proscription, Violence, and the 2026 Elections
The government’s response to JAAC’s mobilisation was swift and violent. On June 5, 2026, the ‘AJK’ government formally banned JAAC under the Anti-terrorism Act, declaring it a proscribed organisation under the First Schedule of the ‘AJK’ Anti-terrorism Act, 2014, for being “engaged in terrorism, acting in a manner prejudicial to the peace and security of the State, involved in creating anarchy”. The notification was issued hours after the Election Commission announced 27 July 2026, as the date for general elections. The government subsequently placed 147 activists on the fourth Schedule of Anti-terrorism Act. These measures, along with the imposition of a 50-day internet blackout and road blockades, severely restricted the movement’s ability to organise and prevented independent scrutiny of the unfolding events. The ‘AJK’ authorities claimed that JAAC had expanded its demands from a few points to 38 and then further, maintaining that 35 of the 38 demands agreed upon last October had already been met, with remaining issues requiring constitutional processes rather than agitation.
The confrontational atmosphere culminated in the July-August 2026 elections. Held in three phases––Mirpur Division on July 27, Muzaffarabad Division and the refugee constituencies on August 2, and Poonch Division scheduled for August 10, the elections unfolded against a backdrop of violence. The first phase was marred by violence in Kotli, where one person was killed and three injured in a shooting, and in Bhimber, where protestors snatched a ballot box containing 232 votes and set it on fire. JAAC urged a boycott, and PTI also withdrew from the process, citing concerns over election fraud. The electoral process was overshadowed by severe clashes, particularly in Rawalakot, where JAAC claimed more than 30 people were killed in clashes with security forces. The Amnesty International, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Kashmir diaspora among others has called for an impartial and independent investigation into the reported killings. Authorities disputed the death toll, alleging that armed individuals have infiltrated the demonstrations. However, the protestors and JAAC leaders rejected government claims, stressing that government forces were operating in civilian dress to promote violence and disrupt peaceful protests.
Conclusion
The 2026 elections in ‘AJK’ represent a critical juncture in the territory’s political trajectory. They have exposed the inherent contradictions of a “democratic” system that operates under an interim constitution, subject to federal oversight, and structured to produce outcomes aligned with Islamabad’s political interests. The JAAC mobilisation, articulated a fundamental demand: that the people of ‘AJK’ should have the right to determine their own government, free from distorting influence of externally elected representatives and federal control. The government proscription of JAAC in response, the ensuing violent crackdown, and the imposition of a communications blackout have exposed the credibility of the electoral process and deepened public mistrust.
While Pakistan continues to describe the territory as autonomous (Azad), the events of 2026 demonstrate otherwise, and whenever the local inhabitants began demanding their constitutional, political and economic rights, they were meet with brutal violence. Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal’s characterisation of the unrest as a shift from “ballot to bullet” inadvertently captured the essence of the crisis. Irrespective of the managed elections outcome, unless Pakistan provides constitutional clarification, equitable fiscal arrangements, and the authentic expression of the territory’s political will, another JAAC formation is already taking shape, with more vocal inhabitants now assuming leadership of the ongoing movement. The unresolved constitutional void, coupled with recurring cycles of protest and repression, suggests that the 2026 elections may be remembered not as a democratic milestone but as a stark reminder of the limits of controlled autonomy in a territory whose final status remains undetermined after more than seven decades.
Dr. Usman Bhatti is an independent analyst from Jammu and Kashmir, now based in New Delhi. The views expressed are his own. Generative AI has been used to polish the language while the arguments made in the Issue Brief are those of the author.
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