The Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) elections of 6 June 2026 exposed the region’s enduring constitutional ambiguity and federal dominance. With 24 seats contested, early results placed the PPP ahead of PML-N, though independents could play a decisive role. Allegations of electoral engineering—such as withholding Form-45, relocating polling stations, and altering voter lists—underscored mistrust in the process. GB’s peculiar status, governed by presidential orders rather than constitutional provisions, leaves its two million residents without parliamentary representation or fiscal rights. Despite generating vast hydropower and tourism revenue, GB is excluded from the NFC Award and denied royalties, fuelling resentment. Federal overreach, demographic shifts since the 1974 revocation of the State Subject Rule, and land appropriation under the Khalsa Sarkar doctrine have deepened local grievances. While PPP promises reform and PML-N emphasises development, Islamabad’s reluctance to grant provincial status—linked to Kashmir diplomacy—ensures GB remains trapped in legal limbo, sparking persistent protests and demands for autonomy.
As the ballots were tallied on 6 June 2026, for the 24 directly contested seats of the ‘Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly’, allegations of pre-poll manipulation, administrative overreach, and a deepening constitutional void shaped the political discourse from Gilgit to Skardu. Early unofficial returns indicated the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leading, followed by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), while independents also remained in the fray and could potentially emerge as kingmakers, as their support would be necessary for either major federal party to secure a majority and form a government. It is a notable feature of GB’s political landscape that no local or regional party contested the elections, leaving voters with a choice between two federal parties, that are widely perceived locally as making lofty promises during the campaigns but delivering little once in power. While the PPP and PML-N emerged as the primary contenders for the Chief Minister’s Office, the electoral exercise was overshadowed by formal complaints from opposition parties regarding the conduct of the vote.
In the months preceding the conclusion of elections, GB experienced localised protests centered on issues like land appropriation under the colonial-era Khalsa Sarkar (Crown lands) doctrine, fiscal disparity arising from the region’s exclusion from the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, and fear of demographic marginalisation following the 1974 revocation of the State Subject Rule. The elections, delayed by four months due to harsh winter weather and logistical constraints, concluded with the PPP formally accusing the federal government of “electoral engineering”, including allegations that Form-45 (the official vote count document) was withheld, voter lists were altered, and polling stations were relocated overnight to disadvantage specific candidates.
Form 45 is the official document issued at each polling station in Pakistan that records the vote obtained by each candidate, signed by the presiding officer and shared with polling agents. The controversy arises when parties allege, they were denied access to it, fuelling suspicions of electoral manipulation. In the 2026 Gilgit-Baltistan elections, both PPP and PTI alleged their polling agents were not given Form 45, undermining confidence in the vote count. PTI claimed unusually high voter turnout after 7 pm and suspected tampering of official result documents, including Form 45 and Form 46 (ballot paper account). Election law mandates timely issuance of Form 45. Delays or withholding raise fears of systematic rigging. Without Form 45, parties cannot independently verify polling station results, leaving final tallies vulnerable to manipulation at later stages (e.g., Form 47 which offers Consolidated Statement of Results).
The political discourse preceding the vote and following it lays bare a region stuck in a holding pattern, as GB is neither a full-fledged province of Pakistan nor a genuinely autonomous entity under the 2009 Empowerment and Self-governance Order. This commentary attempts to ground the analysis of the 2026 elections within the deeper historical context of federal intervention, resource exploitation, and the legal absurdities that leave the two million residents of GB without representation in Pakistan’s parliament or a fair share of their natural wealth.
The Constitutional Void: Neither Kashmir nor Pakistan
To understand the voting patterns and the specific nature of recent unrest in Gilgit-Baltistan, one must first navigate its unique legal status, designed and implemented by successive federal governments to produce permanent ambiguity. Unlike the four provinces of Pakistan, GB is governed by a legal framework that has evolved through presidential order rather than constitutional provisions. The ‘Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance order of 2009’ was signed into law by President Asif Ali Zardari. While this order established a Legislative Assembly, a Chief Minister, and a Governor, it deliberately stopped short of integrating the region into Pakistan’s constitutional framework. This 2009 order was subsequently replaced by the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018, a presidential decree, which remains the governing instrument in effect today. The 2018 order provides no constitutional representation for GB in Pakistan Parliament, does not entitle GB to a share in the NFC Award, and crucially, does not guarantee protection under Articles 1 and 8 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which define the territorial boundaries of the state and the rights of its citizens. Article 60 (2) of the 2018 Order gives the Prime Minister of Pakistan power to legislate on any matter in GB, and Article 60 (4) gives the prime Minister veto power over legislation passed by the GB Legislative Assembly.
It has been argued that the federal government’s perpetual maintenance of this “ambiguity” is a calculated diplomatic and legal strategy. By refusing to fully integrate GB, Islamabad maintains the legal fiction that the region is a disputed territory awaiting a United Nations-mandated plebiscite which would decide the future of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. This position is reinforced by the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s 1999 judgement in Al-Jehad Trust vs. Federation of Pakistan, which acknowledged GB’s fundamental rights but explicitly states that the Court could not direct parliamentary representation for the region “because of the fact that a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations is to be held.” However, this “dual rhetoric”, treating GB as strategically integral for projects like CPEC while legally peripheral for rights and taxation, has produced a deep well of local resentment. For the residents of Hunza, Skardu, and Gilgit city, the constitutional limbo translates into tangible deprivation. The region is excluded from the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, the mechanism that distributes federal revenue to the four provinces under Article 160 of the Constitution. Consequently, despite generating billions in revenue through hydropower (with a potential exceeding 30,000 megawatts), tourism, and serving as the land corridor for CPEC, GB does not have fiscal autonomy and receives no royalty payments. In 2023, the regional government was forced to approach the Supreme Court merely to challenge the federal government’s decision to withhold budget releases and development funds, a fiscal stranglehold that would be politically untenable in Punjab or Sindh.
Federal Overreach and the ‘Deep State’ in the Mountains
The 2026 elections were not merely a contest between the PPP and PML-N, they were a stage upon which the administrative machinery’s control over the periphery was demonstrated. The run-up to the 6 June vote saw the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the party of incarcerated former Prime Minister Imran Kahn, systematically marginalised. Dr. Yasmin Rashid, a senior PTI leader, noted that the party was deprived of its electoral symbol, mirroring the tactics of the February 2024 general elections, and faced administrative hurdles in campaigning. This asymmetry of the playing field was not subtle. While one party’s leadership like PML-N Nawaz Sharif campaigned openly, other political parties, especially those not in power in Islamabad, faced significant restrictions on their movement and public gatherings.
The PPP, while a major beneficiary of the anti-PTI sentiment, also vocally accused the federal government of “electoral engineering.” PPP leaders alleged that federal ministers were pressuring presiding officers to withhold Form-45 (the vote count document) and that polling stations had been physically relocated overnight to disadvantage PPP voters in constituencies like Astore-II. With growing allegations of irregularities, the Election Commission of GB withheld results from constituency GBA-13 of Astore and ordered re-polling due to irregularities. Residents of the district reportedly protested against the administrative changes, blocking key roads to express their grievances.
These allegations point to a persistent reality of federal overreach that transcends party lines. The federal government retains direct control over the transfer and posting of key administrative officers in GB, including the Chief Secretary and Inspector General of Police. In March 2023, the GB cabinet revolted against the federal government’s unilateral transfer of the IGP, a move viewed as an attempt to exert pressure on the local police force. This administrative subjugation ensures that the Chief Minister in Gilgit exercises little authority over the levers of power, which remain tightly held by Islamabad’s bureaucracy.
Beyond the political wrangling, the election brought to the fore the volatile issue of sectarian identity and evolving security situation in the region with the presence of militant groups, a phenomenon largely accused by locals as orchestrated by the elements within the Pakistani ‘deep state’. GB is a majority Shia Muslim region, a demographic fact that has historically made it a target for state-engineered militancy. Locals have long accused the state of a deliberate “divide and rule” policy.
The revocation of the State Subject Rule in 1974, which previously protected the indigenous demographic composition, allowed for the large-scale settlement of non-locals, primarily Punjabis and Pashtuns into the region, particularly in the commercial hubs of Gilgit and Skardu. This demographic shift, coupled with the allotment of land to non-locals near strategic military installations and CPEC routes, has fueled the perception among GB’s indigenous population that Pakistan is plundering the region’s resources on the name of security while systematically altering its demographic character.
Resource Exploitation and the Khalsa Sarkar Doctrine
The economic grievance driving the latest protests in GB are perhaps the most deeply felt, as GB’s natural resources are extracted under the shadow of the Khalsa Sarkar (Crown lands) doctrine. This colonial-era legal framework, originally introduced by the Dogra Maharaja of Kashmir and formalized under Pakistani rule through the Northern Areas Nautore Rules (1978-80) under General Zia-ul-Haq, allows the state to claim ownership of barren or uncultivated land, even land held in common by the community without adequate compensation. This legal framework is specific to GB and has no equivalent in Pakistan’s broader legal system. The Khalsa Sarkar doctrine reclassified communal lands (known as Shamilaat-e-Deh) as state property, dispossessing local communities of ownership and use rights that had existed for generations.
Under the guise of “development” and “national security”, vast tracts of land have been appropriated for CPEC-related infrastructure, army cantonments, and special economic zones. In Gilgit and Skardu specifically, large tracts of land have been allotted to non-locals near strategic installations. The construction of the Diamer-Basha Dam, a critical infrastructure project, will generate immense electricity and water storage for the rest of Pakistan, but GB receives no provincial share or royalty from this power generation. During the winter months, while lights burn in Lahore and Islamabad, the people of Gilgit face power outages lasting most of the day, a bitter irony given that the region’s rivers power the national grid.
This sustained economic exploitation has fuelled the low-boil unrest currently simmering in the region. Recent years have witnessed the eruption of persistent protests both in major cities as well as at local levels, resulting in sporadic roadblocks by local civilians, including by tourism unions demanding greater share of the revenue from tourism industry largely controlled by Islamabad, student protests over job quotas which has been eroded by the settlement of non-locals, and frequent localized sit-ins against electricity shortages. The “hypocrisy of the system”, is evident in the fact that while the federal government refuses to grant provincial status, it taxes the residents of GB and drafts its youth into the armed forces, treating them as Pakistani citizens only when strategically convenient for the state.
Structural Ambiguity Remains
The outcome of the 6 June 2026, elections will likely do little to resolve this structural ambiguity. The PPP has historically positioned itself as the party of constitutional reform, pointing to the 2009 Empowerment order as a stepping stone toward provincial status. PML-N, conversely, campaigns on the promise of development and completion of infrastructure projects, which appeals to a business class weary of instability. However, Pakistan strategy of keeping the GB status as constitutionally ambiguous that is, without a provincial status is unlikely to change without a seismic shift in Islamabad’s Kashmir policy. Granting GB provincial status would effectively concede to India the argument that the disputed territory is no longer “disputed” but integrated, potentially closing the door on the UN plebiscite that Pakistan has officially demanded since 1948.
It is also true that the cost of this legal limbo is rising. The youth of GB, who are increasingly digitally connected and aware of their comparative deprivation compared to citizens of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Punjab, are no longer satisfied with cosmetic reforms. GB bears the cost of both positions that the state holds simultaneously: it is treated as settled territory for domestic administrative purposes (conscription, taxation, state infrastructure projects) while being presented as disputed territory for international audiences to preserve Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir plebiscite.
The election may have concluded, but the underlying crisis has not. As long as the people of GB remain “stranded in legal ambiguity”, taxed but not represented, strategically vital but not sovereign over their own resources, the resistance will continue with the eruption of frequent protests. The federal government, having tactically managed the election results according to its administrative priorities, must now confront the harder reality: a region that holds the keys to Pakistan’s energy security and trade routes cannot be governed indefinitely by administrative fiat and selective memory. The latest “tense standoff” witnessed in “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir” (PoK) serves as a warning; the fragmented but persistent grievances of GB have the potential to coalesce into a unified demand for rights and autonomy that Islamabad can no longer ignore.
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