Pakistan faces mounting crises on multiple fronts. The nation's relative stability post-2023 is eroding as economic pressures intensify with the IMF imposing stringent reforms that may heighten public discontent. Simultaneously, security challenges persist with Balochistan's insurgency and rising militant attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa straining federal-provincial relations. The recent dismissal of the PTI-led provincial government signals precipitate army action against Afghanistan and potential escalation against the Taliban government in Kabul, with whom tensions have grown over Pakistan’s belief that it is providing sanctuaries to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) even after repeated reminders. Despite initial hopes that a Taliban-led Afghanistan would stabilise relations, cross-border conflicts have increased, creating a cycle of insecurity that Pakistan's establishment may exploit to justify increased militarisation, which is going to worsen the crises being faced by the hybrid regime in Islamabad.
Pakistan stands at a crossroads once again. The relative stability that emerged in the aftermath of the 9 May 2023 attacks, largely maintained through the military establishment’s grip on the state and the country’s political landscape now appears to be weakening with each passing day. This was accompanied by a narrative promoted by the Pakistani army that it had defeated India in its response (Bunyan un Marsoos & Marka-e-Haq) to India’s Operation Sindoor. Deliberately cultivated to fuel nationalist sentiment among the population, this narrative helped the military establishment divert public attention from the country’s underlying problems for some time. However, that shield is now gradually beginning to crumble.
Economic Distress and IMF Pressure
Pakistan’s economy remains in a difficult position. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has reached a staff-level agreement with Pakistan following the completion of its latest economic review, potentially unlocking $1.21 billion in funds. However, the agreement offers limited long-term relief and comes with strict conditions. The IMF has stressed the need for further reforms, including ending fuel subsidies, reducing losses in the energy sector and improving revenue collection. At a time when Pakistan is already facing the economic consequences of the escalating conflict in the Persian Gulf and the wider region, implementing these measures could intensify public anger against the ruling elite. Rising living costs and mounting economic pressures are likely to make it increasingly difficult for ordinary Pakistanis to meet their daily needs.
The Crumbling Security Shield and Growing Political Turmoil
Rising militant attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have further strained relations between the federal government and the provincial administration. The provincial government has called for counterterrorism policies that take local complexities into account, a position that has caused friction with the federal centre. There had been growing indications that the provincial government could be dismissed. In addition to the PTI’s long march demanding the release of its founder, Imran Khan, the federal government was also dissatisfied with the provincial administration’s handling of law and security challenges. On 11 October 2026 Pakistan’s President dismissed the PTI-led provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This decision is likely going to be followed by Pakistan’s major offensive against the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan, whom Pakistan has been at odds since they have took to power. This may complicate relations with Afghanistan and lead to intensification of political opposition to the current regime.
The persistent insurgency in Balochistan, which has recently witnessed an increase in attacks on military convoys, also remains a major challenge for the Pakistani state. Pakistan has blamed it on India and even named Baloch insurgents as Fitna al Hindustan! Such externalisation of an internal security issue demonstrated the unwillingness of the ruling elite in Pakistan to diagnose the cause of the problem and take adequate measures to resolve it. On the contrary, the regime has used it conveniently as an alibi to raise the bogey of India, without any evidence, and sought to rally public support behind its continued hold on power.
For decades, Pakistan sought a reliable partner in Afghanistan, with the Pakistan Army particularly keen to establish an ideological ally across the border. In the 1970s, the Bhutto government began supporting Afghan Islamists partly to counter Pashtun nationalism. The Pakistan Army initially backed Hizb-e-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who proved unable to consolidate power. As the Taliban emerged, Javed Ashraf Qazi, then director-general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), monitored their rise and eventually decided to support them. The ISI assigned Colonel Imam to this effort. He trained Taliban fighters and supplied them with arms, helping the movement consolidate its control over southern Afghanistan. That did not help Pakistan as it was seen how the Pakistani Taliban pledging their loyalty to the Afghan Taliban kidnapped and killed Imam in captivity. The relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban remained a point of concern that led to a de facto rupture in Pak-Af relations as one could see later. Pakistan initially welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, hoping that a friendly government in Kabul would secure its western border, limit Indian influence in Afghanistan, and help suppress anti-Pakistan militant groups. However, these expectations have not been fulfilled, and tensions between Islamabad and Kabul have continued to grow.
Soon after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, clashes broke out along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, undermining Islamabad’s expectations that the new government in Kabul would help secure its western frontier. Pakistan has since witnessed a rise in militant attacks. Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban government of providing safe havens to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which it holds responsible for many of these attacks. On the other hand, the Taliban government denies sheltering the TTP and blames Pakistan for its internal security challenges.
Over the past few years, Islamabad has employed a range of measures to pressure the Taliban government in Afghanistan to rein in the TTP. These have included sending delegations of prominent Deobandi scholars from Pakistan to persuade the Taliban leadership to act against TTP militants, expelling Afghan migrants living in Pakistan, seeking third-party mediation, and carrying out airstrikes inside Afghanistan. Such measures have failed to curb the attacks inside different parts of Pakistan. Despite its limited military capabilities, Afghanistan has also grown increasingly assertive, launching retaliatory strikes inside Pakistan.
A recent New York Times article quoted a senior Pakistani intelligence official as saying that “the country’s leadership has concluded that Pakistan’s domestic security wouldn’t improve until it sorted out the Taliban.” Meanwhile, despite its commitments under the Mecca Agreement, Pakistan has officially declined to participate in offensive combat operations against Houthi forces. Islamabad recognises that pressing security challenges closer to home demand the attention and resources of its military.
Although Pakistan has not openly called for regime change in Afghanistan, Taliban officials have grown increasingly concerned in recent months about the possibility of a Pakistani-backed effort to remove them from power. Lynne O’Donnell argues “that Afghanistan has no unified armed resistance movement, but rather a collection of disparate armed groups operating under ambitious leaders with different constituencies, external patrons and political goals”. These groups are not yet coordinating their activities on a large scale, nor do they have a firm foothold in significant territory. It is therefore premature to view them as a unified national resistance movement capable of challenging Taliban rule. However, these groups can operate with relative impunity in areas where they are strongest, weakening Taliban control, disrupting its ability to respond, and gradually reducing the territory over which the Taliban can exercise secure and effective control. Over time, these groups could possibly weaken the Taliban’s grip on power.
Against this backdrop, the dismissal of the provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could give the federal government greater scope to take tougher action against TTP militants, while challenging the Taliban government’s claims regarding Pakistan’s internal security. However, such a move could also trigger a resurgence of militancy in the border region and deepen political divisions within Pakistan. A more aggressive campaign against the TTP could also lead Islamabad to intensify military operations against the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, further escalating tensions between the two countries.
The Militarisation Cycle Endures
The Pakistani state has often used security challenges at home and in the neighbourhood to justify increased defence spending and strengthen the military’s role in national affairs. Such policies have, at various times, received Western financial and military support. The threat from Afghanistan could once again serve this purpose, potentially reinforcing a cycle in which a new militant group like the TTP emerge, creating new security challenges and providing further justification for military expenditure. In this way, the cycle of insecurity and militarisation could continue, potentially with renewed American support for Pakistan’s security establishment. For decades, Pakistan has relied on such policies, and similar patterns may re-emerge in the future, as past experiences appear to have done little to deter the country’s deep state from pursuing them again.
Pakistan's current trajectory suggests a continuation of deeply entrenched patterns, where domestic and regional insecurities provide justification for increased military influence and expenditure. As the nation navigates economic reform pressures, political turmoil at home, persistent insurgencies, and deteriorating relations with Afghanistan, there is a palpable risk that history may repeat itself. The security establishment may once again leverage these challenges to reinforce its institutional dominance, potentially perpetuating a cycle where short-term stabilisation measures come at the cost of long-term democratic and economic development. Pakistan's ability to break this pattern will determine whether current crossroads lead toward sustainable stability or deeper crisis.
Muneeb Yousuf is a Research Fellow at Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. The views are his own.
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