Abstract
The Quad’s November 2026 summit in Manila, followed two days later by the US–China–Russia meeting in Shenzhen, highlighted the dual direction of Washington’s Indo-Pacific policy. The United States has not abandoned the Quad, but its increasingly transactional approach appears to privilege immediate economic, technological, and maritime priorities while preserving room for engagement with Beijing. This has left the grouping’s longer-term strategic purpose less clearly articulated, even as practical cooperation continues. The pattern also raises the question of whether the locus of caution within the Quad has shifted from India to Washington. The article argues that the diversification pursued by its members is better understood through the lens of strategic risk management than as evidence, in itself, of alignment hedging.
Introduction
The Quad leaders met in Manila on 17 November 2026, at the first leaders’ summit in more than two years.[i] Two days later, President Donald Trump met Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen, where the three issued a joint declaration toward Peace.[ii] The sequence brought into sharp relief two strands of Washington’s Indo-Pacific policy: continued engagement with partners through the Quad and renewed high-level engagement with Beijing. The juxtaposition is politically significant, but it does not, by itself, establish that the latter shaped the language or outcomes of the former.
That distinction frames the question this article addresses. The Quad remains active, and its practical agenda continues to expand; yet its collective articulation of strategic purpose appears less geographically specific and less explicit about the maritime challenges that originally brought its members closer. The central argument is not that Washington has abandoned the grouping, but that its increasingly transactional approach—prioritising immediate economic, technological and maritime deliverables while preserving room for engagement with Beijing—has left the Quad’s longer-term strategic direction less clearly articulated. Transactionalism need not imply an absence of strategy; it may itself reflect a preference for flexibility and selective engagement over sustained collective positioning.
This shift also raises a question about the changing locus of caution within the Quad. India, initially the most guarded member in articulating the grouping’s maritime-security purpose, subsequently moved towards greater convergence with its partners. By 2026, however, the dilution of collective language invites examination of whether the source of caution has shifted towards Washington. All four members continue to manage strategic uncertainty by widening their options, but their approaches differ according to their respective vulnerabilities and relationships with the major powers.
From Sea Foam to Axiom—and Back?
Japan and the United States met in Manila. The initiative drew Chinese diplomatic protests; the expanded Malabar 07-02 exercise in September sharpened regional sensitivities. External pressure was not the sole cause of its collapse. India and Australia resisted an overt security character; domestic opposition reinforced New Delhi’s caution; Abe Shinzo’s resignation removed the initiative’s principal political advocate; and after Kevin Rudd’s election, Australia announced in January 2008 that it would not join a second meeting. The Quad faltered not solely because of Beijing’s opposition, but also because its members lacked a shared assessment of its purpose and the resolve to sustain it.[iii]
The idea persisted. Returning to office in 2012, Abe proposed an ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’ linking the four countries to safeguard the maritime commons. His 2016 promotion of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ reinforced the logic of connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Meanwhile, bilateral and trilateral ties had strengthened, perceptions of China’s regional role had converged, and Washington became more supportive of quadrilateral cooperation. Renewed Japanese and US advocacy provided the immediate impetus for the four countries’ November 2017 meeting in Manila.[iv] They issued separate national readouts: Washington, Canberra and Tokyo referred explicitly to freedom of navigation, international law and maritime security; New Delhi emphasised an inclusive Indo-Pacific and its Act East Policy.[v] In March 2018, Wang Yi likened the four countries’ Indo-Pacific initiative to ‘sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean’, suggesting that it might attract attention but would soon dissipate.[vi]
That forecast was not borne out. Convergence came gradually, through practice rather than design. Officials’ consultations became foreign ministers’ meetings in 2019 and leaders’ summits in 2021. An expanding agenda covered vaccines, critical technologies and maritime domain awareness. Australia’s return to the Malabar exercise in 2020 marked an important step in the Quad’s operational convergence. India’s movement in the declaratory domain was equally significant: by 2022, New Delhi had endorsed language on the East and South China Seas, UNCLOS and opposition to coercion. The Quad had moved from conundrum to axiom.[vii]
The Wilmington summit of September 2024 marked the high point of this convergence. Its declaration described the four countries as more strategically aligned than ever and identified the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award as a significant milestone. The absence of a leaders’ summit in 2025 and the less geographically specific language of 2026 raise the question implicit in the title: can the Quad sustain the convergence that confounded Wang Yi’s prediction?[viii]
Reading the Quad: Competing Assessments and Alternative Pathways
Assessments of the Quad’s present condition fall into three broad interpretations. One sees the grouping as being in decline, with its strategic relevance diminishing to the point of being described as dead or on life support.[ix] A second regards the recent interruption in leaders’ summits as a period of turbulence rather than institutional collapse, pointing to the continuation of ministerial engagement and practical initiatives.[x] A third emphasises the political and regional dimensions of the grouping: the leaders’ decision to reconvene can itself signal continued strategic engagement to Beijing, while questions remain about the Quad’s added value to ASEAN-led regionalism.[xi]
Beyond these assessments, a proposal to deepen India–Japan–Australia coordination offers a possible organisational response to uncertainty about American commitment. Such an arrangement is envisaged as complementary to, rather than a replacement for, the Quad.[xii]
Two questions therefore warrant closer examination. First, how have changing priorities within the four capitals, particularly Washington’s, affected the Quad’s strategic direction, and has the locus of caution within the grouping shifted? India’s movement from its initially guarded position towards greater convergence provides an important historical reference point for examining this question. Second, does the common use of ‘hedging’ adequately distinguish deliberate ambiguity about alignment from the broader management of strategic risk? All four members seek to manage strategic uncertainty by diversifying relationships and capabilities, though in different ways and in response to different vulnerabilities. This requires distinguishing between risk management—reducing exposure to volatility and coercion—and alignment hedging, which involves deliberately signalling ambiguity about where a state would stand in a security contingency involving China.
Manila Decoded: The Narrowing of the Quad’s Strategic Language
The form of the Manila text is itself analytically significant. The first leaders’ summit in more than two years produced not a declaration but a brief joint press release of some 530 words. This was markedly different from the more expansive Wilmington Declaration of September 2024 and followed the adoption of the joint press-release format by the foreign ministers in July 2026.[xiii] Its framing is largely commemorative: it marks nearly a decade since the Quad’s revival and the tenth anniversary of Abe Shinzo’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific, describing the grouping as “a force for good and a partnership of action”.[xiv] Substantively, the summit reaffirmed the Quad’s emphasis on practical cooperation across maritime security, critical technologies and economic resilience. Its principal announcements included the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration, a joint maritime patrol-aircraft exercise planned for 2027, expanded cooperation on undersea and electricity cables, and enhanced cybersecurity collaboration. The leaders also welcomed undersea cable projects in the Indian Ocean and announced an India-hosted Business Leaders’ Forum for early 2027. Alongside these initiatives, President Trump announced critical-minerals agreements on the margins of the summit, although these did not feature in the joint press release. Taken together, the outcomes reflected continuity in the Quad’s functional agenda, even as its collective articulation of strategic purpose appeared more circumscribed.
The table below compares the Manila text with selected Quad joint statements and national readouts since 2017.
Table 1.
The Quad’s declaratory language: what has been retained and what has receded
|
Selected text |
East and South China Seas named |
2016 arbitral award named |
UNCLOS named |
Rules-based order explicitly invoked |
Inclusive Indo-Pacific |
Freedom of navigation / overflight |
|
Manila officials, Nov 2017¹ |
No |
No |
No |
Partly |
Partly |
Partly |
|
Tokyo leaders, May 2022 |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Wilmington leaders, Sep 2024 |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Washington ministers, Jul 2025 |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
New Delhi ministers, May 2026 |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
Atlanta ministers, Oct 2026 |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes² |
|
Manila leaders, Nov 2026 |
No³ |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
Notes:Partly indicates that the language appeared in some, but not all, national readouts.
¹ The November 2017 meeting produced no joint text; entries reflect four separate national readouts. References to a rules-based order, international law and freedom of navigation appeared in some partner readouts; India’s alone described the Indo-Pacific as inclusive. International law was mentioned, but UNCLOS was not named. ² The Atlanta text uses the formulation “navigational rights and freedoms”. ³ The East and South China Seas were omitted from the Manila joint press release but mentioned in Japan’s separate national readout. Not shown: references to named terrorist attacks and fixed dates for subsequent summits.
Source: Official Quad joint statements, joint press releases and national readouts; compiled by the author.
Read vertically, the table suggests that the narrowing of the Quad’s declaratory language proceeded in stages rather than through a single decision at Manila. The New Delhi ministerial statement of May 2026, the last comprehensive text before the summit, continued to refer to the East and South China Seas and the 2016 arbitral award. Both were absent from the Atlanta statement of October, which nevertheless retained a section on maritime security and a reference to UNCLOS. That reference, however, concerned navigational rights and freedoms in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb, rather than the maritime disputes in East and Southeast Asia. The Manila release omitted UNCLOS altogether.[xv] The Atlanta text also appears to have provided a template for Manila: the leaders reproduced, almost verbatim, its concern over economic coercion through arbitrary export restrictions and endorsed the AI Accelerator announced there.[xvi] Freedom of navigation, by contrast, is the only one of these specific maritime commitments retained in every selected joint text since 2022. The general principles therefore remain, but their application to the waters most directly associated with the Quad’s earlier maritime-security concerns has receded from its collective statements. Japan’s separate national readout of the Manila summit is the exception.[xvii]
The contrast between 2017 and 2026 is particularly revealing. In 2017, India was the only member whose readout omitted explicit maritime-security language. By May 2026, as host of the ministerial meeting, it had endorsed a statement naming the East and South China Seas, the arbitral award and UNCLOS. Yet six months later, it accepted a leaders’ text that omitted all three. This reversal makes Indian reluctance an unlikely explanation for the latest omissions. The pattern is more consistent with a change in the preferences shaping the collective language, particularly those of Washington, which hosted the Atlanta ministerial and whose President was due to meet the Chinese and Russian leaders in Shenzhen two days after Manila. This remains an inference from the sequence and content of the texts, not proof of who proposed or negotiated the omissions. It nevertheless suggests that the locus of caution within the Quad may have shifted.[xviii]
The narrowing of declaratory language has not been accompanied by a corresponding retreat in practical cooperation. The Manila release launched the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration, announced a 2027 joint exercise involving the four countries’ P-8 and P-3C patrol aircraft, and extended cooperation from undersea cables to electricity cables. It also welcomed undersea cable projects in the Indian Ocean and announced enhanced cybersecurity cooperation.[xix] Critical-minerals agreements announced by President Trump at the summit, however, did not feature in the joint text.[xx] The Quad’s agenda thus appears increasingly oriented towards managing specific risks and advancing practical interests rather than articulating a consistently shared strategic purpose.
For India, the Manila outcome presents a mixed ledger. The joint text retains the condemnation of cross-border terrorism, welcomes undersea cable projects in the Indian Ocean and announces a Business Leaders’ Forum for early 2027, to be hosted by India.[xxi] It does not, however, repeat the explicit reference to the Pahalgam attack included in the Washington and New Delhi ministerial statements, or mention the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Nor does it identify a host or date for the next leaders’ summit. The term “inclusive”, which India had used in its 2017 readout, has also been absent from collective texts since 2025.[xxii] India’s interests therefore remain represented in parts of the Quad’s practical agenda, but some of the geographical, political and declaratory specificity it had secured in earlier texts has receded. Whether this is a temporary adjustment in the grouping's language or signals a more durable shift in its strategic orientation is a question that extends beyond India to the Quad as a whole.
Parallel Risk Management: Beyond the Hedging Label
The Shenzhen meeting sharpens the question raised by Manila. Two days after the Quad leaders issued a press release that omitted UNCLOS, the United States joined China and Russia in a declaration affirming the importance of state consent and the immunities of state officials, while cautioning against the abuse of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court and similar bodies.[xxiii] The declaration was principally concerned with questions of jurisdiction and sovereignty. Its language nevertheless sits uneasily alongside the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award, which Beijing rejected partly on grounds of jurisdiction and consent.[xxiv] The juxtaposition does not establish a direct connection between the two positions, but it illustrates the uncertainty that Washington’s simultaneous pursuit of strategic competition and accommodation with Beijing can create for its partners.
This raises a conceptual difficulty. The term hedging is frequently used to describe the combination of engagement, diversification and risk reduction pursued by states navigating strategic uncertainty. Applied this broadly, however, it risks becoming an all-purpose description that explains little. Lim and Cooper have questioned its analytical value when it is used without distinguishing between different forms of alignment behaviour.[xxv] Two practices need to be separated. Strategic risk management involves diversifying partnerships, supply chains, technological dependencies and sources of energy to reduce exposure to volatility or coercion. Alignment hedging, in the stricter sense used here, involves deliberately signalling ambiguity about which side a state would support in a security contingency involving China. Diversification alone is therefore insufficient evidence of hedging. The more discriminating question is whether a state deliberately preserves uncertainty about its strategic alignment in such a contingency.
India provides an important test. Its external relationships are diversified, and its emphasis on strategic autonomy is well established. Yet neither should automatically be interpreted as evidence of alignment ambiguity. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s formulation that India is not so much a middle power as a “power in the middle” conveys a sense of structural position rather than equidistance between competing powers.[xxvi] He has also spoken of the wider inclination among states “to hedge, to de-risk and to diversify”.[xxvii] These formulations reflect the vocabulary of risk management, but the more consequential evidence lies in policy and conduct. In May 2026, India hosted a Quad ministerial statement that explicitly named the East and South China Seas, addressed coercive actions at sea and cited the 2016 arbitral award.[xxviii] This is difficult to reconcile with the proposition that New Delhi is deliberately signalling uncertainty about its position on the maritime balance in Asia. India’s differences with Washington, moreover, need not indicate ambivalence towards China. They may instead reflect an assessment that dependence on an increasingly unpredictable partner creates risks of its own. Jaishankar’s observation that the United States was “deliberately becoming a lonelier power” captures this concern.[xxix]
The pattern extends beyond India. Japan seeks greater defence autonomy and wider partnerships while remaining anchored in its alliance with the United States. Australia continues to regard the alliance as central to its security, but has also sought to stabilise relations with Beijing and broaden cooperation with regional partners. India, without a treaty alliance with Washington, combines national capability-building with closer strategic and defence cooperation with Japan and Australia. These approaches differ in institutional form and in the degree of dependence on the United States, but each seeks to reduce vulnerability to strategic uncertainty. Recent Japanese and Australian defence initiatives, alongside closer India–Japan–Australia engagement, illustrate this widening of options.[xxx]
The United States presents a different case. Its engagement with Beijing, including the Shenzhen declaration, reflects a willingness to pursue accommodation on selected issues even while strategic competition persists. This may complicate the expectations of its partners, but it should not simply be labelled hedging in the same sense used to describe the choices of secondary states. The concept developed by Lim and Cooper concerns the alignment strategies of states operating between competing great powers; applying it symmetrically to Washington would obscure the difference in structural position.[xxxi]
The different pathways through which the four members are managing strategic uncertainty are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Four members, different pathways to strategic risk management
|
Member |
Relationship with China |
Relationship with the United States |
Principal mode of risk management |
Evidence of alignment ambiguity in a China contingency |
|
Japan |
Territorial and maritime disputes in the East China Sea |
Treaty ally |
Greater defence autonomy and wider partnerships, particularly with Australia and India |
Limited; alliance commitments remain central |
|
Australia |
No comparable territorial dispute; seeks to stabilise economic and diplomatic ties |
Treaty ally |
Diversification of partnerships while retaining the alliance as the security anchor |
No clear evidence of alignment ambiguity; diversification primarily reflects economic and strategic risk management. |
|
India |
Unresolved land boundary dispute and wider strategic competition |
Strategic partner, not treaty ally |
National capability-building and partnerships without alliance dependence |
No clear evidence of alignment ambiguity; diversification primarily reflects economic and strategic risk management. |
|
United States |
Strategic rivalry alongside selective engagement and accommodation |
Alliance hub and Quad member |
Selective stabilisation with Beijing while retaining regional partnerships |
The evidence points to greater policy flexibility, but does not establish alignment hedging in the same analytical sense |
Source: Official statements and policy documents, and contemporary reporting cited below. The characterisations are analytical assessments, not formal classifications by the governments concerned.
The comparison highlights that diversification does not carry the same strategic meaning for all four members. While the three non-US members seek to preserve the benefits of the Quad while managing their respective dependencies and vulnerabilities, Washington's selective accommodation with Beijing introduces a different source of uncertainty.
The more useful description, therefore, is parallel risk management, not “hedging in parallel”. The three non-US members remain committed to the Quad but are also widening their options in case American priorities fluctuate. This does not demonstrate a common intention to distance themselves from Washington, still less a shared alternative alignment. Rather, it indicates a convergence in method: preserving the benefits of the partnership while reducing exposure to uncertainty within it. The distinction matters. Strategic diversification can reinforce the resilience of the Quad’s members without necessarily weakening the grouping; whether it does so will depend on whether their additional partnerships complement collective cooperation or gradually substitute for it.
Sustaining the Quad: Strategic Priorities and India’s Choices
How the four members respond to the changing priorities in Washington will shape the Quad's next phase. Three possible trajectories merit attention. The first is a functional but strategically less articulated grouping: ministerial engagement and practical cooperation continue, while collective statements remain less explicit about the geographical and political contexts that informed earlier convergence. The restoration of references to the East and South China Seas and UNCLOS in the next leaders' statement would be an important indicator of a reversal. The second is a re-anchoring of the Quad by Washington, reflected in a more predictable summit schedule, renewed strategic language and the implementation of agreed initiatives, including the planned maritime exercise in 2027. The third is more regular India–Japan–Australia coordination alongside the Quad, potentially institutionalised through a standing trilateral ministerial mechanism. These trajectories are not mutually exclusive; the second and third, in particular, could develop in parallel.
For the Quad collectively, the priority should be to sustain credibility through delivery. This calls for greater focus on initiatives that offer tangible regional value: the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration and its planned 2027 exercise, cooperation on undersea cable resilience, and critical minerals and supply-chain partnerships. The grouping should also give practical content to its support for ASEAN centrality through sustained engagement with ASEAN-led mechanisms, while restoring a stronger Indian Ocean dimension to its agenda, including through engagement with the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Finally, its members should ensure that commitments to freedom of navigation and international law retain relevance to the maritime contexts in which these principles are contested. Strategic restraint in language may facilitate consensus, but prolonged omission risks weakening the credibility of collective commitments.
For India, the task is to preserve the Quad's strategic utility while ensuring that its own regional priorities remain adequately represented. New Delhi should press for a stronger Indian Ocean dimension in the grouping's agenda, particularly maritime surveillance, undersea infrastructure and regional connectivity. It should use its convening role in the Business Leaders' Forum to advance economic and technological cooperation, while seeking greater predictability in the summit process and sustained attention to cross-border terrorism. At the same time, deeper coordination with Japan and Australia in maritime security, defence capabilities and supply-chain resilience would provide additional strategic options without implying an alternative alignment or diminishing the Quad.
India's challenge, therefore, is not to choose between commitment to the Quad and strategic autonomy. It is to make the two mutually reinforcing. The earlier pattern, in which Indian caution constrained declaratory convergence, has given way to a more complex situation in which Washington's preference for strategic flexibility may have a similar effect. The test of the Quad's future will be whether its members can sustain practical cooperation while retaining sufficient strategic coherence to give that cooperation direction and credibility.
What Manila ultimately signals is not the Quad’s demise but its dispersal, which means strategic weight shifting from a single Washington-led centre toward a more distributed architecture of middle-power initiative. For India, this represents a paradoxical culmination of its long arc toward convergence of interests within Quad. New Delhi joined the grouping rather defensively and diffidently, anxious that declaratory boldness would inflame Beijing and constrain its options; today, it risks discovering that excessive strategic restraint in Washington has become the greater threat to the Quad’s credibility. India’s task, therefore, is to complete its transformation from that of a cautious participant to a proactive custodian. This does not mean supplanting American leadership, but complementing it— by deepening trilateral coordination with Japan and Australia, anchoring the Indian Ocean as a core strategic theatre for Quad rather than as a region losing its import, and using ‘strategic autonomy’ not as aloofness but as the very capital that allows India to invest more heavily in the grouping’s strategic direction. The Quad’s next decade will be defined less by whether Washington remains committed than by whether New Delhi, Tokyo, and Canberra can supply the predictability that no single capital, however powerful, can guarantee alone.
Commodore (Retd.) Abhay Kumar Singh is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Peace Studies (CPS), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.
[i] Trevor Hunnicutt, Karen Lema and Mikhail Flores, “Trump Meets Key US Regional Allies in Manila Ahead of China Visit,” Reuters, November 17, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-kick-off-asia-trip-with-quad-talks-manila-ahead-china-visit-2026-11-17/; The White House, “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release,” November 17, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/quad-leaders-summit-joint-press-release/.
[ii] The White House, “U.S.-Russia-China Heads of State Declaration toward Peace,” November 19, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/u-s-russia-china-heads-of-state-declaration-toward-peace/.
[iii] Siddharth Varadarajan, “Four-Power Meeting Drew Chinese Démarche,” The Hindu, June 14, 2007, republished at https://svaradarajan.com/2007/06/14/four-power-meeting-drew-chinese-demarche/; Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue.
[iv] Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012, https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2017, chap. 1, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000290287.pdf; Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, Defining the Diamond.
[v] Ministry of External Affairs, India, “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific (November 12, 2017),” November 12, 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_IndoPacific_November_12_2017; Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” November 12, 2017, https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/aus-india-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” November 12, 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html; U.S. Department of State, “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” November 12, 2017, https://2017-2021.state.gov/australia-india-japan-u-s-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific/.
[vi] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” updated March 9, 2018 (press conference held March 8, 2018), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyjh/202405/t20240530_11341219.html.
[vii] Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Quad Leaders’ Meeting Tokyo 2022,” chronology of Quad meetings, https://www.kantei.go.jp/quad-leaders-meeting-tokyo2022/index.html; Ministry of Defence, India, “Malabar 2020 Naval Exercise,” Press Information Bureau, October 19, 2020, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1665830; “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” Tokyo, May 24, 2022, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202200446/pdf/DCPD-202200446.pdf.
[viii] “Joint Statement by President Biden, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India—The Wilmington Declaration,” September 21, 2024, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202400805/html/DCPD-202400805.htm; The White House, “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release,” November 17, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/quad-leaders-summit-joint-press-release/.
[ix] Michael Shoebridge, “The Incredible Shrinking Quad,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, September 4, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/incredible-shrinking-quad.
[x] Harsh V. Pant and Sayantan Haldar, “The Year Gone By, The Quad’s Year of Interregnum,” Observer Research Foundation, January 16, 2026, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-year-gone-by-the-quad-s-year-of-interregnum; Justin Bassi, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and James Corera, “For the Quad, Turbulence Doesn’t Mean Collapse,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 2, 2025, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/for-the-quad-turbulence-doesnt-mean-collapse/.
[xi] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Justin Bassi, “Just by Meeting, Quad Leaders Send a Signal to Beijing,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 16, 2026, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/just-by-meeting-quad-leaders-send-a-signal-to-beijing/; Shameek Godara, “The Quad Needs ASEAN More than ASEAN Needs the Quad,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, August 5, 2026, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/the-quad-needs-asean-more-than-asean-needs-the-quad.
[xii] Sanchari Ghosh, “Four Legs Bad, Three Legs Better? Rescuing the Quad with an India-Japan-Australia Grouping,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, September 1, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/four-legs-bad-three-legs-better-rescuing-quad-india-japan-australia-grouping; Phelim Kine, “Another International Alliance Withering under Trump: The Quad,” Politico, November 14, 2026, https://politi.co/4iPvYfJ.
[xiii] “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release,” November 17, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/quad-leaders-summit-joint-press-release/; “Joint Press Release on Cooperation with ASEAN by the Quad Foreign Ministers,” Manila, July 22, 2026, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/joint-press-release-cooperation-asean-quad-foreign-ministers. The Wilmington Declaration is substantially longer; the word count is the author’s.
[xiv] “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release.”
[xv] “Joint Statement of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” New Delhi, May 26, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101034337.pdf; “Quad Joint Press Release on Economic Prosperity and Security,” Atlanta, October 31, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101110375.pdf; “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release.”
[xvi] “Quad Joint Press Release on Economic Prosperity and Security”; “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release.”
[xvii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders’ Summit,” November 17, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000691_00003.html.
[xviii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” October 31, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/pageite_000001_00006.html; “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release”; The White House, “U.S.-Russia-China Heads of State Declaration toward Peace,” November 19, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/u-s-russia-china-heads-of-state-declaration-toward-peace/.
[xix] “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release.”
[xx] “Trump Announces Critical Minerals Agreements at Quad Meeting in Manila,” Al Jazeera, November 17, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/17/trump-announces-critical-minerals-agreements-at-quad-meeting-in-manila.
[xxi] “Quad Leaders’ Summit Joint Press Release”; Randhir Jaiswal (@MEAIndia), post on X listing the outcomes of the Quad Leaders’ Summit, November 17, 2026, https://x.com/MEAIndia/status/2122680303659741274.
[xxii] “Joint Statement of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” Washington, DC, July 1, 2025, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100868822.pdf; “Joint Statement of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” New Delhi; “The Wilmington Declaration”; Ministry of External Affairs, India, “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific (November 12, 2017),” November 12, 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_IndoPacific_November_12_2017.
[xxiii] The White House, “U.S.-Russia-China Heads of State Declaration toward Peace,” November 19, 2026, para. 3, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/11/u-s-russia-china-heads-of-state-declaration-toward-peace/.
[xxiv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” December 7, 2014, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367291.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines,” July 12, 2016, https://fm.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/201607/t20160713_1357.htm.
[xxv] Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 696–727, especially 696 and 698, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1103130.
[xxvi] “India Not a ‘Middle Power’ but a Power in the Middle: EAM Jaishankar at Bloomberg New Economy Forum,” DD India, October 14, 2026, https://ddindia.co.in/2026/10/india-not-a-middle-power-but-a-power-in-the-middle-eam-jaishankar-at-bloomberg-new-economy-forum/; see also Bloomberg New Economy, “India’s Jaishankar on Key Foreign Policy Objectives,” YouTube video, October 13, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubL4c6yjU3I.
[xxvii] Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Remarks by EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar at the 15th Annual Convocation Ceremony at IIM Raipur,” April 4, 2026, para. 5, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements?dtl/41020.
[xxviii] “Joint Statement of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” New Delhi, May 26, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/101034337.pdf.
[xxix] “‘US Has ‘Deliberately Become a Lonelier Power’: EAM Jaishankar on Shifting Global Order,” Business Today, October 4, 2026, https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/us-has-deliberately-become-a-lonelier-power-jaishankar-on-shifting-global-order-559411-2026-10-04.
[xxx] Phelim Kine, “Another International Alliance Withering under Trump: The Quad,” Politico, November 14, 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/11/14/trump-asia-pacific-quad-alliance-01166490. The article reports on recent Japanese and Australian defence initiatives and quotes Yuki Tatsumi on the limits of any effort to exclude the United States.
[xxxi] Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 724–26.

