Date
04-09-2026
The Saudi–Türkiye–Pakistan trilateral security partnership, formalised through the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement in August 2026, represents a major recalibration in West and South Asian geopolitics. Signed amid the Iran–US–Israel war, the pact commits the three Sunni-majority states to collective defence, intelligence sharing, and institutionalised cooperation, echoing NATO’s Article 5. Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and brings in the centrality of the Gulf; Türkiye offers experience of the NATO and a growing defence-industrial base, while Pakistan brings military capacity and nuclear power to the group. The alliance reflects Riyadh’s diversification beyond reliance on the US, Ankara’s bid to expand its footprint in the Gulf, and Islamabad’s search for strategic relevance and deterrence vis-à-vis India. While symbolically powerful, its operational depth remains uncertain, with divergent threat perceptions and economic interdependencies—particularly Saudi–India ties—likely constraining its scope. The agreement nonetheless signals a shift towards flexible, multi-polar security arrangements, linking Gulf and South Asian theatres, and creating new challenges for India’s strategic calculus in the region.
Executive Summary
The emerging Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan trilateral security partnership marks a significant development in the evolving strategic architecture of West Asia and South Asia. Driven by converging security interests, the partnership reflects the efforts of three major Sunni Muslim states to strengthen strategic autonomy amid shifting regional power dynamics and uncertainty surrounding established security arrangements. Saudi Arabia brings substantial economic resources, diplomatic influence and a central position in the Gulf security order. Turkey contributes military capabilities, defence-industrial capacity and an expanding regional strategic presence while Pakistan offers significant military experience, a large defence establishment and longstanding security ties with Riyadh. The partnership has acquired greater relevance amid intensifying geopolitical competition, conflicts across West Asia, instability in Afghanistan and changing perceptions of the reliability of external security guarantees. Its significance extends beyond bilateral defence cooperation as closer coordination among the three states could create new linkages between Gulf and South Asian security theatres. For India, the emerging alignment warrants close attention given its implications for the regional balance, its strategic interests in the Gulf, and its relations with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, while also intersecting with the wider India-Pakistan security dynamic. At the same time, differences in threat perceptions, strategic priorities and relations with other regional powers may constrain the depth and institutionalisation of trilateral cooperation. This Issue Brief examines the drivers, strategic objectives and limitations of the partnership, arguing that it reflects a broader regional recalibration in which states are seeking greater strategic agency through flexible security partnerships rather than dependence on a single external guarantor.
Introduction
On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a much-anticipated defence agreement. Negotiations had been underway for more than two years, but the war involving Iran, the United States and Israel created a favourable environment for the treaty.[1] While the ongoing war in West Asia may not have clear winners, it has created an opportunity for other powers to capitalise on the changing security environment. Since the outbreak of the war, both Ankara and Islamabad have offered diplomatic and security guarantees to several Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, culminating in the trilateral Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Riyadh. The agreement emphasises a commitment to deterrence through intelligence sharing, defence cooperation and the institutionalisation of existing bilateral security partnerships. The declaration contains the striking formulation that an armed attack against any one country would be regarded as an attack on all three. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan subsequently stated that the provision is technically similar to Article 5 of NATO.[2]
Many have characterised this trilateral security arrangement between three major Sunni Muslim countries as Sunni NATO. However, it would be premature to make such assertions as these countries have different geostrategic interests and threat perceptions. There is also limited clarity about its institutional depth, force structure, command arrangements and, more importantly, alliance obligations. The significance of the partnership will depend on the extent to which its command arrangements and institutional structures are developed and made operational.
The declaration has both symbolic and strategic significance. Its symbolic dimension derives in part from the decision to sign it in Mecca, one of the most sacred cities in Islam and a place of profound religious significance for Muslims worldwide. The fact that the agreement was signed on a Friday further reinforces the symbolism of the occasion. All three signatories have, at different points, sought to project themselves as influential actors within the broader Sunni Muslim world, although their respective visions of leadership and regional order have often differed and, at times, brought them into strategic competition.
The agreement comes at a time when West Asia is undergoing a major strategic transition. This can be gauged from the fact that relations between Riyadh and Ankara have shifted from periods of rivalry and mistrust towards greater alignment and partnership. This reflects a broader recalibration of regional relationships, with states reassessing older rivalries in response to changing threat perceptions and power dynamics. The convergence between Saudi Arabia and Turkey illustrates how shifts in the regional balance can transform relations from strategic competition into partnership. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have had a mutual defence agreement since September 2025, under which Pakistan has deployed troops and air defence assets inside the kingdom.[3] Pakistani officials have maintained that the bilateral defence agreement with Riyadh does not extend to a nuclear umbrella. During the Iran-US war, however, Saudi Arabia was able to leverage its partnership with Pakistan in negotiations and efforts to manage escalation with Iran. Against this backdrop, the trilateral agreement carries a diplomatic dimension that could make it more consequential than the existing bilateral arrangements.
The three countries bring different strategic capabilities to the partnership. Turkey contributes extensive experience in NATO interoperability and a rapidly expanding indigenous defence-industrial base. Pakistan brings substantial military capacity, significant missile capabilities and nuclear deterrence. Saudi Arabia provides financial resources, strategically important geography, influence over energy markets and considerable diplomatic and political weight in the region and the broader Muslim world. Together, these capabilities give the partnership the potential to develop into a comprehensive and institutionalised military and security arrangement. The alliance, however, has deliberately retained ambiguity regarding the object of its deterrence as no common adversary has been explicitly identified.
Riyadh: Between Geostrategic Ambition and Security
Over the past two years, Saudi Arabia has signed multiple defence agreements. In September 2025, Riyadh concluded a bilateral security agreement with Pakistan following the 12-day June war involving Iran, the United States and Israel. Under the agreement, Pakistan deployed a contingent of troops, a Chinese-made air defence system and a squadron of fighter aircraft. In July 2026, Riyadh announced the formation of an international alliance to protect Red Sea shipping from attacks by Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.[4] The maritime initiative came against the backdrop of the Houthi blockade imposed on Riyadh on 20 July 2026 and the disruption of oil shipments diverted towards the Red Sea following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.[5]
The Makkah defence agreement, together with these bilateral and multilateral arrangements, reflects Saudi Arabia’s growing concern over its security environment. Riyadh has faced threats from Iran, Houthis and Iraqi Shia militias. The economic costs associated with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Houthi activity around the Bab al-Mandeb and uncertainty surrounding Donald Trump’s policy towards Iran have increased the kingdom’s sense of vulnerability. These pressures have encouraged Riyadh to diversify its security partnerships and develop alternatives to exclusive reliance on the United States.
Saudi Arabia has made clear that the Makkah Declaration is not directed against any particular country. Yet, since 7 October 2023,[6] Israel’s unrelenting military aggression across the region has contributed to perceptions in the Gulf that Tel Aviv is seeking greater regional dominance. [7] Several Gulf states increasingly perceive Israel as seeking to reshape the existing regional order rather than merely preserve the status quo. Israel’s rejection of a two-state settlement vis-à-vis Palestine has further weakened prospects for the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has become more reluctant to join the framework.
The kingdom’s security predicament has three principal dimensions. First is Iran’s expanding regional influence and presence. Second is the Houthis’ growing regional ambition, reinforced by developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the introduction of transit fees. Third is Israel’s expanding regional military reach and ambitions for strategic dominance. Saudi Arabia is therefore confronted with a difficult balancing exercise. Political accommodation with the Houthis could encourage greater demands from the group while imposing additional political and economic costs on Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has also recognised the limits of US influence over Israeli decision-making. Washington could not prevent Tel Aviv from launching an attack on Iranian territory in June 2025, just days before the United States and Iran were expected to begin a new round of nuclear negotiations.
Riyadh expects that credible defensive measures deployed at the appropriate time can deter the Houthis from targeting Saudi territory, including critical infrastructure and economically sensitive facilities. There is also a realisation that a unilateral military campaign against the Houthis could prove unsustainable and counterproductive, as it did in 2015 which embroiled the kingdom in an unending war with severe economic and security consequences. The central question is whether the Makkah agreement can translate into a meaningful collective-defence commitment.
Turkey possesses substantial naval capabilities, but its geographical distance from the Bab al-Mandeb and its principal maritime theatres could constrain the scale and sustainability of any deployment. A key test will be whether Turkey is prepared to deploy naval assets to safeguard the Bab al-Mandeb and contribute directly to protecting Saudi maritime interests in the Red Sea. Pakistan has already committed to the kingdom’s broader security architecture, with Pakistani forces integrated into Saudi Arabia’s defence structures and participating in its security arrangements.[8] Questions remain, however, whether Pakistan will allow its forces deployed in the kingdom to directly participate as combatants in military operations against the Houthis should Riyadh decide to pursue such a course. While Pakistan’s parliament vetoed the country’s military involvement in Saudi Arabia’s war efforts against Houthis in 2015, whether it will be able to exercise such an option with a treaty in place in the future remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the partnership could provide a broader framework for deterrence directed towards Iran, Israel and the Houthis, depending on how its security commitments evolve.
Saudi Arabia’s calculations extend beyond immediate security concerns, as it has sought to reduce its dependence on the United States by strengthening ties with other regional powers. But this does not necessarily imply a desire to alter its defence relationship with Washington which remains deeply entrenched. Instead, it resembles what some scholars describe as a “post-dependence insurance policy”.[9] Washington provides high-end weapons, intelligence, logistics, and integrated air and missile defence capabilities. Saudi Arabia does not question the military capabilities of the United States. Its principal concern is Washington’s political willingness to employ those capabilities on the kingdom’s behalf. The uncertainty concerns the circumstances under which the United States would intervene militarily, the nature of threats that would trigger such intervention and the extent to which Washington would be willing to bear the costs and risks of defending Saudi interests.
Intra-Gulf competition is another factor behind Saudi Arabia’s defence activism. Riyadh is aware of the close relations the United Arab Emirates (UAE) shares with the US and Israel. Geostrategic alignment between Abu Dhabi and Washington has deepened, positioning UAE as an important partner in the US’s broader regional strategy. Riyadh is also conscious of Abu Dhabi’s growing strategic importance to Washington and the deepening alignment between UAE and Egypt, which could further reshape regional power dynamics and constrain Saudi Arabia’s room for strategic manoeuvrability.[10]
To preserve its strategic centrality and strengthen its security position, Riyadh, therefore, has an interest in developing a more diversified regional security architecture. The Makkah agreement can enhance the kingdom’s bargaining position with the United States and other regional actors. It also signals to Washington that Riyadh has alternative sources of security cooperation available.
Turkey: Expanding the Strategic Footprint from the Mediterranean to the Gulf
The Iran-US war provided Turkey with an opportunity to influence the emerging security order in West Asia. Since then, Ankara has expanded its regional footprint through defence trade, security partnerships and the redesign of trade routes.[11] Turkey has one of the region’s fastest-growing defence industries and has become a significant exporter of drones, missiles, electronic warfare systems, armoured platforms and naval technology. Its well-developed shipping industry also provides commercial incentives for deepening access to the Gulf.
For Ankara, the trilateral agreement is significant because it can complement NATO membership and relations with the US while reducing dependence on any single strategic partner. The arrangement gives Ankara an additional security network linking Anatolia, the Gulf, and South Asia, while also allowing it to deepen its security partnerships with two important Muslim-majority states and to maintain engagement with the Western security architecture. The agreement can also strengthen Ankara’s defence diplomacy by creating opportunities to integrate its indigenous defence capabilities with Saudi Arabia’s security requirements.
The agreement could provide Turkey with an additional platform for forward military deployment in Saudi Arabia, complementing its existing military presence in Qatar. Such a deployment would extend Ankara’s strategic footprint across the Gulf and strengthen its ability to shape regional security dynamics. It could also introduce an additional variable into Israel’s strategic calculations, particularly as Tel Aviv has sought greater strategic depth through closer security and defence relations with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. According to Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, an expert on Turkey-Israel relations at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, “just as Turkey makes various strategic moves in the Eastern Mediterranean, in Libya, in Somalia, and in Syria to improve its international standing, the State of Israel is also allowed to get closer to other countries. It is also allowed to expand its sphere of influence.”[12] He further stated that “Turkey and Israel view one another as central rivals. And if we see a chessboard here, it is fitting that when we see Turkish moves, we also see counter-moves.”[13] The emerging pattern is therefore one of bilateral partnerships accompanied by competing efforts among regional actors to develop interconnected networks of strategic access and security cooperation.
Turkey’s major security challenge is increasingly posed by Israel. Ankara’s expanding footprint, particularly in Syria, has become a source of concern for Tel Aviv which considers Turkish military activity there a red line. On 20 August 2026, Israel bombed the Abu al-Duhur airbase, where it said Turkish troops were deployed and where Ankara was reportedly in the process of upgrading the facility.[14] The incident could mark the emergence of a new front in Turkey-Israel relations. The trilateral agreement therefore has a direct strategic relevance for Ankara’s security calculations. Turkey can also use the Makkah Agreement as part of a broader hedging strategy.[15] The availability of alternative security partnerships could provide Ankara with greater leverage within NATO and in its negotiations with Western partners.
Pakistan: From Leveraging Defence Capabilities to Pursuing Strategic Relevance
Pakistan has a long history of forging alliances to enhance its geostrategic relevance. From SEATO and CENTO to the Makkah agreement, Islamabad has repeatedly entered military partnerships that extend beyond its immediate geographical neighbourhood. Pakistan is facing an intense internal crisis, while its external relations, particularly with several neighbouring states, remain at a low point. Yet Islamabad has recognised that the US-Iran war has created an opportunity to play a more active regional role.
In an increasingly transactional geopolitical environment, particularly under the Trump administration, considerations of shared values have increasingly been complemented by pragmatic calculations of mutual interests and strategic utility. As Alec Russell wrote in The Economist, “But while a shambles at home, Pakistan is delivering a Machiavellian masterclass abroad”.[16] With this tripartite agreement, it further consolidated its security relationship within the region.
Since the 2025 June war between US-Israel and Iran, Islamabad has positioned itself as a security and defence actor, leveraging its diplomatic standing and making efforts to mediate between Washington and Tehran while deepening defence relationships with other regional states. A distinctive feature of Pakistan’s diplomacy has been its willingness to take calculated risks and adapt policy to changing regional and international circumstances. In West Asia, demand for stability and deterrence has created favourable conditions for Pakistan to expand its presence and enhance its strategic profile. The agreement, along with Pakistan’s subsequent presence in the Red Sea, could strengthen Islamabad’s regional influence and improve its strategic position vis-à-vis its principal adversary in South Asia, India.
The key question is how much Pakistan would bring to the partnership. Would Islamabad extend nuclear deterrence to its allies? There remains considerable ambiguity over whether such deterrence would be available. This ambiguity may itself serve a strategic purpose by increasing uncertainty about the alliance’s deterrent capacity and strengthening the bargaining position of its members.[17]
Pakistan considers India its principal security concern and could seek to invoke the pact during a future conflict with India. The real test would be whether the other partners would join such a conflict. Turkey sided with Pakistan during last year’s brief confrontation with India, providing military support, including drones and technicians. Ankara also refused to allow the transit of military equipment to India through its airspace. Pakistan remains reliant on Saudi Arabia’s economic and diplomatic support. Islamabad is aware of the scale of trade between Riyadh and New Delhi, which stood at USD 41.88 billion, with Indian exports at USD 11.76 billion and imports at USD 30.12 billion in fiscal year 2024-25.[18] Saudi Arabia would therefore be unlikely to join Pakistan in a war with India. Islamabad’s more immediate expectations from Riyadh are likely to centre on continued loan rollovers and reliable fuel supplies during periods of economic crisis.
In any future contingency in which Pakistan expects its allies to join a conflict with India, Islamabad would also face pressure to participate in Saudi military operations against the Houthis or Iran should such a situation arise. Such involvement could produce serious spillover effects for Pakistan. The country shares a direct land border with Iran and has a large Shia population and any containment policy towards Tehran could create strategic complications for Islamabad, given the Islamic Republic’s influence among Pakistani Shia communities, instability in Balochistan and the evolving relationship between Tehran and the Taliban.
For all three partners, avoiding entrapment in conflicts while mitigating the risk of abandonment will remain a central concern. The absence of a clearly defined security objective does not diminish the value of the pact. It reflects the changing regional order in West Asia and the declining ability of the United States to exercise uncontested strategic leadership.
Less Militaristic, More Strategic
The Makkah agreement has largely been analysed through a military lens, with considerable attention given to the declaration that “an attack on one is an attack on all”. Such an approach risks overlooking the agreement’s wider strategic dimensions. The trilateral relationship has economic and geostrategic implications, particularly as competition over trade routes and connectivity becomes increasingly important in the region.
In 2023, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was envisioned in New Delhi with considerable fanfare.[19] The project was conceived to reduce strategic dependence on vulnerable chokepoints and establish alternative trade routes. At the same time, IMEC could undercut the strategic interests of both Pakistan and Turkey. Since its success requires a stable and normalised relationship between Israel and the Gulf states, prospects for such a normalisation under the Abraham Accords have become more difficult after 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks inside Israel and subsequent Israeli war against Gaza, Lebanon, Iran besides recurrent military strikes in Syria. Under the Makkah agreement, Saudi Arabia may be more reluctant to join the Abraham Accords given the growing tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
It assumes significance since Israel has increased its efforts to establish its own regional security framework, including signing a tripartite agreement with Greece and Cyprus on 29 December 2025, alongside separate bilateral agreements with both countries.[20] The geographical proximity of Greece and Cyprus provides Israel with a strategic advantage vis-à-vis Turkey. On 2 January 2020, Israel, Greece and Cyprus signed an agreement to develop an undersea pipeline to transport natural gas from offshore fields in the eastern Mediterranean to Europe through the EastMed project, reducing Turkish leverage as a key transit route for energy supplies to Europe.[21]
Against these developments, Ankara and Islamabad have an interest in advancing alternative trade routes. Turkey is promoting Iraq’s Development Road project, which aims to establish a trans-border transportation network linking the Persian Gulf with Turkey.[22] The route could complement the China-supported China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) by connecting southwestern China to Basra, Iraq, and then to Turkey and the European Union.
There is also a developing convergence among the new partners over Syria’s future. Ankara has sought to strengthen the legitimacy and international recognition of the new Syrian government led by Ahmed Al Sharaa, the former militant commander known as Abu Muhammad Al Julani, whose Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) led Syrian opposition militant groups to topple the Bashar Al Assad government in 2024. A stronger and more autonomous Syrian state with close security relations with Turkey could constrain Israel’s freedom of action in Syria, which Tel Aviv may perceive as a security challenge. Turkey’s Syria policy therefore has both diplomatic and geopolitical dimensions. These dynamics could reshape regional alignments and challenge the strategic calculations of other regional actors.
Implications for India
The tripartite agreement does not explicitly name its common adversary; nevertheless, it reshapes the regional security calculus, which India would take into consideration. Except for Saudi Arabia, which has maintained a constructive relationship with India, Pakistan and Turkey have not been well disposed toward New Delhi. In the same realm, India’s external affairs minister S Jaishankar maintained that “In my calculus, everything counts, everything will have a weight…and sometimes things need to play out”.[23] The agreement enhanced Pakistan’s profile in the world and thus further undermined India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically by naming and shaming it for sponsoring terrorism.
The trilateral agreement would have an impact on the regional balance of power in South Asia. By strengthening Pakistan’s geostrategic and diplomatic position, the agreement introduces a new variable into its relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Therefore, the implications for India are not only militaristic in nature but also extend beyond conventional security, encompassing diplomacy, regional influence, economic and energy security, and the evolving trade and energy corridors. In the security realm, once institutionalised, the tripartite form can help the Pakistan military further consolidate their capabilities and help in their Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) domain. Pakistan’s military would have access to maritime domain awareness, intelligence sharing, Air and Missile defence, Unmanned systems, Precision strike, Cyber and electronic warfare, and logistic support.[24] This could prompt the Pakistani military to test the alliance’s credibility and to leverage it during future military skirmishes with India. During wartime, Pakistan can leverage its alliances and security partnerships with other Gulf states by sabotaging crucial oil supplies and maritime trade and connectivity.[25] India’s real paradox of apprehensions would come once Bangladesh joins the Makkah pact.[26] The potential presence of Pakistani and Turkish troops on Bangladeshi soil could exacerbate India’s vulnerabilities on its North-Eastern flank. In that case, the security architecture, which is explicitly meant for West Asia, would extend to the South Asia region, which could provide Pakistan with an additional layer of strategic depth vis-à-vis India by extending its security and military footprint in Bangladesh.
For India, strategic ambiguity and diplomacy can help draw a clear red line regarding its security threats emanating from Bangladesh. New Delhi can extend and also institutionalise its security partnerships with other Gulf countries without entering into a military alliance. With Saudi’s, India should rely on diplomacy by enhancing its engagement in trade, energy, defence and maritime security. New Delhi can further strengthen its strategic relations with Greece and Greek Cyprus while maintaining channels of communication with Ankara. India can also consider upgrading its diplomatic relations with the Taliban, which may counterbalance Pakistan’s potential footprint in India’s north-eastern sector.
Conclusion
The core significance of the Makkah agreement extends beyond its military dimension. The partnership brings together complementary forms of strategic power and creates opportunities for cooperation across defence, diplomacy, energy and regional connectivity. It must be understood against the backdrop of a wider transformation in West Asian power politics.
While the traditional regional security architecture relied heavily on the United States, the recent US-Iran war has intensified doubts among Gulf states about the reliability of existing security guarantees. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have recognised that the presence of US military bases does not necessarily guarantee protection against regional rivals. During periods of intense fighting, these bases can also become liabilities for host states. Amid uncertainty about Washington’s willingness to safeguard the kingdom and growing American pressure to reduce its regional commitments, Saudi Arabia has sought greater strategic depth and additional deterrence capacity.
After weakening Hamas and Hezbollah and reducing Iran’s influence across parts of the region, Israel has increasingly turned towards the Levant, where Ankara and Tel Aviv have competing interests. The Makkah agreement offers Turkey three strategic benefits. First, it broadens Turkey’s geopolitical and strategic presence in the Arabian Peninsula. Second, it consolidates its longstanding defence partnership with Pakistan and creates greater scope for institutionalised security cooperation. Third, it enhances Turkey’s strategic leverage and deterrence capacity vis-à-vis Israel, particularly given Israel’s close security and strategic ties with Greece and Cyprus.
Pakistan has also emerged as an important beneficiary of the changing regional environment. Islamabad became an important interlocutor in US-Iran negotiations because it maintains working relations with Tehran while maintaining strong strategic ties with China. The Makkah agreement strengthens Pakistan’s position in three ways. First, Pakistan’s strategic footprint has expanded from South Asia into the Gulf. If institutionalised, the agreement could help Islamabad emerge as a cross-regional strategic actor connecting South Asia with the Gulf and the Levant. Second, the arrangement creates opportunities for cooperation in defence technology, intelligence and strategic coordination. It also diversifies Pakistan’s partnerships beyond its traditional reliance on China and could enhance its strategic autonomy. Third, Pakistan could use the network to increase its diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis India.
Pakistan’s participation in a framework combining Saudi economic influence with Turkish political and technological capabilities could raise the strategic costs of future confrontation and provide Islamabad with greater diplomatic depth. It also gives Pakistan a stronger platform from which to raise regional concerns, including those related to South Asian security. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia or Turkey would automatically support Pakistan on every India-related issue. The broader network of strategic relationships, however, expands Islamabad’s diplomatic space.
The alliance will face several tests that will determine its strategic coherence and durability. One challenge will be how the three partners respond to renewed tensions with the Houthis in the Red Sea. Another will be managing tensions involving Shia militias in Iraq. A further test will be maintaining common positions on major regional issues, including tensions between Pakistan and India, conflicts in Sudan and Yemen, Somalia’s territorial integrity, Syria and the Gaza peace process. The pace at which the alliance develops institutional mechanisms and advances defence-industrial cooperation will also be an important indicator of its long-term credibility and strategic relevance.
Dr. Yaqoob ul Hassan is a Srinagar-based independent analyst. He has also worked as a researcher at MP-IDSA in New Delhi and was a visiting fellow at South Asian Voices at the Stimson Centre in Washington, DC.
[1] Reuters (2026), “Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia defence pact technically same as NATO’s Article 5”, 9 August, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/turkey-pakistan-saudi-arabia-defence-pact-technically-same-natos-article-5-2026-08-08/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[2] Ibid.
[3] White, J.T. (2026), “The signal and substance of the new Saudi–Pakistan defense pact”, Brookings, 8 August, Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-signal-and-substance-of-the-new-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[4] Lawal, S. (2026), “Why is Saudi Arabia forming a coalition to protect the Red Sea?”, Al Jazeera, 30 July, Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/30/why-is-saudi-arabia-forming-a-coalition-to-protect-the-red-sea (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[5] Al Jazeera Staff and Reuters. (2026), “Houthis want to copy Iran’s Hormuz control in the Red Sea: Yemeni FM”, Al Jazeera, 28 July, Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/28/houthis-want-to-copy-irans-hormuz-control-in-the-red-sea-yemeni-fm (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[6] Kurtzer, D.C. and Miller, A.D. (2026), “Gaza 1000 days: United States Middle East policy”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 July, Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/07/gaza-1000-days-united-states-middle-east-policy (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[7] Baharoon, M. and Vatanka, A. (2025), “Gulf Arabs fear Israel is becoming Goliath”, Middle East Institute, Available at: https://mei.edu/publication/gulf-arabs-fear-israel-becoming-goliath/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[8] Obaid, N. (2026), “The post-American Middle East is beginning to take shape”, Al Jazeera, 8 August, Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/8/8/the-post-american-middle-east-is-beginning-to-take-shape (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[9] Valente, G. (2026), “Mecca Joint Defence Agreement exposes limits of US military reliance”, The Media Line, 11 August, Available at: https://themedialine.org/top-stories/mecca-defence-pact-exposes-limits-of-us-military-reliance/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[10] Edroos, F. (2026), “Saudi Arabia opposed Egypt’s inclusion in Mecca agreement, sources say”, Middle East Eye, 11 August, Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-opposed-egypts-inclusion-mecca-agreement-sources-say (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[11] Dalay, G. (2026), “As Iran war reshapes West Asia, Turkey’s regional role looks set to expand”, Chatham House, 01 June, Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/iran-war-reshapes-middle-east-turkeys-regional-role-looks-set-expand (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[12] Lappin, Y. (15 08 2026). “How Turkey inadvertently forged the Israel–Greece–Cyprus alliance”, JNS, 15 August, Available at: https://www.jns.org/analysis/how-turkey-inadvertently-forged-the-israel-greece-cyprus-alliance (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Cornwell, A. and Gumrukcu, T. (2026), “Syria says no Turkish military build‑up planned; airbase struck by Israel”, Reuters, 20 August, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-says-no-turkish-military-build-up-planned-airbase-struck-by-israel-2026-08-20/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[15] Chatham House (2026). “Talk: Turkish military alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reflects Ankara’s opportunistic”, Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/talk-turkish-military-alliance-saudi-arabia-and-pakistan-reflects-ankaras-opportunistic (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[16] “Mecca defence pact exposes limits of US military reliance”, Financial Times, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/a9573d72-7bb2-462f-83d7-c0fe36f8c98d?syn-25a6b1a6=1 (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[17] Alhasan, H. and Wajid, A. (2026), “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye: a new defence pact”, IISS, Available at: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/08/pakistan-saudi-arabia-and-turkiye-a-new-defence-pact/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[18] “India–Saudi bilateral relations”, Embassy of India, Riyadh, [Online], Available at: https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/page/india-saudi-bilateral-relations/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[19] “About IMEC”, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, [Online], Available at: https://www.imec.international/about/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[20] JNS (2025), “Israel, Greece, Cyprus sign military cooperation deals”, [Online], 29 December, Available at: https://www.jns.org/israel-news/israel-greece-cyprus-sign-military-cooperation-deals (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[21] Carpenter, S. (2020). “New gas pipeline deal gives Europe access to Eastern Mediterranean reserves, angering Turkey”, Forbes. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcarpenter/2020/01/02/new-gas-pipeline-deal-gives-europe-access-to-eastern-mediterranean-reserves-angering-turkey/ (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[22] Hiltermann, J. (2024), “Iraq’s Development Road: Geopolitics, rentierism and border connectivity”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/05/iraqs-development-road-geopolitics-rentierism-and-border-connectivity (Accessed on 25 August 2026).
[23] Narayan P. (2026), “EAM downplays Pakistan-Turkey-Saudi defence pact: ‘What has it done amid live military situations in these countries?”, Hindustan Times, Available at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/eam-downplays-pakistan-turkey-saudi-defence-pact-what-has-it-done-amid-live-military-situations-in-these-countries-101787412910281.html (Accessed on 29 August 2026).
[24] Ahuja A. (2026), “Makkah (Mecca) Joint Agreement: Geopolitically Fragile – Militarily Reinforcing, Vivekananda International Foundation, Available at: https://www.vifindia.org/print/14949 (Accessed on 29 August 2026).
[25] Pandya, A. (2026), “How India Views the Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey Mecca Pact”, Middle East Forum, Available at: https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/how-india-views-the-saudi-pakistan-turkey-mecca-pact (Accessed on 29 August 2026)
[26] Alam, R. (2026), Bangladesh govt. positively weighs in joining Mecca pact; Opposition throws in support, Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bangladesh-govt-positively-weighs-joining-mecca-pact-opposition-throws-in-support/article71399207.ece (Accessed on 29 August 2026).
