Operation Sindoor marks a decisive shift in India’s counterterrorism strategy, combining precision strikes and escalation dominance to dismantle Pakistani terror networks. While it signals India’s resolve, its long-term deterrent effect remains uncertain as Pakistan may adapt its tactics. This paper explores India’s evolving deterrence posture, the risks of brinkmanship, and the strategic implications of sustained kinetic and non-kinetic responses in the India-Pakistan conflict.
Highlights:
- Operation Sindoor represents a major shift in India's counterterrorism approach, focusing on escalation dominance and cumulative deterrence.
- India successfully eliminated key militants and disrupted terror networks, but the long-term deterrent effect remains uncertain.
- Pakistan may adapt its strategies, requiring India to enhance intelligence and precision for future operations.
- The India-Pakistan deterrence dynamic now operates in a fragile zone of ambiguity, where miscalculation could escalate conflict.
- India employs both kinetic and non-kinetic measures—including military strikes, diplomatic pressure, and water treaty suspensions—to sustain deterrence.
Last April and early May (2025) plunged South Asia into turmoil following devastating terror attacks in Kashmir’s Pahalgam, which claimed the lives of 25 Indian and one Nepalese citizen. In response, India launched Operation Sindoor on 7 May, executing a series of precision strikes against nine known terror sites linked to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Indian officials reported eliminating around 100 terrorists, including high-profile operatives designated as global threats by the UN and the US. The operation underscored India’s uncompromising stance on cross-border terrorism, signaling a strategic shift in its counterterrorism doctrine.
Most significant of Indian claims include Markaz Suhaaba (Bahawalpur) and Markaz Taiba (Muridke), Haqqani/Rezar camps in Sialkot/Muzaffarabad, weapon depots in Tehra Kalan, and infiltration launchpads at Kotli and Kotli (Azad Kashmir). India also claimed to have eliminated Abdul Rauf Azhar, who played a part in the killing of Jewish American the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl back in 2002 in Pakistan. Pakistan responded with cross-border drone and missile strikes, termed “Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos,” resulting in several days of reciprocal assaults until a truce, partially facilitated by the U.S. (a claim India categorically rejected), was established on 10 May. Prime Minister Modi characterised Sindoor as a “paradigm shift” in India’s counter-terrorism strategy: terrorism, along with its state backers, would be confronted with a “visible and forceful” military response. This assertive new stance poses a critical inquiry: Can Operation Sindoor provide credible deterrence, in conventional, nuclear, and hybrid forms, against Pakistan and its proxies?
Deterrence conventionally refers to dissuading an opponent from aggression by threatening intolerable retribution. In the context of the Cold War nuclear age, deterrence, as articulated by Waltz, Schelling, Jervis, and others, depended on reciprocal vulnerability, with each side apprehensive of devastating reprisal if it initiated an attack. In traditional or low-intensity confrontations, deterrence often included threatening immediate retribution for acts of violence. India's historical strategy conformed to this pattern: it issued public warnings of reprisal after assaults (e.g., the 2001 mobilisation, surgical strikes, Balakot) and presumed that Pakistan's nuclear deterrent would enforce restraint. However, experts now note a transition. Sindoor exemplifies what is said to be "cumulative deterrence" or deterrence-by-punishment: India seems to acknowledge that Pakistani proxies would continue their assaults, hence it aims to diminish their capabilities with each strike substantially.
According to an analyst, New Delhi now seems to recognise that Pakistan's objective is “immovable”—cross-border terrorism is a fundamental aspect of Islamabad's strategy—thus, India's optimal approach is establishing a cycle of costs that diminishes the efficacy of future attacks. This rationale parallels Israel's "mowing the grass" strategy against Hezbollah and Hamas: tolerate intermittent violence while consistently targeting their networks to diminish their capabilities.  However, classical theorists caution against inherent risks. Thomas Schelling underscored that deterrence thrives on ambiguity and the fear of unintended escalation. India's evolving strategy—executing limited strikes under the nuclear umbrella—may create additional "rungs" on the escalatory ladder. Yet, it hinges on the assumption that Pakistan will always show conventional restraint—a hazardous presumption. LUMS academic Ali Hasanain warns that India's confidence in sub-nuclear warfare opens the doors to "brinkmanship", where each side believes it can strike without immediate repercussions. At its core, "deterrence... depends not on control but uncertainty." The fragile equilibrium between India and Pakistan remains susceptible to misjudgment or technological failures, potentially triggering uncontrollable escalation. Thus, when assessing Sindoor's deterrent impact, one must consider not only India's strategic signals but also how both nations perceive their nuclear vulnerabilities.
 Operation Sindoor demonstrated India's formidable conventional strike capability while signalling a new philosophy of escalation dominance. By penetrating deep into Pakistan and dismantling nine militant launch sites, India delivered a decisive blow to terrorist networks. Official reports attribute the operation to the elimination of over 100 terrorists and the destruction of nine major terror launchpads, significantly weakening the operational capacities of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Hizbul Mujahideen. The Press Information Bureau of India stated that these precise strikes were intended to send a clear message: that "neither the Line of Control nor Pakistani territory will be spared if terrorism emanates from there." This stands in stark contrast to India’s actions in 2016 and 2019, when military operations were confined to border region or symbolic targets. According to one study, Sindoor represented a "decisive departure" signalling a shift in India’s strategic focus towards "dismantling Pakistan's terror factories throughout the entire operational chain."
In the short term, Operation Sindoor achieved critical tactical objectives: eliminating prominent militant commanders, dismantling terrorist camps , and restraining Pakistan's conventional troops. Pakistan's counterattacks— missile strikes on Indian towns and drone assaults on air bases— were largely intercepted or neutralised. India effectively minimised civilian collateral damage and avoided further escalation, exemplifying what experts call a “calibrated use of force”—displaying determination without triggering full-scale conflict. The swift and decisive results—significant cost imposed on Pakistan with minimal Indian casualties— suggest that Operation Sindoor successfully delivered retribution. Additionally, analysts recognise this operation as as  solidifying a “new normal”— a guaranteed response to terrorist provocations.
However, the long-term deterrence effect remains uncertain. While past operations have led Pakistan to exercise caution, terrorism has persisted. After the 2019, Balakot strikes, Pakistan suffered losses yet resumed proxy assaults. To maintain deterrence, India must rely on isolated strikes but on the continued expectation of reprisals to discourage future aggression. A strategic expert warns that Pakistan may disperse assets and develop countermeasures, requiring India to enhance intelligence and precision efficacy for future attacks. Ultimately, Operation Sindoor’s effectiveness as a conventional deterrent depends on India’s ability to execute such strikes consistently—without escalating beyond the nuclear threshold.
Operation Sindoor decisively raised the stakes in India-Pakistan deterrence. By combining advanced conventional attacks with a clear strategic message, India placed Pakistan in a constrained position and redefined the parameters of the conflict. Demonstrating both competence and resolve, India imposed severe costs on Pakistani-sponsored terrorism and shattered the notion of an untouchable nuclear threshold. For the first time in decades, Pakistan realised that the launchpads of its proxies were susceptible to Indian attacks, even under the threat of nuclear retaliation. From New Delhi's perspective, Operation Sindoor "combined restraint with strength" and sent out an unequivocal message: “terrorism will be addressed with prompt and proportional response.”
However, credible deterrence relies as much on perception and sustainability as on individual action. Drawing from Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Waltz, deterrence thrives on reciprocal, guaranteed suffering. Operation Sindoor exemplifies India's willingness to impose unbearable costs on Pakistan; but the real question is will Pakistan accept that continued aggression will lead to persistent retaliation, until it changes its conduct? Or will it gamble that India’s domestic and international constraints prevent sustained escalation?
Contemporary South Asia operates in a "zone of ambiguity" where miscalculation could prove disastrous. If either side misinterprets the other's red lines, stability could rapidly unravel. With Operation Sindoor, India has expanded its strategic toolkit and deepened its penetration into Pakistan’s operational space. Alongside kinetic strikes, India has employed non-kinetic measures, such as suspending the Indus Water Treaty and downgrading diplomatic linkages. Notably, post-ceasefire messaging indicates that India has merely paused its Operation Sindoor— rather than concluding it. By framing terrorism as a global menace rather than just an India-Pakistan issue, India seeks to build international momentum in its counterterrorism campaign. Through these responses, India aims to sustain non-kinetic deterrence, keeping Pakistan perpetually in check. Yet, effective deterrence demands continuous evolution, requiring investment in both military and diplomatic strategies to maintain credibility.
*Harsh Pandey is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He is associated with International Centre for Peace Studies as a research analyst.
