The comment traces the evolution of US-India relations from post-WWII non-alignment through Cold War tensions to post-globalisation strategic autonomy, amid a shifting multipolar world order. It critiques Trump’s second-term ‘America First’ policies, including a 50 per cent tariff on India, which threaten economic growth and bilateral ties. Advocating pragmatic diplomacy, it urges both nations to seek common ground to sustain cooperation amidst global flux and China’s rise.
Highlights
- Post-WWII relations fluctuated, with India opting for non-alignment in the 1950s; the 1960s saw peaks under Kennedy-Nehru, including US aid during the 1962 India-China war; the 1970s-1980s featured aid via PL-480 and IT collaboration under Reagan-Rajiv, but strains from the 1971 war and US ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan.
- With the USSR’s collapse, India embraced globalisation and strategic autonomy, moving from unipolar US dominance to a diffused multipolarity by the 2000s, involving powers like China, Japan, and the Global South.
- China pursued a ‘peaceful rise’ via BRI and ‘String of Pearls’ strategy in the Indian Ocean; India countered through multilateral forums (SAARC, BIMSTEC, ASEAN) and initiatives like Sagarmala and SAGAR to assert regional influence.
- Trump’s 2024 victory and ‘America First’/MAGA agenda prioritises domestic issues, leading to transactional diplomacy; imposition of 50% tariffs on India has strained ties, potentially reducing GDP growth by 0.9% to 5.6% in FY2026 and causing $33 billion losses in exports like textiles and gems.
- Tariffs exacerbate Covid recovery challenges; India, aiming for a $5 trillion economy and third-largest global status, expects recognition as a swing power with hard/soft capabilities.
- Suggests mutual pragmatism—US reducing tariffs, India adopting nuanced stances on China/Russia and avoiding de-dollarisation—to foster a sustainable, long-term partnership amid volatility.
*****
US-India equation in recent times has been a topic of intense debate and discussion by policy analysts and area study academics privy to this consequential bilateral relationship. It is important, however, to make systemic and sub-systemic analysis of US-India relationship within the context of current global flux.
While the notion of an alternative, plausible non-western/ non-US international order appears to be bit far-fetched, the fact remains that global power matrix, of late, has tilted towards a messier, multipolar world order, one in which the emergence of Global South with a very resilient and vibrant economy as a viable entity has to be reckoned along with the cluster of middle and aspirational world powers. India, a significant swing and competitive power, aiming at 5 trillion dollar benchmark and set to become the third largest economy in the world with immense hard and soft power capabilities has legitimate expectations to be taken as a serious global player.
US-India relations in the post-WW II have undergone number of ups and downs. In the 1950s, India was caught up between embracing a US-led security order and a Soviet Union-led security alliance, and India instead chose, and rightly so, the path of non-alignment wherein it (India) could carve a niche for itself and assume a leadership role in the Afro-Asian bloc of nations while pursuing diversified diplomacy. The 1960s brought new equation to bilateral relationship with personal chemistry between President Kennedy and PM Nehru at its zenith. US support to India at a crucial phase of India-China war in 1962 was an immediate dividend of this enhanced partnership. Although military action by India on Goa, a former Portuguese colony, was an irritant, it was amicably resolved due to deft handling of diplomacy at the highest level.
The subsequent decades of 1970s and 1980s witnessed areas of engagement such as food aid to India in the form of PL-480 Act and the onset of IT/Computer revolution during the Reagan-Rajiv era. There were instances of discord and distrust too when Nixon-Kisinger duo dispatched seventh fleet to the Bay of Bengal during the India-Pakistan War of 1971 much to the chagrin of India as it was peeved at overt US ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan. India emerged from this crisis sticking its neck out as a viable power committed to its core national interests.
With the end of Cold War in late 1980s and with the advent of globalization and the US emerging as the solo hegemon in the unipolar world, India, too, strategically altered its policy of putting all eggs in one basket and instead adopted a more expansive policy, emphasising its strategic autonomy on critical areas.
At the onset of the 21st century, at the global level, unipolarity led by US led to a more diffused multipolarity wherein powers such as China, Japan, Germany, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, South Africa along with traditional Post-WW II major players such as Britain and France became dominant players in the global scene. By 2010 and onwards, due to various dynamics in the changing geopolitical compulsions, China, led the race to rival US in the world power system and bring the power equation at the global level to a bipolar mode. China, on her part, in the Post-Deng phase, right up to Xi Jinping, pursued a policy of ‘peaceful rise’ along with making financial assistance available to countries in Asia and Africa looking for economic and infrastructure development under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Although India, on her part, stuck to a more traditional, multilateral path, with commitment to SAARC, BIMSTEC, and outreach to ASEAN, GCC, I2U2, EU, OAU, OAS, etc. and provided a more vigorous counterweight in the Indian Ocean region with flagship schemes such as Sagarmala, SAGAR, Project Mausam and Mahasagar, China used its capability as an edge, through a carefully calibrated strategic approach seeking to expand its strategic presence in and around the Indian Ocean region. Some observers called it ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, although China never owned it up as such.
With Donald Trump coming to power for the second term after his decisive victory in the US Presidential election in November 2024 along with his America First policy and his commitment to Make America Great Again(MAGA), he has decided to stay aloof from global conflict zones and instead focus on domestic priorities such as economy and immigration, Trump’s transactional nature of diplomacy towards various countries of the world including India has been in full display ever since he assumed office for a second term. In the process, the post- World War II international liberal order seems to be in disarray. To cap it all, Trump imposed a stiff 50 per cent tariff on India thus pushing an already uneasy relationship to a new low.
From India’s perspective, with its economy and domestic base on a reasonably firm ground in spite of the spillover effect of Covid pandemics, the timing of Trump’s actions could not have been worse. Let us take a few examples of how tariff at 50 per cent might affect India. If it is retained as it is, India’s GDP growth may decline by 0.9 per cent from a projected 6.5 per cent growth to 5.6 per cent in FY 2026. India, may also entail a loss of $33 billion approximately which is about 2.17 lakh crore Indian rupees. Similarly, the primary exports from India to US will be impacted severely, in particular in the areas of textiles, gems, jewelry, sea food, carpets, etc.
President Trump’s decision to impose an additional 25 per cent tariff on India, ostensibly in response to New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil, is profoundly unfair, exacerbating an already fragile bilateral dynamic at a time when strategic partnership is of paramount significance in a world undergoing significant power realignments. This measure, justified by the US as a deterrent against perceived circumvention of sanctions, ignores the geopolitical realities India navigates, including energy security amid global volatility, and disproportionately penalises a key ally without equivalent scrutiny on other nations like those in Europe continuing substantial Russian energy imports. Peter Navarro’s criticism, characterising India’s actions as duplicitous and undermining US interests, is grossly unfair and uncharitable, painting a democratic partner as an adversary rather than a collaborator in a multipolar world. Notably, India did not undertake these oil procurements stealthily; they were conducted transparently and with the full knowledge of the previous US administration. Trump administration, ever since it assumed office, has not offered any directives or consultations to alter the course prior to this abrupt tariff escalation. Given the historically close and multifaceted US-India relationship—encompassing defence, technology, and countering an assertive China— this unexpected punitive step not only erodes mutual trust but also risks inflicting lasting harm on the partnership, which ought to be preserved through dialogue and reciprocity rather than unilateral coercion.
A way forward to bring the relationship to a more predictable level is to find a common middle ground wherein tariff rate could be reduced substantially by the Trump Administration. For India’s part, it may very well adopt a more nuanced stand vis-à -vis China and Russia and send a subtle message to US of not joining the de-dollarization brigade in the global economy and bilateral trading. A more matured, pragmatic stand by Delhi and Washington with a ‘longue duree’ view is more likely to succeed and sustain amidst the current global tumult and fast changing volatility.
Dr. Mohammed Badrul Alam was Director of Research, Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, Jamia Milia Islamia University, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.
Comments