The Pakistan–Saudi Arabia Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed in September 2025 marks a formal deepening of bilateral security ties, declaring that “any aggression against either country shall be considered aggression against both.” This pact reflects shifting regional alliances amid Middle Eastern instability and declining US security guarantees. For Pakistan, it offers financial, military, and diplomatic gains; for Saudi Arabia, it provides a nuclear-capable partner in a volatile region. The agreement carries strategic risks, especially for India, which must recalibrate its Gulf diplomacy and counterterrorism engagement in light of this development.
Highlights
- Signed on 17 September 2025 in Riyadh during Shehbaz Sharif’s visit, . Declares mutual defence: “aggression against one is aggression against both.” Culmination of decades of defence cooperation dating back to 1951 Treaty of Friendship, now formalised.
- Pakistani troops have trained Saudi forces since 1967; up to 20,000 troops deployed over time. Pakistani forces assisted during the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979. Regular joint exercises and advisory missions, including a 2018 deployment.
- Strategic Drivers: Saudi concerns over US reliability post-Israeli strikes in Qatar, Pakistan’s nuclear capability and military experience seen as strategic assets. Riyadh seeks diversified alliances amid regional instability.
- Benefits for Pakistan: Potential for new Saudi financial aid and investment; Pakistan might seek to reinforce its Kashmir stance via Saudi influence in OIC and Arab League; Expanded military cooperation and possible Saudi-funded defence projects.
- Risks for Pakistan: Possible entanglement in Saudi-led conflicts (e.g., Yemen). Risk of antagonising Iran, complicating Pakistan’s western frontier. Strategic overreach could destabilise Pakistan’s regional posture.
- Implications for India: Pact may embolden Pakistan’s posture on Kashmir and cross-border terrorism; could reverse India’s diplomatic gains in the Gulf; symbolic clause may enable Pakistan to seek greater Saudi backing in future disputes.
- India must engage Riyadh assertively, define red lines, and reinforce counterterrorism cooperation. The pact reflects tectonic shifts in Middle Eastern geopolitics. India must respond with strategic foresight, not complacency. Continued engagement with Saudi Arabia is essential to protect India’s western flank
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On 17 September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in Riyadh during Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s state visit at the invitation of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The agreement, as described in the joint statement, which is so far available in the open source, declared that “any aggression against either country shall be considered aggression against both”. This agreement marks an important development in regional geopolitics. Officials from both the countries have stressed that the accord is not merely a reaction to recent tensions but the culmination of years of discussions aimed at deepening their defence cooperation.
In response, the Indian government issued a statement through the Ministry of External Affairs, noting:
“We have seen reports of the signing of a strategic mutual defence pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The government was aware that this development, which formalises a long-standing arrangement between the two countries, had been under consideration.”
The statement further emphasised India’s commitment to safeguarding its national interests and ensuring comprehensive security in all domains, while closely monitoring strategic developments in the neighbourhood and their potential impacts on regional dynamics.
Historical context of Pakistan-Saudi defence ties
For decades, Riyadh and Islamabad have maintained close defence ties. Their relationship was first anchored in the 1951 Treaty of Friendship, followed by Pakistan’s training of Saudi military personnel beginning in 1967 and the landmark 1982 security cooperation agreement that formalised the deputation of Pakistani troops to the Kingdom. Over the years, up to 20,000 Pakistani troops have been deployed in Saudi Arabia, and Pakistani military personnel have helped train their Saudi counterparts in recent decades. Pakistani forces also played a vital role during the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979, assisting Saudi authorities at a moment of acute internal security threat. In 2018, Pakistan also deployed troops to Saudi Arabia, on a training and advisory mission.
Over the years, they have held regular joint military exercises, and Saudi officers have been extensively trained under Pakistani supervision, while the Kingdom has often extended financial lifelines to Pakistan in times of crisis. Yet this latest pact signals a deeper institutionalisation of their security partnership, giving their long-standing cooperation a formal treaty-like character. It comes at a time of heightened instability in the Middle East. Recent Israeli airstrikes in Qatar targeting Hamas leaders shook the Gulf states, raising serious doubts about reliability of US as a security guarantor in the region. Saudi Arabia, increasingly anxious about its vulnerability and isolation, appears determined to consolidate alliances beyond Washington, with Pakistan—armed with nuclear capability—emerging as an important partner.
For Islamabad, the pact offers clear rewards. Pakistan, facing an economic crunch, can expect fresh Saudi financial aid and investment, building on Riyadh’s multibillion-dollar commitments, including $2 billion in MoUs signed on 10 October 2024 across energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and mining sectors, as well as the extension of a $3 billion deposit in December 2024 to stabilise Pakistan’s finances. Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic weight in the Muslim world also benefits Islamabad, particularly in reinforcing its international stance on Kashmir. Riyadh’s sway within the Arab league and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) could provide Pakistan stronger backing on diplomatic forums, potentially over the Kashmir issue, for calling out India on multilateral platforms. Militarily, Pakistan stands to gain from expanded cooperation, training programmes, and potentially Saudi-funded defence projects. Yet the pact also carries risks.
Analysts warn that it could entangle Pakistan in Saudi-led regional conflicts such as Yemen, echoing the 2015 episode when Islamabad refused to send troops, wary of being drawn into a Saudi–Iran rivalry. With Pakistan sharing a long and sensitive border with Iran, overt alignment with Riyadh risks antagonising Tehran, destabilising its western frontier, and complicating its broader security calculus.
Evaluating the implications
The implications for India are serious. Closer Saudi–Pakistan ties could embolden Islamabad’s policies towards New Delhi, especially on Kashmir and cross-border terrorism. The “attack on one equals attack on both” clause, even if largely symbolic, may lead Pakistan to put pressure on Riyadh to lend greater diplomatic support to Pakistan in future disputes. Until now, India’s growing outreach to the Gulf had helped reduce the support Pakistan once enjoyed on Kashmir, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE playing a key role in this shift. However, given Saudi Arabia’s central influence in the Gulf, its renewed alignment with Pakistan could change the equation. When Riyadh takes a stand, other Gulf countries often follow, and this may once again boost Pakistan’s confidence in launching its anti-India campaign more vigorously in the Gulf and complicate New Delhi’s equation, undermining its interests.
Some analysts dismiss the pact as a mere formalisation of existing ties, especially after Saudi government has assured that it would not have any impact on its relationship with India. However, such a reading underestimates the shifting strategic environment in India’s extended western neighbourhood. The environment in South Asia today is not what it was in the past. India–Pakistan dynamics have changed dramatically; regional geopolitics are more volatile, and Pakistan, which appeared to be in a quandary, is in a different state now. It has sought to leverage its partnership with Saudi Arabia and take it forward. In such a setting, every new defence agreement must be evaluated for its wider implications. In this volatile landscape, every new security agreement carries implications that go far beyond the text of the pact.
For India, the central question is not simply what Saudi Arabia gains from this arrangement, but what Pakistan might extract from it—whether in terms of financial aid, military equipment, or diplomatic cover. Each of these directly affects New Delhi’s security interests. While India enjoys strong geoeconomic and cultural ties with Riyadh, it cannot afford complacency. The government must engage Saudi Arabia with clarity, convey its red lines, and ensure that this agreement does not embolden Islamabad in ways detrimental to India’s security. This is important because of Pakistan’s abiding hostility vis-à -vis India and its pathological obsession with its strategy of using terror as an instrument of its security policy. Continued engagement with Saudi Arabian authorities, particularly on counter terrorism focussed on cross-border terror from Pakistan is the need of the hour, sensitising them about Indian concerns and redlines on the issue.
The Pakistan–Saudi Arabia defence pact is, therefore, not just a symbolic reaffirmation of friendship but a reflection of the shifting tectonics of Middle Eastern politics. It strengthens Pakistan at a time when India’s western neighbourhood is already fraught with challenges, and it forces New Delhi to rethink its approach towards both Riyadh and Islamabad. In an era of fluid alliances and eroding certainties, this development must be taken seriously, and India must respond with both caution and strategic foresight.
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