Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) is on the brink of widespread unrest as the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has called for a major lockdown protest on 9 June 2026 over 38 unmet demands. Despite earlier violence—including the killing of a JAAC leader by security forces, internet blackouts, and the group’s banning— frustrations over inflation, electricity shortages, unemployment, exploitation of resources, and political marginalization continue to mount. The Muzaffarabad Agreement of October 2025 remains largely unimplemented. Critics highlight the controversial 12 “refugee” seats used for Islamabad’s control, the autonomy-curtailing 13th Amendment, and the gap between Pakistan’s “Azad Kashmir” propaganda and the region’s repressive reality.
In so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the situation is now turning increasingly serious. On 9th June, a lockdown protest call has been announced by the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), accusing the Pakistani government of repeatedly betraying the aspirations of the people of the region. The committee has warned of massive protests, shutter-down strikes, wheel-jam demonstrations, a long march, and an indefinite sit-in if its demands are not addressed. According to the committee, the upcoming agitation will focus on the implementation of 38 specific demands related to governance, basic rights, and long-standing socio-economic grievances of the region.
However, events have already begun to overtake the planned protest schedule. Demonstrations have reportedly started in different parts of the region ahead of the proposed 9 June shutdown, reflecting growing public frustration and escalating repression. The situation intensified when Pakistani security forces allegedly opened fire on civilians near Khaigla Burma Bridge in Rawalakot, resulting in the death of Shahzaib Habib, an executive member of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), while several others were reportedly injured. Reports also indicate that telecom and internet services have been suspended across parts of the region, while additional contingents of Pakistan Federal Police and Pakistan Rangers have been deployed to Muzaffarabad ahead of the planned shutdown. Adding to the tensions, the authorities have formally banned the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), declaring it a proscribed organisation and accusing it of being “engaged in terrorism”, acting in a manner “prejudicial to peace and security” of the state, and “creating anarchy in the state by intimidating public, promoting hatred and creating a sense of insecurity in society”. These developments have significantly escalated tensions across the region and heightened fears that AJK could witness a much larger wave of unrest in the coming days.
Escalating Political Tensions and Renewed Protest Calls
JAAC leaders say that Islamabad has failed to honour its commitments and promises regarding constitutional, electoral, and governance reforms, and has instead resorted to delaying tactics to suppress and weaken the movement. It has also instructed residents to stockpile ration and other essential supplies for at least one month in preparation for a prolonged shutdown. Furthermore, the committee has declared that no political election rallies will be allowed in the region, citing the upcoming elections, unless its demands are met. Despite the passage of a long time, people in the region continue to struggle for basic issues and fundamental rights, reflecting deep and persistent grievances that remain unresolved.
People in AJK say that the administration has been using the pretext of dialogue for the past two years simply to waste time and weaken the resolve of the committee. However, Pakistani authorities are now reportedly trying to pressure the committee into withdrawing the protest call amid fears of a larger anti-government uprising in the region.
This fresh protest call comes at a time when resentment against Pakistan’s administration in AJK is intensifying due to deep-seated anger over rising inflation, a severe electricity crisis, including prolonged load-shedding, unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, poor healthcare and educational facilities, inadequate infrastructure, water shortages, poor internet services with high tariffs, political marginalization, suppression of basic rights, and ongoing administrative repression and corruption. There is also growing frustration over the exploitation of the region’s forests, water resources, and other natural wealth without corresponding benefits reaching the local population. In particular, people feel exploited over the electricity issue, as power is generated from the region but is largely supplied to other parts of Pakistan, while locals continue to face persistent load-shedding. The local populace feels increasingly alienated as their fundamental needs continue to be ignored while the administration relies on heavy-handed tactics to suppress dissent.
Last year, when protests erupted across AJK, the Pakistani government was forced to come to the negotiating table after days of unrest, bloodshed, and widespread public anger. Under the Muzaffarabad Agreement reached on 4 October 2025, it assured the people that their demands would be fulfilled and accepted a 38-point charter addressing a wide range of political, economic, and governance-related issues. However, those commitments remain largely unimplemented. The protests witnessed significant violence, with more than 15 innocent Kashmiri protesters reportedly killed and many others injured.
Controversy of the 12 Refugee Seats
The issue of the 12 refugee seats remains one of the most contentious matters in the rubber-stamp assembly of AJK. These seats are reserved for state subjects in the AJK Assembly in the name of refugees from Jammu and Kashmir who are settled in Pakistan. In practice, these 12 members wield enormous influence over the assembly and the political system of AJK. They are widely viewed as instruments of political engineering, playing a decisive role in government formation, policymaking, and major political decisions. These seats are actually used by Pakistan’s military establishment to control the political system of AJK, influence election outcomes, engineer governments, and ensure that the region remains under Islamabad’s control. These are also used as an instruments for political blackmail and for triggering no-confidence motions to influence political outcomes. Since governments are often formed on narrow margins, these 12 members frequently become kingmakers and play a decisive role in determining who forms the government and what policies are pursued.
Adding to the controversy, they enjoy various privileges and perks, including access to a 19% quota in government jobs, development funds from the AJK budget, and the same salaries, allowances, legislative powers, and other privileges enjoyed by elected members of the assembly, despite not residing in AJK and spending these funds in their own provinces. The central criticism is that these seats do not actually represent the refugees they are supposedly meant to serve. Those who genuinely deserve representation remain excluded, while the beneficiaries are largely refugees already settled in provinces such as Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Approximately 8,000 families crossed the line of control after 1990 and settled in refugee camps within AJK. Despite paying taxes and residing in the region for decades, these families remain without proper housing, property rights, domicile certificates, or full citizenship rights. Ironically, these are the very people who should have benefited from such representation but remain politically marginalized.
In AJK, the assembly is largely a rubber stamp. It has no real powers, and all major decisions are taken from Islamabad and Rawalpindi. At the same time, Pakistan continues to accuse India, while Indian Jammu and Kashmir has a functioning democratic system with elected representatives, institutional accountability, and active political participation at the grassroots level. Yet Pakistan continues to carry out extensive propaganda against India while projecting a completely different picture internationally. In reality, AJK is governed through a highly centralised system where local decision-making power does not exist in any meaningful form, and people have no effective political representation, as all key authority remains outside the region.
This political structure also shapes how dissent is treated within the region. Whenever people in the region raise demands for basic rights, they are often urged to stay silent on the grounds that it could “harm the Kashmir cause” or “benefit India.” Such narratives are widely seen as a means of discouraging dissent and limiting public expression on issues of governance and daily life. As a result, even protests over essential needs are politically framed in a way that delegitimises them, with protesters being labelled as acting under external influence rather than expressing local grievances.
The 13th Amendment and the Question of Political Autonomy
Crossing all limits, in 2018 the 13th Amendment was passed within the constitutional framework of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, further reinforcing an already restrictive political order under which political activity is required to operate within the established constitutional framework supporting accession to Pakistan. While similar pro-accession provisions already existed in the constitutional structure, the 13th Amendment further entrenched and strengthened these restrictions by tightening the existing arrangement and reinforcing the constitutional limits on political expression and participation. It made clear that political activity must remain within these defined constitutional boundaries, while political expression outside this framework is restricted under the constitutional provisions. In practice, those advocating independence or any other political future are effectively pushed outside the mainstream political process. The constitutional position itself reflects this framework, stating that “No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to, the ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan.”
Electoral rules were also reinforced through related amendments in 2018, introducing procedural requirements that align electoral participation with the constitutional position on accession to Pakistan. Candidates are required to submit nomination papers accompanied by an affidavit declaring support for “Pakistan’s ideology, the ideology of accession of the disputed Kashmir region with Pakistan, and the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan.” These measures collectively narrowed the political space by adding ideological conditions to electoral participation, particularly affecting groups and individuals associated with pro-independence positions, including organisations such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
On the other hand, Pakistan shamelessly continues to call for a plebiscite under UN resolutions while simultaneously preventing those who do not support accession to Pakistan from participating in the political process. This exposes a fundamental contradiction in its position and reveals the selective and politically convenient use of the principle of self-determination. While presenting itself internationally as a champion of the Kashmiri people’s right to decide their future, it has structured the political system in a way that excludes alternative viewpoints from electoral politics. At the same time, it has steadily deepened its control over the region and reshaped its constitutional framework. As a result, the political space has been narrowed to such an extent that merger with Pakistan remains the only acceptable option within the system itself, thereby undermining the very spirit of the UN resolutions that Pakistan so frequently invokes on the international stage and uses as a tool of propaganda against India.
Moreover, under this amendment, all legislative and executive powers previously vested in the AJK Council were transferred, with most of these powers assigned to the Government of Pakistan, while finance and audit-related matters were retained within the AJK Assembly along with their corresponding executive authority. This significantly altered the original constitutional arrangement and reduced the functional authority of the Council, while its institutional structure, including members and staff, remained largely intact. This created a situation where the Council continues to exist with salaries, perks, and privileges despite having minimal practical authority. The 13th Amendment Act of 2018 thus marked a major departure from the earlier framework, with most Council powers transferred to the Government of Pakistan rather than Parliament, thereby reducing the autonomy of AJK and reshaping its governance structure to its detriment.
Pakistan accuses India of making constitutional changes in Kashmir in 2019, but it itself altered the constitutional reality in 2018 by curtailing the autonomy of the people of AJK through this amendment.
“Azad Kashmir” Narrative and Political Reality
Pakistan has done one thing very effectively: it has strategically used the name “Azad Kashmir” as a propaganda tool. When one hears this name, it creates the impression of an independent Kashmir with its own prime minister, assembly, decision-making powers, strong democratic participation, high living standards, and a high human development index, where people enjoy full rights and a high quality of life. This narrative has been used to project that image internationally and shape global perception. However, the reality is the opposite. The people of AJK have effectively been denied their rights since 1947. All political and civil rights, including freedom of speech and expression, are severely restricted, and anyone who speaks against the military or the state risks being picked up and disappeared.
This narrative has also been used to convey the message at the global stage that only the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed, while the status of the territories under Pakistan’s control is somehow considered settled and beyond question. This terminology has helped Pakistan project an image of legitimacy and self-governance in AJK while diverting attention from the region’s own political and constitutional realities.
Now, as frustrations have intensified and people have become more aware of these narratives, they have started confronting them.
Many people now believe that the Kashmir issue has increasingly been used as a political instrument to maintain control over AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan, while deflecting attention from local governance failures and unmet public demands. As protests and counter-pressures continue to build, the region remains caught in a cycle of unrest and unmet expectations, with no clear or lasting resolution to these underlying issues in sight.
Dr Idrees Aftab is a freelance commentator on regional issues in South Asia. The views are his own.
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