The ongoing unrest in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (AJK (PoK)) escalated significantly after the regional government banned the Jammu and Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) on 5 June, labelling the grassroots organization as a terrorist outfit. Formed in 2023 to protest federal electricity hikes, the JKJAAC emerged to fill a local leadership vacuum created by the complete helplessness of local elected representatives vis-à-vis Islamabad. Pakistan effectively controls local politics through its mainstream political parties, reducing local elections to a mere facade. Furthermore, 12 reserved refugee seats located outside the region are systematically used to influence the assembly. Facing upcoming elections on 27 July, the JKJAAC launched major protests to pressure Islamabad, prompting a violent, military-led state crackdown.
At least 17 people have been killed (11 in Rawalakot and 6 in Kotli) in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (AJK (PoK)) in the latest phase of the protests. The protests and clashes unfolded after the regional government decided to ban the Jammu and Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC), an organisation comprised of civil society and business leaders, on 5 June.
Two days before banning the JKJAAC, Prime Minister Faisal Mumtaz Rathore had said that the ongoing negotiations between the government and the JKJAAC were going on, and his government was making every effort to prevent the situation from deteriorating. While these negotiations were going on, according to the premier, his government banned the organisation with which it was talking. The contradiction was underscored by Amnesty International by stating that “Branding a grassroots organization as ‘terrorist’ on vague grounds, while simultaneously cutting the region off from the outside world, raises serious concerns regarding the Pakistani authorities’ conduct and their disregard for human rights.”
JKJAAC was formed in 2023 after protests broke out against the rise in electricity bills, a decision announced by the federal government in Pakistan. Despite being apparently “Azad” (free) from Islamabad, the decision was taken and imposed on AJK (PoK) without even making a pretext to consult the elected government. This disconnect between the masses and the local government and the latter’s helplessness vis-à-vis Islamabad created space for locals who were genuinely concerned about the situation on the ground. In such a vacuum of true local voice and representation, JKJAAC emerged as a hope; it gave direction to the protests and provided leadership to the people of AJK (PoK) that was distinct from the ruling elite, which was and is seen as under the control of Islamabad.
The latter is not hard to establish. In fact, the current protests are a sign that the local elected representatives are toothless and dependent on Islamabad even to discuss and concede on any local genuine demand. Otherwise, what would explain the contradiction in the position taken by the Prime Minister of the area, who was talking to the same people whom his government designated as potential terrorists and anarchists?
Furthermore, it is a long-standing fact that Islamabad has controlled politics in AJK (PoK) via Pakistan’s mainstream political parties. These have ruled AJK (PoK) for a long time, and without a break for the last two decades, by shrinking the space for the local parties. In fact, the ruling party in Islamabad also wins elections in AJK (PoK) (and Gilgit-Baltistan). That cannot be a mere coincidence, even for the sake of the argument that having the same party in power at the federation and at the region possibly smoothens the functioning of the local government.
It has two main issues, however. One, that means the so-called democratic exercise of holding elections is merely a facade, as the conditions created by Islamabad compel locals to align with the party in power in Islamabad. Second, by the logic that having the same party in power makes governance efficient, AJK (PoK) should have been the most developed in Pakistan. That, however, is not the case, as it remains the least developed and exploited (so is Gilgit-Baltistan).
The above political structure, consequently, has two broad and serious implications. One, the elections are organised or conducted in such a way that only the mainstream political parties can provide space and funds to local leaders to fight elections. This makes them dependent on the mainstream political ideology and policies. It is not surprising, therefore, to assent to the reality that the major local political party, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, has become irrelevant by such tactics. Second, even if some of the local leaders decide to cut loose their ties and raise the local issues fairly by being representatives of the local population, that is hampered by the reserved 12 seats for refugees from the erstwhile Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir.
It is interesting how these 12 seats are used to influence the general assembly and thus the government of AJK (PoK). All these 12 seats lie outside AJK (PoK). That means they are meant for the “Kashmiri refugees” who don’t stay in AJK (PoK). Among the total latest 3,804,385 electorates of AJK (PoK), 3,365,839 voters are registered in the 33 constituencies within AJK (PoK), while 438,546 are registered in the 12 constituencies in Pakistan reserved for refugee seats. That means roughly over one lakh electors for a constituency within AJK (PoK), while less than 40,000 electors for one constituency for reserved seats.
Furthermore, according to JKJAAC, the 12 seats reserved for the representation of the refugees are fraudulent and appointed based on political connections. JKJAAC said in May that “If AJK is regarded as the representative government of the entire erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, why does no representation exist for Gilgit-Baltistan and Indian-occupied Ladakh?” It, therefore, demands their complete abolition. The government, on the other hand, argues that it is not an executive call but a constitutional issue: only a constitutional legislative assembly can bring in the changes. The question is then, is it on their agenda? In other words, can they put it on their agenda? How would that impact their politics and political career?
The outgoing Prime Minister, Faisal Mumtaz Rathore, is from the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP); he became the Prime Minister after a no-confidence motion against then Prime Minister Chaudhry Anwar ul Haq from Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) removed him from the post. The PTI had won the 2021 elections as it was in power at the federal level. Efforts to undermine the PTI government in AJK (PoK) had started as soon as Imran Khan was removed as the Prime Minister in Islamabad in April 2022. On 10 April, Imran was removed, and the first no-confidence motion against the PTI Prime Minister in AJK (PoK) was introduced on 12 April. How will the next premier “elected” and what power will s/he have to debate the 12 reserved seats?
Such interference and control of Islamabad on the local politics make it unlikely that it would be willing to make any change in the existing political structure. Therefore, no progress on the agreement on the October Agreement between the JKJAAC and the Centre, particularly on the issue of 12 reserved seats, appears more due to the unwillingness of the Centre to change the political structure than due to the technical or legalities of the matter.
As the elections for the general assembly were drawing close, it was becoming clear that the existing political structure would continue, and the local government would remain under the control of Islamabad. Meanwhile, the election commissioner declared the date for the general elections in the region. The elections will be held on 27 July in one phase for all 45 constituencies. Left with no option, JKJAAC announced the protests and mobilisation towards Muzaffarabad to build pressure on Islamabad to fulfil its promise before holding fresh elections in the region.
Pakistan, however, seems in no mood to be considerate of the demands of the people. Since 2023, after the removal of Imran Khan and the Military’s dominant role in the country’s politics, the military establishment has been keen to suppress any voice that seeks political negotiation and rearrangement, whether in AJK (PoK), Balochistan or Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Political parties and human rights groups have been banned, and individuals designated as terrorists to get rid of any resistance against the centralisation of politics under the military establishment. JKJAAC has become the latest target of this policy.
The military establishment can go to any extent to strengthen the existing order in the country, even resorting to a killing spree. No wonder that the first time such massive violence was used by the Pakistani State in AJK (PoK) was to suppress the local resistance against Islamabad. As the leader of JKJAAC, Shaukat Nawaz Mir wrote on X that “The state has begun a massacre of our people in Rawalakot.” That is not entirely wrong to describe the overall siege of AJK (PoK), the overwhelming presence of the security forces and the crackdown on the JKJAAC members— hundreds of whom have been arrested and charged with anti-terrorism law. Announcing rewards for providing information about the core members of JKJAAC is a tactic to terrorise individuals and set an example for others who dare to resist and raise their voice against the state.
Pakistan is likely to continue this policy and will try to suppress the resistance that will question its policy towards AJK (PoK): the ongoing violence has politics behind it. It happened in Poonch also underlines the significance of the target area: Poonch has a long history of resistance against oppression. At the same time, it would use the local leaders of mainstream political parties in AJK (PoK) to delegitimise the genuine leaders, including JKJAAC, in an effort to channelise its policy through the local elected government. The next elections will, in all likelihood, repeat the same practice in which the Centre/military establishment brings a party to power that would align with its ideology and the practice of the Pakistani statecraft.
In conclusion, the current political crisis in AJK (PoK) underscores the profound disconnect between the local population and a toothless regional government entirely subservient to Islamabad. The state's decision to ban the JKJAAC and deploy lethal force reflects a broader, military-driven strategy to suppress any genuine local resistance or demands for political rearrangement. Through structural manipulation—such as the controversial 12 reserved refugee seats and the dominance of federal political parties—Islamabad ensures that local governance remains deeply subservient. Ultimately, the upcoming general elections are highly likely to perpetuate this cycle, cementing a puppet regime aligned with the military establishment's centralising agenda while completely ignoring the real grievances of the Kashmiri people.
Dr Nazir Ahmad Mir is a freelance commentator based in Delhi. The views are his own.
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