Date
23-10-2026
Israel’s 2026 Knesset election unfolds amid domestic polarisation, prolonged conflict and regional instability. The contest will test Benjamin Netanyahu’s political survival following the security failures of 7 October 2023, the Gaza war and escalating regional tensions. This article examines the electoral system, coalition arithmetic and key campaign issues, including military service exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men, corruption allegations and the cost of living. A younger, increasingly right-wing electorate and the contested role of Arab parties add complexity to the outcome. With neither major bloc likely to secure a majority, another political deadlock could follow, with limited prospects for a fundamental shift in Israeli policy towards the Palestinians.
Israel will hold its 26th Knesset election on 27 October 2026. [1] It is widely regarded as the most consequential vote in the country’s recent history and the first national election since the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Gaza, which have polarised Israeli voters and divided international opinion on Israel’s conduct of the war. Conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon and a war with Iran have added to the strain. Israel goes to the polls deeply divided at home and under intense scrutiny abroad, and the result could shape its political system, its policies towards Gaza and the West Bank, and its standing in the international community.
How the Israeli electoral system works
Israel’s electoral system is multiparty and proportional: voters choose party lists rather than individual candidates. The Knesset, Israel’s parliament, has 120 seats. Before each election, every party submits a list of up to 120 candidates, and seats are allocated in proportion to each party’s share of the vote. To win any seats, however, a party must clear the electoral threshold, currently 3.25 per cent of valid votes. Parties that fall short are excluded from the Knesset entirely. The threshold was raised from 2 per cent to 3.25 per cent in 2014. [2]
Because no single party typically wins an outright majority, a party or coalition must secure at least 61 seats to form a government and survive a confidence vote. Israel’s parties are divided along ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological lines, each representing a distinct group or faction. Governments are therefore almost always coalitions, and they tend to be unstable. Small parties often hold disproportionate influence, since their support can make or break a coalition.
Netanyahu’s fight for political survival
Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, has dominated Israeli politics for roughly two decades, with brief interruptions. Likud’s core ideology centres on national security and the “management” of the Palestinian question. Throughout his tenure, Netanyahu has aligned with centrist, religious and far-right parties to keep his governments afloat, often conceding to the hardline demands of his coalition partners. His current government has now completed its term, no small feat in Israel’s fragmented system, and that outcome owes much to his skill at managing a coalition with which Likud shares few ideological positions.
The government has nonetheless faced severe pressure. Even before the 7 October attack, it was embroiled in a bitter dispute over Netanyahu’s efforts to curb judicial powers, which critics saw as an attempt to shield him from corruption charges. Mass protests demanding his removal continued for months. The attack abruptly shifted the national debate from governance and corruption to security. Many Israelis blamed Netanyahu for failing to prevent one of the deadliest attacks in the country’s history, and critics say a majority called for his resignation.
The election is therefore a major test for a leader long associated with security and political control. Netanyahu’s central challenge is to retain office despite public anger over the failures of 7 October and the consequences of the wars that followed. His critics accuse him of prolonging the Gaza war and sustaining regional tensions to deflect attention from his government’s failures and his corruption proceedings. They have also interpreted his August rejection of the US-backed 15-point Gaza plan as evidence that domestic political considerations continue to shape his decisions. [3] Netanyahu and his supporters, by contrast, present his approach as necessary to protect Israel’s security and prevent its adversaries from regrouping.
The issues driving the campaign
Security dominates the campaign, including the future of Palestinians in war-ravaged Gaza and the occupied West Bank. Yet this is not a contested issue in the usual sense: the major Zionist parties are broadly united on the Palestinians’ fate, so the question shapes the tone of the campaign more than the choice between blocs.
A long-standing and more divisive issue is the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) draft, which has deepened the divide between religious and secular Israelis during the war. Ultra-Orthodox men studying in yeshivas have long enjoyed a blanket exemption from military service, but in 2024 the High Court ruled unanimously that, without a legal framework for the practice, the government must begin drafting them. Under pressure from Haredi coalition partners, the Knesset then passed a Basic Law (quasi-constitutional legislation) declaring Torah study a “foundational value” of the Jewish people and the State of Israel, thereby effectively preserving the exemption. [4]
The move attracted criticism from across the political spectrum and from IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, who warned that the arrangement was divisive and harmful to the military’s ability to sustain operations on several fronts. [5] The dispute concerns more than military manpower. It raises questions about the distribution of civic obligations, the influence of religious parties and the terms on which different communities participate in the state. For Netanyahu, the issue is particularly difficult because his parliamentary survival depends partly on the support of ultra-Orthodox parties, even as the military and many secular Israelis demand a more equitable system of service.
The corruption cases against Netanyahu and the high cost of living are also on the agenda. For Netanyahu, his and his party's survival is the priority. His coalition partners, such as Itamar Ben Gvir of the far-right Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich of the Religious Zionist Party, are more focused on expanding West Bank settlements, which is their main appeal to their voter base. Smotrich, however, is at odds with the ultra-Orthodox parties over the draft.
A younger, more right-wing electorate
Right-wing politics, including opposition to territorial compromise and scepticism about the prospects for peace, has become increasingly influential in Israel. A Channel 12 poll found that around half a million new Jewish voters are entering the electorate, potentially representing as many as 17 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. According to the survey, these younger voters are more right-wing and more religious than older voters: around 75 per cent identified as right-wing, compared with 68 per cent among older voters. [6] Arab citizens were not included in the poll.
Being right-wing, however, does not necessarily mean voting for Netanyahu. Anyone who is 18 today has known no other leader throughout their political life except Bibi. Many small right-wing parties are also contesting and could fall below the electoral threshold, waste right-wing votes and hurting a Netanyahu-led coalition largely composed of right- and far-right parties.
The blocs and the Arab parties
Coalition politics, and the emergence of new parties from splits in older ones, will likely continue to dominate Israeli politics, as they have for decades. The electoral system makes single-party government almost impossible, so small parties will again be decisive. Two main blocs currently compete: The “Netanyahu bloc”, which includes Netanyahu (Likud), the ultra-Orthodox parties (Yahadut HaTorah and Shas), Bezalel Smotrich and Moshe Feiglin (HaTzionut HaDatit / Zehut), Itamar Ben-Gvir (Otzma Yehudit) and Ofer Winter (Amcha Yisrael). And the “change bloc”, led by Gadi Eisenkot (Yashar), Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett (Beyachad), Yair Golan (HaDemokratim) and Avigdor Liberman (Yisrael Beiteinu). These alignments could shift depending on post-election offers and commitments.
A third, politically significant bloc is the Joint List, an alliance of Arab parties: Hadash (Arab-Jewish, communist), Balad (Palestinian nationalist), Ta’al (Arab nationalist) and Ra’am (Islamist). At present, only Hadash, Balad and Ta’al are members. Ra’am, also known as the United Arab List and led by Mansour Abbas, has rejected rejoining, though it has reportedly said it would accept a technical joint electoral list provided it keeps its independence.
Israel’s Central Elections Committee recently voted to disqualify the Arab parties from the election, a move that would have affected the more than 2 million Palestinian citizens of Israel, over 20 per cent of the population. Likud and Otzma Yehudit, the main proponents, argued that the parties deny Israel’s existence and character as a “Jewish and democratic state”. [7] The Supreme Court unanimously overturned the disqualification and allowed the parties to run, although Balad’s leader withdrew his candidacy after the court advised him to do so. [8] Arab parties have historically been kept out of government. The exception came in 2021, when Ra’am made the historic decision to join the Bennett-Lapid coalition that briefly unseated Netanyahu. [9]
Likely outcomes
Polls and political commentary point to a close contest in which neither of the main blocs is likely to secure a clear majority. A Channel 13 poll published in October put Netanyahu’s bloc ahead of the Zionist anti-Netanyahu bloc by 55 seats to 50, leaving both well short of the 61 seats needed to form the government. The so-called third bloc, the Joint List and Ra’am, was projected to win a combined 15 seats (nine and six, respectively), potentially giving them a pivotal role in the government formation. [10] Earlier polls had shown the two main blocs level, suggesting that even a small shift in voter preferences could affect the final result.
The possibility that Arab parties might decide the next government should be treated with caution. Israel has experienced repeated electoral deadlocks, and the political divisions that followed 7 October have made cooperation between Zionist parties and Arab parties even more contentious. Opposition leaders may be reluctant to enter such an arrangement because Netanyahu could use it to portray them as dependent on parties he and his allies accuse of undermining Israel’s national interests.
Three broad outcomes are possible: a narrow majority for a Netanyahu-led government, a slim victory for the anti-Netanyahu bloc, or another deadlock followed by prolonged negotiations and possibly a further election. The third scenario could offer Netanyahu a particular advantage. If no bloc reaches 61 seats, he could remain prime minister of a caretaker government until a new coalition is sworn in. As the incumbent, he can continue to set the security agenda and dominate the news cycle rather than campaigning from the opposition benches. It may also shield him from his ongoing corruption trials, since the longer he stays in office, the longer he avoids their conclusion. An electoral deadlock would therefore keep him in power, governing from the centre of a prolonged stalemate.
What the election means for the region and the world?
This is an unusual election because Israel is already fighting on several fronts, from Iran in the Persian Gulf to Lebanon on the Mediterranean. Military action in Gaza also continues, and deaths are reported almost daily despite the ceasefire between Palestinian armed factions and the Israeli government. The US-Israeli war with Iran has left the region exhausted, and any further escalation would deepen a humanitarian crisis already visible in the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Iran. [11] Relations with Turkey are under severe strain. Israel has repeatedly struck Syria, where Turkey backed the forces that, together with the Western-recognised Ahmad Al-Sharaa, overthrew Bashar Al-Assad’s brutal dictatorship. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and its growing military ties with Greece and Cyprus have added to the tension. [12] Even close regional partners such as the UAE, Jordan and Egypt have joined other Arab and Muslim states in condemning Israeli actions in Gaza. [13]
In this tense environment, the international community is watching the election in the hope that a change of government might moderate Israel’s military posture and create space for a reassessment of its regional policies. Netanyahu’s critics argue that he has used security crises and foreign policy to deflect domestic criticism and avoid accountability. A change of leadership could reduce the influence of the far right and allow diplomacy greater room to operate. It would not, though, guarantee a fundamental shift in Israel’s approach to its neighbours or the Palestinians.
Gadi Eisenkot, a former army chief who leads Yashar, and Naftali Bennett, whose Beyachad list is centre-right, have both made removing Netanyahu their principal political objective. [14] Neither appears likely to make a major departure from established Israeli policy towards the Palestinians. Bennett has repeatedly ruled out discussions about a Palestinian state and describes himself as a “man of the right”. [15] The situation of Palestinians in the occupied territories, and settlement expansion, are therefore expected to continue unchanged.
Settler violence could be one area in which a new government shows greater restraint. Even the US ambassador has described violent settlers as “Israeli terrorists”. [16] International pressure might encourage a different response, although such criticism has had little effect under Netanyahu. Some members of his coalition have openly defended settlers accused of violence. [17] A successor government could seek to repair Israel’s international standing and improve relations with neighbouring Sunni-majority states, but its room for manoeuvre would depend heavily on the outcome of the war with Iran and the broader regional security environment.
Conclusion
The cycle of violence that followed the 7 October attack continues to shape Israel’s politics and the wider region. Netanyahu has moved beyond his longstanding policy of “conflict management” towards a more aggressive regional posture, unsettling existing relationships and intensifying confrontation with Israel’s adversaries. [18] The election will be read as a verdict on what kind of region Israelis want and what price they are willing to pay. They may prioritise domestic concerns, including Netanyahu’s corruption cases, the cost of living and cohesion among Israel’s Jewish communities. Or they can back a state in perpetual war that critics say seeks regional hegemony, is feared by its neighbours, and is condemned by the international community.
The position of the Palestinians receives comparatively little attention in this electoral choice. Because the major Zionist parties are broadly united on their fate, the issue is unlikely to sway Israeli voters either way.
Netanyahu remains the central figure in the campaign, and the election will largely turn on whether he can retain office or whether his opponents can assemble a viable alternative. With the blocs closely matched, a decisive result appears far from certain. Another round of coalition bargaining may follow, leaving small parties to determine the balance of power and Netanyahu potentially governing as caretaker prime minister while negotiations continue. Israel could once again emerge from an election without resolving the political divisions that made it necessary in the first place.
* Dr. Afroz Khan is a Research Fellow with Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi.
[1] “Anti-Netanyahu Bloc Regains Lead but Both Camps Short of Majority 19 Days Ahead of Vote,” The Times of Israel, October 2026, Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/toi-poll-anti-netanyahu-bloc-regains-lead-but-both-camps-fall-short-19-days-ahead-of-vote/ (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[2] “The Electoral Threshold, Wasted Votes, and Proportionality,” Israel Democracy Institute, Available at: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/5225 (Accessed 20 September 2026); “Knesset Passes Governance Law,” Globes, March 2014, Available at: https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-Knesset-passes-Governance-Law-1000923416 (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[3] “Netanyahu Rejects Gaza Plan, in Fresh Break from Trump,” Dawn, 10 August 2026, Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/2021818 (Accessed 20 September 2026); Steven Scheer and Nidal al-Mughrabi, Reuters, 9 August 2026, Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2026-08-09-netanyahu-says-israel-wont-pull-out-of-gaza-before-hamas-disarms/ (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[4] “Knesset Passes Basic Law Declaring Torah Study ‘Foundational’ State Value,” JNS, July 2026, Available at: https://www.jns.org/news/israel-news/knesset-passes-basic-law-declaring-torah-study-foundational-state-value (Accessed 20 September 2026); Ariela Karmel, “Israel’s Legislature Enshrines Torah Study as a Value in Its Basic Law,” ConstitutionNet, 21 July 2026, Available at: https://constitutionnet.org/news/israels-legislature-enshrines-torah-study-value-its-basic-law (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[5] Ynetnews, July 2026, Available at: https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b13rb3mvfe (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[6] “Young Israeli Voters Are More Right-Wing, Survey Finds,” The Jewish Independent, 2026, Available at: https://thejewishindependent.com.au/young-israeli-voters-2026-election/ (Accessed 20 September 2026); Mondoweiss, February 2026, Available at: https://mondoweiss.net/2026/02/new-israeli-poll-shows-young-jewish-voters-most-right-wing-fanatically-religious-and-pro-genocide-in-israeli-history/ (Accessed 20 September 2026)
[7] “Israel Bans Arab Parties from Election: Who They Are, Why It Matters,” Al Jazeera, 26 September 2026, Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/26/israel-bans-arab-parties-from-election-who-they-are-why-it-matters (Accessed 20 September 2026)
[8] “Supreme Court Unanimously Overturns Election Panel’s Ban on Arab Parties,” The Times of Israel, 2 October 2026, Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/supreme-court-unanimously-overturns-election-panels-ban-on-arab-parties/ (Accessed 20 September 2026)
[9] “Anti-Netanyahu Bloc Regains Lead”
[10] “Netanyahu-Led Bloc Ahead of Zionist Opposition Parties with 55-50 Seats in TV Poll,” The Times of Israel, October 2026, Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-led-bloc-ahead-of-zionist-opposition-parties-with-55-50-seats-in-tv-poll/ (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[11] Netanyahu Rejects Gaza Plan, in Fresh Break from Trump, Dawn, 10 August 2026.
[12] “From Syria to Somaliland: Turkey-Israel Competition Reshapes Region,” RUSI, Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/syria-somaliland-turkey-israel-competition-reshapes-region (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[13] “Saudi Arabia, Muslim Countries Condemn Israeli Attacks on Gaza,” Arab News, 6 August 2026, Available at: https://arabnews.com/node/2653620/saudi-arabia (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[14] “Who Is Opposition Candidate Gadi Eisenkot?” The Guardian, 15 October 2026, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/15/israel-gadi-eisenkot-profile-netanyahu-election (Accessed 20 September 2026)
[15] “In His Own Words: Naftali Bennett Is Committed to Annexing the West Bank,” Haaretz, 30 June 2026, Available at: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-politics/2026-06-30/ty-article-magazine (Accessed 20 September 2026)
[16] “Huckabee Defends Calling Violent Settlers Terrorists: ‘They’re Pouring Gas on a Fire,’” The Times of Israel, 19 August 2026, Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/huckabee-defends-calling-violent-settlers-terrorists-theyre-pouring-gas-on-a-fire/ (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[17] “In Fiery Security Meeting, Ben Gvir Said to Defend Violent Settlers as ‘Sweet Kids,’” The Times of Israel, 28 June 2023, Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-fiery-security-meeting-ben-gvir-said-to-defend-violent-settlers-as-sweet-kids/ (Accessed 20 September 2026).
[18] “Netanyahu’s Policy of Conflict Management Has Failed,” Haaretz, 5 February 2016, Available at: https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2016-02-05/ty-article/netanyahus-policy-of-conflict-management-has-failed/0000017f-e0c1-d75c-a7ff-fccd61700000 (Accessed 20 September 2026)
